Korea Watch

Last Updated: April 1996
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Take heed, watch; for you do not know when the time will
come. It is like a man going on a journey, when he leaves home
and puts his servants in charge, each with his work, and
commands the doorkeeper to be on the watch. Watch therefore-
for you do not know when the master of the house will come, in
the evening, or at midnight, or at the cockcrow, or in the
morning- lest he come suddenly and find you asleep. And what I
say to you I say to all: Watch."
(Mark, chp.13; vs.33-37)

Below are articles and news updates from around the world.

MOST RECENT NEWS (2/97)

"War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is
inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to
attack. Our time will come in thirty or forty years. To win,
we shall need the element of surprise. The Western world will
need to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the
most spectacular peace movement on record. There shall be
electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The
capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to
cooperate to their own destruction. They will leap at another
chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall
smash them with our clenched fist."

(Dmitrii Z. Manuilskii)
(Lenin School of Political Warfare, Moscow, 1931)

Top of Watch

"The Rise Of The Trans-Asian Axis: Is It The Basis Of New Confrontation?"

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy September 30, 1994 (Asia; Pg.8) "The Rise Of The Trans-Asian Axis: Is It The Basis Of New Confrontation?" By Yossef Bodansky, Contributing Editor ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The clear lines of the East-West confrontation of the Cold War years were replaced, with the collapse of the USSR, by an array of small, medium and great powers. Now, some of the smaller and medium powers are gathering around the PRC in a new power bloc, emerging as the Trans-Asian Axis. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky looks at the Axis. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A new cohesive strategic global bloc is emerging amidst the fractured structure of the post-Cold War world. This bloc emerges from the consolidation of an essentially anti-US/anti-West alliance led and guided by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and stretching from North Africa to North East Asia. The Iran-led Islamic bloc is a major component of the Axis and is the main vehicle for the further spread of the alliance's influence into Africa. This new Trans-Asian Axis derives its might from the rapid collapse and ensuing radicalisation of much of the Third World. It is significant that the Axis has a growing dependence in international terrorism and subversion as instruments of statecraft. The Trans-Asian Axis stretches from North Korea (DPRK) and the PRC in the east and north-east, down into South-East Asia, including Myanmar and -- potentially -- the oil rich Spratly Islands. Its main westward arm -- the Islamic bloc along the Silk Road -- aims at integrating the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, and then continues into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (including Syrian occupied Lebanon). There is a growing Islamist influence in Turkey which could come under the Axis sway in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Islamic bloc which Iran intends to consolidate under its influence expands westwards into Africa: from the post-civil war Yemen, to Sudan (already a major hub of militant Islamism) and Somalia, as well as toward the Atlantic Ocean across North Africa. This has been demonstrated in the rapidly escalating Islamist subversion of Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, all of which face severe destabilisation from the covert violence being conducted against them. This geo-strategic surge is the outcome of several years of careful studies and deliberations in Beijing, Tehran, and, to some extent, Islamabad. Since mid-1991, the PRC High Command has anticipated an overall worsening situation in the post-Cold War world. A strategic study published in December 1991 concluded that events and emerging trends in many world regions already point to "the marked escalation of regional turmoil and conflicts". The PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) anticipates "the basic military situation of 'frequent small engagements but no major wars' will continue. However, the absence of major wars does not at all mean peace under heaven. Contrarily, the world will be even more turbulent and less peaceful." In January 1992, the High Command elaborated that Beijing was convinced that "wars and armed conflicts ─ould| continue to 'run amok' in some countries and regions, with strong discord remaining in the 'post-cold war' world." Beijing concluded that the optimal way to cope with the challenge was an all-out surge to evict the US and Western influence from the region coveted by the PRC and its allies. By now, Tehran and its allies were convinced that a major confrontation with the US was inevitable and imminent. In March 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, although apprehensive about growing challenges, the Islamists were determined to capitalise on the upheaval and rage to further their cause. Tehran and its allies were convinced that the time was uniquely ripe for the implementation of Iran's grand strategy. Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah explained that the Near East was providing incomparable circumstances and conditions for the resurrection of the Islamic Revolution on a global scale: "The Middle East is the base of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, which has expanded to reach various regional and world locations at interlinked levels of security, politics, and culture. The Middle East is a strategic region . . . Only the Middle East could unsettle the world's political centres and affect them adversely." Tehran's Institute of Strategic Studies under Hojjat-ol-Islam Mussavi-Khoi-niha was ordered to study Iran's future strategic posture and needs, as well as formulate Iran's long-term grand strategy. The results, as presented in a major conference in May 1991, still constitute the foundations of the Iranian grand strategy. In the conclusion of the conference, Mussavi-Khoiniha emphasised that the US threat would increase since Iran was emerging as "the only centre of national liberation movements in the world" committed to the cause of anti-US struggle. Iran, he said, should adopt a twin track strategy based on the interrelationship between regional hegemony made possible by undisputed Iranian military superiority and the leadership of the Third World's revolutionary (terrorist) struggle. In October 1991, in a subsequent international conference devoted to formulating a long- term strategy to confront the rise of Pax Americana, Iran's Ahmad Khomeini emphasised the fatefulness and uncompromising character of the inevitable struggle with the US: "We should realise that the world is hostile toward us only for ▊ur commitment to| Islam. After the fall of Marxism, Islam replaced it, and as long as Islam exists, US hostility exists, and as long as US hostility exists, the struggle exists." These principles determine the current strategy of Iran. It was in the context of this world view, that Tehran and its allies moved to significantly intensify their cooperation with the PRC. The Chinese strategic cooperation with both Iran and Pakistan intensified in the wake of the visit by PRC President Yang Shangkun in the Fall of 1991. In this visit, Beijing introduced this new grand strategy to its most important allies and won its commitment to close cooperation. In Islamabad, Yang discussed the expansion of defence cooperation with both Pakistan and Iran. Yang finalised the details of an "essential agreement on the signing of a joint pact" with both Pakistan and Iran aimed at countering the nuclear threats from the US and India. Pakistani and Iranian officials stressed at the time that the tripartite agreement would remain clandestine: "These three nations will not sign a treaty officially, but in the event of foreign aggression against the one of these nations, the other two will treat the aggression as aggression against itself and will rise to its defence." In Tehran, Yang dwelled on the expansion of Sino-Iranian relations in the context of the new strategic realities. Tehran explained that the legacy of the Gulf War "would certainly take the two countries' relations to a new height". A key to the new strategy is an alliance between the PRC, Pakistan and Iran: "The expansion of the three countries' cooperation and relations, while enabling those countries to reduce impressively the existing political and economic obstacles on the way of their political, economic, progress, would undoubtedly also establish a new system for the maintenance of regional security without the presence of the world powers, particularly the United States, in the form of defence and military cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, and China." Soon afterwards, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC: Pasdaran) Maj.-Gen. Mohsin Reza'i elaborated on the "strategic relationship" and objectives of the PRC-led alliance as a core for a wider Islamic bloc. He explained that "if there is unity among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, this will strengthen Muslim soliarity and enable the peoples of Soviet Central Asia and Kashmir to join in. China would also welcome such a development, but I am not sure about the Indian view, although there are a lot of people in India (ie: 150- million Muslims) who share a similar heritage with us." He urged a major mobilization of all the bloc's members in order to acquire the required military capabilities to face the US's "dangerous designs in the region, as America sees Islamic fundamentalism as a threat now after the collapse of communism." Reza'i was optimistic about the long term prospects of the Islamic bloc because, even though "unlike communism, Islamic fundamentalism has no such military might, America is still scared of it". By mid-1992, there was a clear globalisation of the strategic thinking of the leaders of the Islamic bloc. Tehran and its allies are genuinely convinced that they are already in the midst of a global confrontation with the US in which no compromise is possible. Reflecting Iran's perceptions, Syria argued in June 1992 that "World War III began with the Malta summit and has not yet ended. Civil, ethnic, and border wars are the bullets" of the war for US global hegemony. Therefore, "it is not in the US interest for the wars raging in several parts of the world ┤o| come to end because US control requires continuing tension". Thus, there is no escape from participation in the world war against the US. "In order not to lose the right and the future we have to give priority to our pan-Arab issues, prove to the world that we are a nation whose stage of division is over, and that we will not be the victim of the new world and the division caused by the Third ㏄orld| War which began with the Malta summit, and whose chapters have not ended yet," Damascus concluded. The spread and consolidation of the Beijing-led Trans-Asian Axis and, within it, the Tehran-led Islamic bloc is the Third World's main response to the World War III challenge. By early 1993, Tehran concluded that "an Iran-US clash" was likely because "Islam █s| at its most sensitive and that heightens our responsibilities more than ever". The West was bent on containing the spread of the Islamism, knowing that Iran was the bastion of the worldwide spread of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, Tehran realised, Washington had no alternative but to confront Iran and Islam in order to solve its own regional problems. "No matter how we look at it, the solution would be linked with the defeat of Iran as an important and potential regional and world power. . . . Iran is a repository of a very deep form of Islamism, which makes it an indicator of the future world order." Therefore, Tehran concluded, it was imperative that "the wave of Islamism is boosted abroad as one of the main pillars of our national security". Indeed, in an address to the IRGC, Ayatollah Khamene'i stressed that "Islam has proposed jihad against infidels and hypocrites as a solution and a defence against internal and external calamity." Meanwhile, the PRC High Command was studying the military aspects of the implementation of the strategic surge. The conclusions were presented in a June 1993 textbook of the PLA High Command called "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?". The PLA considers the US as the PRC's principal strategic adversary. Beijing concluded that "the conflict of strategic interests between China and the United States . . . is now surfacing steadily" to the point that Washington "absolutely cannot tolerate the rise of powerful adversary in East Asia". With the PRC determined to become the region's power, "the military antagonism between China and the United States" could reach the point of armed confrontation. Seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US, the PRC High Command identifies in "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", eight scenarios in which Beijing goes to war against the US in the near future to defend its vital interests. The optimal points of military clash with the US are at the extreme fringes of the Trans- Asian Axis -- Korea in the east and the Middle East in the west -- where Beijing's close allies (North Korea and Iran-Syria respectively) are willing to take on the US and its regional close allies on their own. Moreover, according to "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", the PLA considers India "the greatest potential threat" to the PRC, because the implementation of the PRC's Trans-Asian Axis strategy endangers India's vital interests and thus might very well lead to a military clash. The PLA stresses that they "see India as a potential adversary mainly because India's strategic focus remains on the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia". Therefore, it is imperative for Beijing to divert India's stretegic attention away from the Chinese strategic surge from the east, both on land and in the ocean. This strategic diversion is the role of Islamabad. Pakistan is thus instigating a major defence challenge to India from the west, ranging from subversion to a major military build-up. The aggregate effect of the Pakistani strategy should be a growing tension along the Indo-Pak border that would compel New Delhi to neglect blocking the PRC's surge until it is too late o reverse the new geo-strategic realities in Asia. Iran shares Beijing's apprehension of an impending confrontation with the US, primarily a localized military clash. In late September 1993, Reza'i defined a new strategic posture in which Iran found itself. He pointed out that the most credible threat to Iran is a US limited strike against key installations to reverse Iran's strategic posture in the region, as well as the Muslim world, without engaging Iran in a full war. "It is possible that the West may contemplate a partial military action against us in the long term." Reza'i warned Washington that "if it enters this military vortex, it will sustain irredeemable losses". Thus, as far as Tehran is concerned, even a retaliatory strike will inevitably escalate into a major war. Moreover, Reza'i warned, the routine US forces in the Near East "can be used for military purposese 糎gainst Iran| within moments". Meanwhile, Islamabad has become a critical linchpin of the Axis: the physical link between the PRC and Iran. Pakistan's role has become more active since the return to power of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto's Islamabad considers the opening of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan as the region's gateway to the Indian Ocean to be the key to the growth of Pakistan's commercial activities. Pakistani officials stressed in the late December 1993 that "the role of China in the construction of the Silk Route has made the bilateral relations as strong as the Karakoram Highway". By early 1994, Pakistan had in part already assumed a discreetly anti-US position. Islamabad's decision to intensify its involvement in the expansion and strengthening of both the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider Trans-Asian Axis alliance with the PRC and the DPRK took place immediately after Prime Minister Bhutto took office. It was during Prime Minister Bhutto's visits to Tehran, Beijing and Pyongyang in late 1993, that the emerging strategic posture of Pakistan was formulated. Starting in early January 1994, Islamabad intensified its participation in the joint anti-US radical front, both as an active member of the Iran-led Islamic bloc, and as a leading member of the PRC-led wider Trans-Asian Axis. This surge of activism was the consequence of a major study of US policy conducted by the ISI -- Inter-Services Intelligence, the principal Pakistani intelligence organisation -- and Pakistan's leading think tanks. Completed in late December 1993, the ISI's assessment, reportedly, was that a confrontation with Washington was inevitable. An ISI report stated that the US had already begun the close monitoring and targeting of nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim countries as a central part of "Washington's new anti-Islamic policy and strategy". That US policy replaced communism with Islam, and not without good reason, the ISI concluded. Consequently, by early January 1994, Islamabad had already defined a coherent world view in which Pakistan was an intended victim of a US-led effort aimed at restraining and constraining its ability to develop indigenous strategic capabilities -- primarily nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles -- so that they always remain at the mercy of the Western superpowers. The only way to reverse this trend was through a joint effort of all potential victims. "In this context the meetings of the leaders of Pakistan, China, and the DPRK have been particularly significant in that they have been resisting attempted subjugation from armed plutocratic powers. At this critical juncture Kim Il-Song's advice aimed at South-South cooperation is significant," explained senior Pakistani officials. Indeed, already in early January 1994, Islamabad began capitalising on the newly reaffirmed alliances in order to further its own policies. Islamabad started urging an activist policy against India by the Islamic bloc as an integral part of the radicals' steadfast resolve against the West. Meanwhile, Tehran was closely studying its future role and posture in the rapidly consolidated Trans-Asian Axis. As of the February 1994, Tehran began presenting itself as the centre of a global strategic axis with China. Tehran explained: "China considers Iran as a very important country in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf, which as a strategic role in maintaining peace and stability in the region." The growing cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, especially in the aftermath of Prime Minister Bhutto's visit to Tehran, was stressed in the context of the Trans-Asian Axis. Tehran and its closest allies were now so apprehensive about an impending major war with the US, that Beijing had to address their concerns. In late January 1994, official Beijing suddenly reported that Tehran "ruled out" the possibility of a US attack on Iran "before 1996". According to Iranian senior officials, "this action will not take place because the United States knows us better than other countries". Tehran believes it is aware of a US and Israeli design to strike Iran before 1996. "Our Government, our Army, and our people are ready for any kind of actions," the Iranian official stated. This Chinese report was essentially Beijing's endorsement of an Iranian warning of an impending crisis, to be blamed on the US and Israel, rather than Tehran's apprehension of an attack on Iran. Such a clash would serve Beijing's strategic interests for it would remove the US presence from a key flank of the Trans-Asian Axis. Iran began to actively urge for a Beijing-Tehran axis aimed at confronting the US and reducing its influence in the region. Toward this end, Tehran began floating in early March 1994 the idea of an all-Asian anti-US alliance centred on Iran, Pakistan, India and the PRC. The declared objective of this alliance was to counter "US hegemony over the world". The offer was a trap for India: an instrument of providing the proof that the essence of New Delhi's approach to relations with the West, mainly the US, was taking side against the Third World. Ultimately, the Iranian strategic plan is a further development and refinement of a strategic vision first raised by Iranian Surpeme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani during Prime Minister Bhutto's recent visit to Tehran. The Pakistani reaction to the Iranian offer was enthusiastic. Islamabad pointed out that the objective of the alliance proposed by Iran was "to eradicate the external influence from the region. This countries have resources which, if they were pooled, would enable them to check the interference of the great powers." However, predictably, Pakistan was apprehensive about the proposed inclusion of India the alliance. Islamabad went into great length to point out the long standing conflicts between India and China, India and Pakistan, and the oppression of Muslims in Kashmir, reminding Tehran that the origin of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's family was in Kashmir. Therefore, Islamabad concluded, India could not constitute a component of such an alliance, while Pakistan had already proven itself as a devoted and dedicated member. This is exactly what Tehran had in mind originally. By waving the Indian flag, Tehran got Islamabad to fully and wholly commit itself to participation in the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider anti-US Trans-Asian Axis. Indeed, Pakistan suggested a new Trans-Asian alliance comprised of an Islamic bloc and an East Asian bloc. Islamabad stressed that "if here can be a new alliance or bloc, then it should include Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, the Islamic countries of Central Asia, and Turkey. That will be a natural alliance... The Muslim countries, having common religious, historical, cultural and economic values and interests, should join a single platform and form a regional bloc. If China can be included in the present alliance, then there is no reason why US hegemony in the world could not be resisted." In this context, Pakistan should be he linking party between the PRC and the Muslim World in view of the unique and special relationship between Islamabad and Beijing. "The history of cooperation and friendship between Pakistan and China is enviable. The PRC has now offered to cooperate liberally with Pakistan to meet its weaponry needs. Pakistani tanks and missiles are also being manufactured in China. China did not even care for the US pressure in this regard. No-one will object to China's inclusion in the alliance of Muslim countries as China has not been seen to carry out aggression against any neighbouring country, nor has it claimed the territory of its neighbours." Tehran differs only in that its sees the development of this alliance with Iran assuming the leading coordinating role vis-a-vis the PRC, although with Pakistan playing an important role as well. Tehran explains that "the PRC sees it in the perspective if Iran and Pakistan, but Iran is more important". The key to the unique position of Iran in this alliance is the strategic maturity of Tehran. "Tehran's vantage point is totally different from that of Beijing and is extremely strategic. In view of the international military structure, the perception that the PRC is a durable regional and international politico-economic force is gaining ground among Iranian leaders." The Iranian leadership is committed to the long-range strategic alliance and special relations with the PRC because "Beijing is a relatively independent force on the international political and economic scene and its model of national expansion has drawn the attention of many Third World countries". Moreover, Tehran also sees the PRC as the key to future weapons technologies. "The Chinese have made immense advances in manufacturing of defensive weapons; and the not so complex technology of Chinese weapons (of course as compared to Western weapons) is capable of being absorbed into Iran's defence system." However, Iran also recognises that much of the transfer of the Chinese military production technologies, primarily in such sensitive areas as nuclear weapons, would be conducted via Pakistan, the long-term special ally of the PRC. Thus, Tehran concluded in the early Spring of 1994, the consolidation of an even stronger Trans-Asian Axis is the key to any strategic development capable of restraining the West, especially the US, and stabilising Iran's own place as the leader of the Muslim World. The key to the profound reinforcement of the Axis must be the inclusion of the newly independent Muslim states of Central Asia: the natural corridor between China and Persia along the historical Silk Road. Beijing shares Tehran's vision fully. Just how crucial the new Silk Road is to the PRC and its allies, primarily Iran and Pakistan, was recently clarified. In mid-April 1994, Premier Li Peng led the largest and most important Chinese delegation to have visited Central Asia on a 12 day tour in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgistan, and Kazakhstan. The primary objective of this trip was to revive China's traditional political economic hegemony in the region: the historical posture of China before the Russians started the slide into Muslim Central Asia in the 18th Century. "Now we want to build a new Silk Road to make our relations even more glorious," Li Peng said following a meeting with Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov. A major development in the formulation of the Trans-Asian Axis took place on August 29-31, 1994. Iranian First Vice-President Hassan Habibi led a delegation of 26 senior officials, including the entire elite of Iran's economic and industrial establishment, on a major visit to Beijing. Both Tehran and Beijing stressed that the visit was "at the official invitation of the Chinese Premier". Li Peng is perhaps the leading force behind the expansion of the Trans-Asian Axis as a cornerstone of the PRC's global strategy. Beijing quoted Habibi's expectations that his "visit to China will produce great impact upon further development of the ties between the two countries". In their statements at the beginning of the Sino- Iranian negotiations, both Li Peng and Habibi stressed historical themes. Li Peng stated that "Iran is a country with an ancient history and civilization which enjoys a special role in the region and across Asia." In his response, Habibi took the theme a step further: "For us, friendship with the people of China and cooperation with its Government is a fundamental strategic issue. We believe that, under present international conditions, Asia's civilised countries which enjoy a long history should increasingly cooperate with one another." While Habibi was still in Beijing, Tehran presented Habibi's vision of the future of Asia, specifically stating that these subjects were being clarified with Beijing at the moment: "The distinctive nature of the contemporary world, which is in a transitional period, demands that the power in the Asian region should forge closer constructive ties -- in short, strategic cooperation to guarantee their survival in the world of the 21st Century in all political, economic, and cultural fields. The experience of the Persian Gulf War clearly proved that, in view of US military power, giving all kinds of green lights to Washington or ignoring international developments results not only in attacks on one country or another, but can also prove catastrophic for the very existence of the Third World." "With the forging of new political alliances on the international level and the changes in international balances, strategic unions are vital and mandatory for all Asian countries that do not want to be in the orbits of US, European, or even Japanese pole, or be relegated to being marginal 'appendages'." "In fact, the era the United States envisions, where it will be the only power centre in the world, has not yet taken shape. Close and consistent cooperation among the bigger independent countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the PRC, Kazakhstan, and even Pakistan can be viewed in this context. High technology, unique manpower, limitless energy resources, and the enviable economic growth of these countries can all be molded into a firm and reliable 'fourth pole' in Asia with the advent of the 21st Century. Time is passing by swiftly; this opportunity should not be lost." Ultimately, the PRC remains the key to the long-term viability and success of the Trans-Asian Axis. The significance in the surge for, and the establishment of, the Trans-Asian Axis lies in that it is the main strategic policy of the younger generation of Chinese leaders. These leaders -- both civilians and military -- come from the next generation of leaders who will soon climb to supreme power in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. The leaders of the post-Deng generation are a sharp deviation from their elders. The very smooth and direct handover of power from one generation of leaders to the other should not mislead as to the extent of the profound difference between these two generations. Whereas the elder leaders were preoccuppied with the survival of the Chinese Revolution in a hostile world surrounding it, the younger leaders grew up in a communist China, and now come to power assertive and self- confident about a very strong China. They are preoccuppied with finding for their China the appropriate place at the top of world affairs. These younger Chinese leaders have a vision of a strong China reasserting itself as a world leader and a first-rank superpower. Their vision of the PRC is a combination of the 5,000-year legacy of China and a perceived role for Beijing as the natural leader for the up-and-coming Developing World. Beijing's rising leaders are fully cognisant that the pursuit of such national policy will place Beijing on a collision course with the West, particularly the US. The escalation of such a confrontation might even result in the removal of Western technology and economic investments from the PRC, as well as the closing down of China's export markets. They are convinced that the rise of China into global prominence is worthy of such a price. Moreover, the long-term forecasting in Beijing anticipates the marked decline of the importance of economic relations with the West to the PRC's economic and technological development. Beijing is convinced that the flow of technology and investments from Japan, the ROC (Taiwan), South Korea, and the rest of the East Asian states now recognising China's hegemony, will more than suffice to replace whatever the West will have taken away. With the entire scope of economic activities of the Far East "dragons" conducted under the clear regional hegemony of the PRC, Beijing will be in a position to dictate comfortable and preferable conditions for the regional economic cooperation. These younger leaders are far more open to economic "liberalism" (permission to get rich), including limited free market economy, than their predecessors. The conducive conditions for economic development and cooperation they intend to establish are bound to attract foreign investments regardless of the PRC's strategic posture and hegemonic designs. Beijing is also encouraged by the gradual revival of Tokyo's quest for sphere of influence -- this time based almost solely on economic might and dominance --because it is inherently anti-American simply because the US is Tokyo's main competition. In building this economic sphere of influence, Tokyo builds much of its strength on stressing common East Asian identity. Beijing is convinced that it will be able to convince, perhaps coerce, Tokyo into placing its economic sphere of influence within the framework of the Chinese strategic hegemonic umbrella. Tokyo's muted criticism of the PRC's military, primarily naval, build-up, as well as Beijing's heavy-handed handling of its claim for the Spratly Islands, reflect, as far as Beijing is concerned, initial signs of Japan's acceptance of the new role of the PRC. Tokyo's pleading with Beijing to restrain Pyongyang's nuclear reach, which is specifically aimed at Tokyo, provides Beijing with additional leverage over Tokyo. A critical question yet to be resolved is the role of Russia. Moscow has always considered "the Orient" as its primary zone of hegemony, and the drive South as its manifest destiny. Russia is working hard on the reintegration of the former Soviet Union, including Central Asia, while anticipating friction (at the very least) with the West. Moscow has no problems with the rise of China, as the myriad of recent and currently military deals demonstrate, as long as it does not interfere with the revival of Russia as a global superpower. The major question is the Islamists' reaction to the revival of Russian (neo-Soviet) hegemony in Central and South Asia. Moscow is convinced it can establish a strategic condominium with Beijing. Beijing is not hostile to such an eventually, especially once the Russophiles assume power in Moscow. In that case, Tehran and the Islamic bloc will have to cope with the new reality along the Trans-Asian Axis. Thus, a major geo-strategic development has been taking place in Asia since late 1993: a Chinese drive to consolidate an anti-US Trans- Asian Axis along the route of the historic Silk Road which connects the heartland of Islam with China and East Asia. This Trans-Asian Axis is already of major political, strategic and economic importance. Considering the Islamic character of the states of Central and South Asia, the PRC pursues this geo-strategic surge in close collaboration with the Iran-led Islamic bloc of which these states are members. The new alliance built around the Trans-Asian Axis is already a centre for military development and production (including nuclear weapons technologies), as well as financial centre for hard currency obtained through drug trade, counterfeiting US dollars, the acquisition of sophisticated Western technologies and industrial systems (both legally and illegally), as well as nuclear materials and sophisticated weapon systems from the former Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that most of the economic activities related to the Trans-Asian Axis are illegal -- when judged by international norms -- and so huge that they already have had a dramatic impact on the structure and functioning of organised crime all over the world. The Trans-Asian Axis already constitutes a clear military and strategic challenge to the US, a threat which will only increase in the immediate future. In 1992, key members of this alliance -- North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- actively prepared to launch a coordinated war against the US and its close allies in order to reverse the growing Western influence in the world. Beijing apparently gave its blessing and provided extensive military assistance. The plan was averted at the last minute because of internal problems in Pyongyang. Presently, the availability of operational nuclear weapons and regional delivery systems in the hands of the most radical elements of the Axis -- Iran and North Korea -- significantly increases their readiness to embark on a major confrontation with the US. The Trans-Asian Axis may soon, if the present pace of preparations and coordination continues, transform into the primary strategic challenge facing the West. The near-future evolution of the Trans- Asian Axis will have a direct impact on the global posture of such countries as Russia and Japan, as well as on the present form of existence of such countries as Israel, India, and South Korea.

Top of Watch

"AN UPDATE ON THE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA."

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy April 30, 1995 "AN UPDATE ON THE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA." (Pg. 10) "North Korea Continues, With Bellicosity, What Appear To Be Preparations For an Imminent War." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Kim Jong-II now has unfettered control over Noah Korea's military forces. He and his Troika of military advisers seem, with the collapse in April of the US-led coalition to contain North Korean nuclear ambitions, to be nowpushing for an excuse to begin armed conflict against South Korea. In the meantime, Pyongyang has successfully split the US away from other states in the diplomatic process. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky analyses the current events and players. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- THE UNITED STATES and the Republic of Korea) the ROK: South Korea) on April 8, 1995, took major confidence-building measures in order to pacify the North Korean (DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Government in Pyongyang. Despite the harsh position of the DPRK in previous negotiations, Washington agreed to resume contacts on April 12. In order to reassure the DPRK of the safety of the South Korean nuclear reactor technology promised by the US to the DPRK, Seoul announced that the ROK was willing to admit North Korean experts to its nuclear power reactor, a standard-model light-water reactors at the nuclear power plant city, Ulchin. Instead, the DPRK embarked on a series of moves which strongly suggest that Pyongyang was more interested in the escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, than its resolution. By the end of April, US-DPRK negotiations were virtually collapsed, but already on April 8, in response to the South Korean offer, Pyongyang formally declared: "South Korea will never be allowed to play a 'pivotal role' in the provision of the lightwater reactors and the scheme to provide South Korean-model light-water reactors will eventually go bankrupt." Pyongyang stressed that the reactor issue was a profound political and strategic issue aimed at consolidating US- DPRK relations. "The DPRK has never invited South Korea to take part in the delivery of the light-water reactors nor expected it to play a 'role,'" Pyongyang asserted. "The South Korean puppets have no justification nor qualification to poke their nose into the DPRK-US negotiations." Moreover, in order to increase pressure, Pyongyang formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, a United Nations agency) that it "was preparing to refuel a five- megawatt reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex." IAEA Director-General Hans Blix acknowledged that the DPRK had the right to do so considering that the implementation of the October 1994 agreement was off schedule. This political rhetoric and brinkmanship would have been just that, had Kim Jong-II not led the DPRK through profound military reforms which significantly enhance his ability to instigate crisis and even war. Even as he is avoiding the formal assumption of the leadership titles, Kim Jong-II is rapidly implementing drastic reforms in the DPRK. Most important is the recent completion of the streamlining and modernisation of the High Command of the KPA (Korean People's Army) at the national-strategic level. As presently organised, the KPA High Command is better organised to go into action on the basis of the whims of Kim Jong-Il, with special emphasis put on special operations, covert actions, and international terrorism. Although these reforms have been gradually evolving since mid-1993, in the aftermath of the "Semi-War State'; it took a dramatic event to bring about their completion. On February 25, 1995, O Chin-U -- the last of the genuinely powerful leaders of Kim Il-Song's generation -- died after a long struggle with cancer. Marshal O Chin-U was much more than Minister of Defence as well as senior member in a host of key defence and political bodies: he was the only man Kim Il-Song truly and wholly trusted since the early 1980s. Indeed, O Chin-U was trusted and revered by Kim Jong-II, who considered him as a father-like figure, an extremely important relationship in a society that places special emphasis on old age and wisdom. Indeed, on February 24, when it was dear that O Chin-U had only a few hours left, Kim Jong-Il paid him a farewell visit at his bedside. This visit was more than a clear expression of the unique place of O Chin-U in Pyongyang. Kim Jongo Il spent several hours with the dying O Chin-U. Reportedly, he emerged from the hospital with expressions of deep sadness on his face, and visible signs of crying. Significantly, it was not only O Chin-U who remained in power even as he was dying from cancer, but with him remained the entire institutions from which he was deriving political power. Thus, with the death of Marshal O Chin-U -- "the most faithful revolutionary warrior of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-Song" (according to the obituary) -- the last impediment for the transformation of the KPA into Kim Jong-Il's military was removed. It is obvious that preparations for this day had long been in the works, for within a couple of weeks a new streamlined High Command -- befitting Kim Jong-II's personality -- emerged with manyyotmger generals in prominent positions. THE SIGNIFICANCE and potential ramifications of the new military reforms in Pyongyang must be assessed in the context of the personality and government style of Kim Jong-Il. Taking into considerations the peculiarities of his personality, the reason for these reforms becomes clear. The Kim Jong-Il in power in Pyongyang is an individual who has been groomed and prepared to assume power for several decades, but whose personality has been altered since suffering brain damage in 1993. Kim Jong-Il suffered some brain damage in September 1993 in a traffic accident, when he crashed his car while speeding and probably drunk. According to Chinese military medical experts, including senior brain surgeons, Kim Jong-Il even suffered damage to the skull bones in this car crash. These injuries came on top of a severe head injury which Kim Jong-Il suffered around June 1993 as a result of falling off a horse. Western medical experts suggest that such a succession of blows to the brain may result in dropping of brain cells, early atrophy, or even some shrinking of the brain. Such a condition leads to mood swings in the affected individual. A very unstable individual will display a greater tendency to lose his temper. With time, the impairment may grow further, but the individual will not notice the change. This danger is more acute especially if the affected individual is surrounded by sycophants. Thus, the individual in question can act irrationally, primarily if there is no external restraint on him. Most important, individuals so affected tend to lose sense of continuity. They tend to concentrate on immediate actions in order to deliver immediate gratification. They gradually lose any sense of consequence or anticipation of results of one's actions. These injuries are not known to have afected the overall routine performance of Kim Jong-Il as either a leader in the waiting, let alone as the de facto supreme leader. Indeed, since the early 1990s, Kim Jong-I1 has been maintaining his usual daily schedule. He is working until very late at night, usually the pre-dawn hours, and then sleeps late. During the day he makes frequent breaks in the work schedule in order to receive "special treatment and enjoyment" from a "pleasure-giving team" under dose and specific medical supervision. He also continues to watch foreign movies spedally imported from the West for himself and dose colleagues. Most important are the many late night sessions in which Kim Jong- Il and a few of his most trusted loyalists debate key issues while enjoying the company of pretty women. Well-informed Japanese sources believe that the question of initiating a war with South Korea has been raised in these sessions during 1993-94. The discussion between Kim Jong-II and his confidantes reached the point of contemplating specific scenarios for provoking a major milltan/dash with the South all the way to launching a surprise attack and a major regional war. Moreover, since he asstuned responsibilities for defence and foreign affairs in the early 1990s, Kim Jong-Il has developed a unique "reception-centre political style" -- similar to an informal kitchen cabinet -- made up of a few loyalists and confidantes whom he trusts most. It is noteworthy that these include mainly technocrats, experts, military people, scientists, and other professionals whose expertise can support state affairs. Kim Jong-Il dearly values their expertise and knowledge. Their late night discussion sessions are reportedly conducted in a relatively relaxed environment which promotes the free exchange of opinions. Ultimatdy, Kim Jong-Il is being portrayed as being far less troubled by formalities ┤han his father|, a more open personality, who is preoccupied with substance. He does have political ability and was properly groomed for decision'makings and crisis management. However, at the same time, these loyalists continue to display flattery in their relations with Kim Jong-Il. In view of Kim Jong- Il's mental condition, and the sensitivity to lack of external restraint, the question remains how free, how objective, and how effective these sessions are. Furthermore, there remains the question of Kim Jong-Il's own decisionmaking capabilities, and especially the possibility of a growing tendency to take bold gambles for immediate effect, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and war. IN MARCH 1995, the DPRK's Ministry of the Armed Forces was formally downgraded from an organisation of the National Defenc Commission, chaired by Kim Jong-Il, to an agency of the State Administration Council. For as long as Kim Jong-Il-Song was alive but Kim Jong-Il was actually in power, the Defence Ministry was listed under the National Defence Commission chaired by Kim Jong-Il who was answering directly to Kim II-Song. Now that Kim Jong-Il is in firm control of the party, military and Government, there is no longer any need for the DPRK to have such an extraordinary committee manned by the older guard, mainly O Chin-U's people. Thus, in March, Pyongyang reshaped the military bureaucracy to fit Kim Jong-Il's cementing his grip on the vitally important armed forces. What is very important is the technical change in the military structure, which does not mean a change in the importance or role of the military. It amounts to Kirn Jong-Il's assuming unchallengeable control over the KPA. This is a reflection of his growing confidence in the running of the country. Indeed, the new High Command is a small group of senior officers, all of them younger, answering directly to Kim Jong-Il as a kind of a Soviet Stavka, a wartime high command that cuts through all institutional constraints. Consequently, the military assumes responsibility to additional segments and aspects of the nation's economy and other functions. Indeed, there has been an increase in the prestige and centrality of the KPA elite, as demonstrated in the recent KPA conferences. Moreover, there is a streamlining in the military chain of command, enabling Kim Jong-Il to get results quickly. ESSENTIALLY, since Kim Jong-Il was largely dominating the personnel system of the military since 1973 via the "three revolution teams", his loyalists have already grown inside the system. Therefore, there has been a smooth transition from one generation of senior officers to the other. Since Kim Jong-Il has controlled the military for a long time, there will not be drastic changes in doctrine or basic military concepts. The only major development since the death of O Chin-U is the clear expression of loyalty to Kim Jong-Il and the younger generation of the High Command. Ultimately, Kim Jong-Il relies on technocrats who are personally loyal to him, and whom he knows and trusts professionally and politically. Of the 1,200 generaIs in the KPA, ouly 60 really have power. All of them are very dose to and personally loyal to Kim Jong- Il. Most, but not all, of them are younger. At the very top of the military and intelligence/special operations establishment there is the "Troika" of the people most loyal to, and trusted by, Kim Jong-II: Generals O Kuk-Yol, Kim Tu-Nam, and Kim Kang-Hwan. Marshal Choe Kwang is also trusted fully, but not like the "Troika". * General O Kuk-Yol (64) is the military confidant and right hand man of Kim Jong-Il. A highly educated former Chief of the General Staff, he is considered a leading expert in modern warfare and nuclear weapons. In mid-1993, O Kuk-Yol emerged as one of DPRK's most senior intelligence functionaries -- the Director of the Operations Department -- a most important intelligence arm. Under O Kuk-Yol, the North Korean intelligence system has undergone major changes which significantly increased its capabilities to operate in and against South Korea, conducting a host of activities ranging from data collection to widespread special operations and covert warfare. * General Kim Tu-Nam (67) is "the military professor" of Kim Jong- Il, his special military tutor who prepared him for leadership and the High Command. Kim Tu-Nam developed a "special relationship" with his student. Subsequently Kim Tu-Nam carried out special projects on the behest of Kim Jong-Il. Most recently, Kim Tu-Nam was responsible for the modernisation of the irregular forces and the light infantry (special forces). * Col.-Gen. Kim Kang-Hwan (63) is an aide and confidante of Kim Tu-Nam who worked with him when he was Kim Jong-Il's tutor. As deputy chief of the general staff, Kim Kang-Hwan took over many tasks from Kim Tu-Nam, especially the development of strategy and operational plans including the use of the intelligence and special forces in a host of possible contingencies ranging from covert actions to a major war. The overall character of the "Troika" of Kim Jong-II -- his closest confidants and senior commanders -- is that they really believe in the practice of special operations, international terrorism, covert operations, and other forms of "dirty war". * The KPA Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Choe Kwang (77), is a rising political-military force in the DPRK. In 1988, Choe Kwang, a Kim Il-Song devotee, was suddenly promoted and nominated Chief of the General Staff. While in office, Choe Kwang proved himself as "a key supporter of Kim Jong-Il" all the way to the reorganisation of the DPRK's national military elite. Choe Kwang is known as "a believer in weapons" and "an expert on modern warfare". He is often described as "a man absolutely fixated on weapons and as such is a specialist with a keen understanding of modern warfare". Choe Kwang was the motivating force behind the DPRK's acquisition and production of new weapons. Kim Jong-Il respects Choe Kwang not just because of his devotion and loyalty, but because of his close relations with Kim Il-Song and O Chin-U. This special reverence was demonstrated during the funeral of O Chin-U. Although Kim Jong-Il was present in the funeral, Marshal Choe Kwang delivered the main eulogy speech. On the basis of his performance in O Chin-U's funeral and the KPA conferences of mid- March, Choe Kwang emerges as the likely successor to O Chin-U as the Minister of Defence. The other key defence officials around Kim Jong-II -- those taking part in his "reception-centre political style" as needed -- are: * Vice Marshal Kim Kwang-Chin (68) enjoys "the highest confidence of Kim Jong-Il". He is an artillery and rocket expert, distinguished in cooperation with the PRC on the development of the supergun and with the USSR on the development of the heavy MRBM with CBW warheads. The initial deployment of both projects was completed successfully in the Autumn of 1994. * Kim Chol-Su (50 or 51) is an intelhgence/special forces/terrorism senior official. Officially he belongs to the General Security Bureau -- Kim Jong-II's body guards -- but that force also carries out highly sensitive covert operations on Kim Jong-Il's behalf. His sudden and meteoric rise, as with the elevation of O Kuk-Yol in the intelligence and special forces, is an expression of Kirn Jong-Il's penchant for the "dirty war". Irrespective of the precise definition of his position, he holds a very important and sensitive position in the military/security forces. Kim Chol-Su is reported to be the eldest son of Kim Yong-Chu, Kim Il-Song's brother and presently a vice president of the DPRK. * General Yi Pong-Won (70) is a military ideological expert, and a candidate for director of General Political Bureau. * General Cho Myong-Nok (65) is the commander of the Air Force and an expert on modern warfare. He is also instrumental in the strategic cooperation with Iran, as well as the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. * General Kim Il-Chol (67) is the commander of the Navy and expert on submarines and cruise missiles. He started his distinguished career as the commander of the seizure of the USS Pueblo. * Chon Pyong-Ho (69) is not a military man but an expert in national economy, mobilisation and production. The force behind the DPRK's war economy, he is responsible for the marked expansion of the munitions and military industries. * General Yi Ha-Il (65) is the director of the Party's Military Department and enjoys the confidence of Kim Jong-Il, as well as that of the younger military leaders. He was instrumental in establishing the Kim Jong-Il personality cult system in the military. A former commander of a Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Brigade, he was promoted by Kim Jong-Il by several ranks. * General Chang Song-U (67) is the director of Political Department of the Ministry of Public Security. He is Kim Jong-Il's loyalist and confidante in the ranks of the internal security apparatus. He also rose in the ranks of the intelligence and special forces. * Kim Ha-Kyu (50s) is akind of military aide to Kim Jong-Il who was noted escorting him during visits to military units. Other rising stars who are yet to enjoy the same trust the senior officers above do include: O Yong-Bang, Kim Pong-Yul, Kim Myong-Kuk, Pak Chae-Kyong, Kim Chong-Kak, Yong Ho-Kyun, Yi Ul-Sol, and Kim Ha- Kyu. The only public appearance of the DPRK High Command was at the KPA conference in mid-March. There, the key senior officers on the rostrum were Marshal Choe Kwang, Vice Marshals Kim Kwang-Chin and Kim Pong-Yul, Generals Yi Ha-Il, Cho Myong-Nok, Kim Il-Chol, Pak Ki-So, Yi Pong-Won, Kim Myong-Kuk, and Col.-Gen. Pak Chae-Kyong. These senior officers are believed to be "the rising stars" of the KPA and confidants of Kim Jong-Il. They seem to have operational control, for they escorted Kim Jong-Il on some of his l0 visits to frontline units in early 1995. THE DPRK LEAVES no doubt that it has resumed the active preparations for war. Since last Winter, the DPRK has been conducting the largest and most vigorous military exercises in recent years. These exercises are purely offensive, and demonstrated impressive capabilities to conduct swift deep offensive (blitzkrieg). These exercises began in December 1994 and were peaking toward March 1995 as the weather was improving. In mid-March, the exercises not only accelerated, but assumed a distinct Kim Jong-Il character. The KPA Air Force embarked on a major war exercise, the largest since 1991. It was purely offensive in character. Most important were deep air strikes by fighter bombers, low-altitude night deep penetration by light aircraft (mainly An-2s delivering special forces), day and night mass para-drops and desant landings, as well as diversified deep bombing and aerial strikes missions. The aerial operations coincided with the wrapping up of a series of intense and rigorous special forces and naval exercises. At the same time, there was a sudden expansion and escalation of the brigade-level combined arms exercises, mainly combined arms deep offensive in terrain similar to South Korea. It is ironic, but these exercises were largely made possible by the US delivery of oil in accordance with the October 1994 Geneva Agreement. Consequently, the DPRK could release large quantities of oil from its strategic military reserves to these exercises. Indeed, there is yet to be a discernible improvement in the availability of electricity to the North Korean civilian population for whom this US- supplied oil is intended. Meanwhile, in recent months there has been an overall marked and discernible improvement in the non-nuclear capabilities of the DPRK Armed Forces. Among the main developments are the activation of a dozen or so ballistic missile bases, the deployment of over 20 "superguns" and some 40 heavy multiple-barrel rocket sites. Most of these long range artillery systems are aimed at the Seoul area. Moreover, in late March, the DPRK fired several up-graded anti-ship cruise missiles -- a Silkworm follow-up with a range of around 85km -- into the Sea of Japan. Japanese officials suggested that these missiles "were fired as part of a routine practice", even though the DPRK had not carried out missile launches of such magnitude since mid- 1993. BY MID-MARCH, the KPA High Command began implementing Kim Jong-II's reforms and guidelines. On March 13, 1995, the KPA High Command had a milestone conference. Officially, the meeting was in commemoration of the 20th anniversary and the fifth anniversary of training programmes introduced by Kim Jong-Il. In reality, it was a milestone conference aimed at briefing the North Korean general rank officers on organising and consolidating Kim Jong-Il's High Command, and the activation of a new streamlined military system under his tight control. The conference was chaired by Marshal Choe Kwang and Generals Kim Pong-Yul and Kim Kwang-Chin. The opening speech was by Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, one of the fast- rising younger generals. He stressed that "the People's Army should repeatedly train itself and strengthen its combat ability in every way, so as to fulfil its sublime revolutionary mission for the times, the revolution, the fatherland, and the people." Col.-Gen. Kim Chung- Kak anticipates troubles and crises for the DPRK in the immediate future due to external threats, but expresses confidence in the ability of the KPA to successfully resolve all challenges. "Although our revolutionary situation has been complicated in the past few days, our People's Army has crushed every one of the provocative moves of the US imperialists and the South Korean military fascist clique, and credibly defended the security of the socialist motherland and the happiness of the people." Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, and other speakers, stressed that the DPRK was once again on the verge of a major crisis in which the KPA might be called upon to save the motherland: that is, to fight the enemies of the DPRK. On March 15, the conference was expanded into a mass gathering of "company commanders and company political officers": that is, the prime of the KPA tactical command echelons. It was a huge crowd. The opening session of the conference was attended by Kim Jong-Il, expressing the importance of the event. Satting at the rostrum with him were Choe Kwang, Kim Kwang-Chin, Kim Pong-Yul, and Yi Ha-Il. The opening statement was delivered by General Yi Pong-Won. He stressed the growing challenges facing the DPRK, and military loyalty to Kim Jong-Il as the source of salvation. The main address was delivered by Choe Kwang. It was a professional presentation, with Choe Kwang specifically stressing the military challenges facing the DPRK, and the urgent need to train strenuously to deal with impending challenges. Choe Kwang told the tactical commanders to prepare their troops to "live and fight in the revolutionary spirit of unconditionally fulfilling the orders of the supreme commander to the letter and complete the combat preparations of the companies to emerge ever victorious in the fight with the enemy". Kim Kwang-Chin also delivered a professional report to the conference. He stressed the modernisation of the KPA companies, the increase in military might, and the growing importance of combined arms and high maneuvrability offensive operations at the tactical level. He also delved on the ability of the tactical units to defend their own bunkers and other fortified installations against overwhelming forces. There was an important sign in his speech. He emphasised that troops should be prepared to carry out missions at any price. He called on the commanders and political officers to embark on an indoctrination campaign in order to prepare their troops to sustain heavy losses and hardships. This kind of indoctrination is usually delivered at the last minute in order to prepare the soldiers for the challenges ahead, but simultaneously so as to prevent soldiers (young men) from delving on the prospects of imminent death for too long, a phenomena known to be drastically decreasing the troops' morale and combat capabilities. Therefore, Kim Kwang-Chin's preoccupation with the subject dearly reflects Pyongyang's belief that a major crisis is imminent. INDEED, THERE HAS been a corresponding change in the political education of both the KPA and the North Korean population as a whole. Since early March, there has been a rapid resumption of the anti-US propaganda in the DPRK, again biting the drums of war. On March 1, Pyongyang announced that the intensified US aerial intelligence gathering activities from South Korea were a sure sign that "the US imperialists are watching for a chance to invade the North", despite Pyongyang's "forthcoming policies". On March 10, Pyongyang attacked the US strategy in East Ash as the spark for a major conflagration. An "expert analysis" by a senior official concluded that the US was determined to go to war. The US Asia-Pacific strategy for the 21 st Century leaves no doubt that "the US ambition to stifle the DPRK with strength and dominate the world remains unchanged" despite political dynamics in the region. The US decision to keep forces in South Korea even after North Korea completely abandoned its military nuclear programme was proof that the US had no intention of complying with the October 1994 agreement. The senior official stated Pyongyang's conclusion: "The "security strategy" is aimed at permanently occupying South Korea and invading the DPRK. It is also a strategy for a military aggression to realise the US dominationist purpose." Pyongyang then introduced its own alternative to the new Korean War. In mid-March, the DPRK revived its call for "reunification through confederation" as the key for the immediate reunification of Korea. Pyongyang cited at great length the specific writings of Kim Il-Song on the subject, thus giving the proposal the highest possible authority and importance. The new element added in the March 1995 proposal was Pyongyang's assertion that the people of South Korea were yearning for such a unification, but only the US was pressuring Seoul by force of arms not to continue on the path to reunification. By late March, Pyongyang further developed the theme of an impending crisis, and possibly a new Korean War, despite the stern efforts by the DPRK to make peace. On March 24, Pyongyang formally warned that Washington's Korean policy was leading toward war. An expert analysis by a senior official warned that "The reckless military moves of the United States still leave the Korean peninsula in a state of military confrontation and bring tension to a higher pitch. The US outcries about 'threat' from the DPRK is nothing but a pretext used to justify its war moves." The analyst warned that conditions on the Peninsula were ripe for an eruption. "The DPRK and the United States are still in a belligerent state," he explained. Therefore, he warned, "the war gamble of the United States may develop into a war any moment". The senior official concluded with a threat. "The United States should ponder over the ensuing grave consequences of the reckless military adventure and quit acting rashly." MEANWHILE, Pyongyang embarked on another course to improve its overall strategic posture in the brewing crisis. Pyongyang decided to remove Japan from the US-led coalition against it. In mid-March, Pyongyang formally added Japan to the list of potential military threats. Pyongyang explained that Japan changed its ostensibly defensive national doctrine to that of "pre-emptive attack" with emphasis on "long-distance attack capacity" of the air force, navy, and other quality arms. Pyongyang has no doubt who is the sole objective of this military modernisation. "The Japanese reactionaries now direct the sharp edge of overseas aggression to the Korean peninsula. They dream of invading Korea and, with it as the springboard, staging a comeback to Asia. This is, however, a foolish dream. Asia today is not what it was yesterday." Pyongyang concluded with a warning to Tokyo that the DPRK would not be able to sit idle as the regional balance of forces is changing so adversely. Significantly, this virtual ultimatum came just as Tokyo was actually considering the resumption of talks on normalisation of relations with the DPRK. The Japanese Government was reluctant to pursue the talks while facing intense pressure from Washington to join and increase the sanctions and pressure on the DPRK in connection with the stalemated nuclear deal of October 1994. And then, on the morning of March 20, still unknown terrorists distributed Sarin nerve agents in the Tokyo subway. Irrespective of whom the actual perpetrators were, the Japanese Government suddenly remembered the DPRK. Within days, a Japanese delegation headed by former Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe arrived in Pyongyang. The Il-member group included lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its partners in the coalition, the Socialists and the Sakigake Party. Officially, their mission was "to resume talks aimed at normalising relations" between their parties and the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). There was no effort to hide their true objective. "Now is a good time for the two governments to resume negotiations aimed at normalising relations," Watanabe told Kim Yong-sun, WPK Secretary. Official Tokyo left no doubt that the Japanese Government knew exactly what it was doing. On March 28, Japanese officials acknowledged that "the current visit could hamper international efforts to break a deadlock over the ￥PRK's| nuclear programme". A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said that Tokyo was "hoping that the delegation will not do anything to encourage North Korea to harden its stance . . . The timing is very delicate and important." Official Tokyo was quick to raise a smoke screen. On March 29, Tokyo acknowledged that "Japanese and North Korean politicians are close to signing a declaration on restartlag efforts to normalise diplomatic relations between their two countries". Japanese politicians in Pyongyang acknowledged that "the two sides had agreed in principle that formal bilateral talks on setting up diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo should restart". The Japanese also reported that the "North Koreans said they needed to discuss ┤he proposed agreement| before deciding whether to accept the Japanese proposal". Indeed, Japan and the DPRK had already reached an agreement on March 28. Ostensibly, it was an agreement between the WPK and the coalition of Japanese political parties. In this agreement, North Korea dropped its demands for massive reparations for the colonial era and World War II in return for quick tangible gains, especially anti- US activities. Significantly, Tokyo promised to help Pyongyang resist Washington's pressure in the row over what type of light-water reactor the DPRK will get. Tokyo will also assist Pyongyang to overcome the present economic crisis and food shortages as a humanitarian gesture and without any linkage to the nuclear crisis. Since Japan had to carry most of the burden of this agreement, Tokyo expected some political concessions from Pyongyang. However, once in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation "suddenly" decided not to challenge the DPRK's proposals and quickly reached an agreement. Indeed, officials in Seoul and Tokyo believe that "Japan and North Korea have already concluded a secret agreement on normalisation. PYONGYANG WAS AWARE Of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations with the Watanabe delegation: that is, that there would soon be major cracks in the US-led coalition against the DPRK from the very beginning. This knowledge can explain Pyongyang's steadfast refusal to break the deadlock on the implementation of the October 1994 agreement. The impasse reached new height in the intense but ultimately futile negotiations on-March 25-27 in Berlin. The North Koreans adamantly refused to accept reactors manufactured in South Korea. US officials insist the only possibility is South Korean reactors since Seoul was expected to foot most of the bill. However, on March 29, Pyongyang announced that it had submitted an "epochal proposal" in Berlin in order to resolve the reactor and all other issues. Official Pyongyang stressed that "the matter was now in the hands of the United States". Pyongyang left no doubt that the very existence of the agreement now depends on Washington's acquiescence to its proposal. "At the negotiations, the DPRK side set forth an epochal proposal to tide over the present deadlocks concerning the question of hght water reactor model and the US side promised to study our proposal," Pyongyang explained. "Since we have made our best for the progress of the negotiations, prospect for the solution of the question entirely depends on the sincerity of our dialogue partner." According to Japanese and South Korean sources, the essence of the North Korean "epochal proposal" is for the US to impose the reunification of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the "reunification through confederation" program Pyongyang revived in mid-March. Essentially, Pyongyang argued that the only way a reactor made in Korea could be built in the North is if it is the product of a single, unified Korea. The precondition for such a reunification is the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK and the establishment of a peace and security pact between Pyongyang and Washington. "The basic strategy to implement the ￡eneva| Agreement is to pull out US troops from South Korea, a major reason behind the military confrontation between the US and the DPRK, and to set up a new peace and security status between the US and the DPRK," a North Korean official told a Japanese counterpart. Once the US troops are withdrawn, Pyongyang is confident the road would be open for a quick "reunification". The pact with Washington would prevent the US from actively intervening in the "reunification process", especially through the use of military means. On March 30, Pyongyang pointed out the alternative, accusing Washington of instigating a war in Korea. Pyongyang argued that recent US military activities prove that Washington "is to make a fait accompli the provocation for a new Korean War by the United States and that the United States is hurrying its preparations". The DPRK stressed that the military solution was acceptable for Pyongyang. "We are ready for dialogue as well as war," Pyongyang said. "The United States must by no means doubt our people's steadfast will. If the United States continues to move toward the adventurous road of war by clinging to the policy of strength as it was regardless of our repeated warning, it will have to be wholly responsible for all consequences arising therefrom." Of course, Pyongyang would love to see Washington acquiescing to the "epochal proposal" and the ensuing "reunification through confederation" of the Korean Peninsula. However, Kim Jong-II's Pyongyang knows better. The real objective of DPRK negotiation tactics is to instigate the catalyst and excuse for the crisis they really seek in order to break the deadlock in the region. Such a strategy fits dosely with Kjm Jong-Il's personality and approach to decisionmaking. As discussed above, there is a growing tendency in Kim Jong-Il to take bold gambles for immediate gratification, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and even a war. Meanwhile, South Korean experts are increasingly worried that the DPRK might "provoke a limited war" in the near future. They base their analysis on the characteristics of the recent military exercises and build-up in the DPRK, as well as the latest reforms in the KPA High Command. These experts believe that Pyongyang is reluctant to embark on a full-scale war unless the economic isolation becomes intolerable to the point that it threatens the stability of Kim Jong- Il. The deal with Tokyo significantly reduces this possibility. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il is determined to reach a quick and dramatic breakout of the deadlock. According to the South Korean experts, Pyongyang believes that "a limited war will be possible if North Korea feels it necessary to create tension for pohtical purposes: to remove factors leading to its own internal unrest." "Since North Korea is now imputing its own economic difficulties to having to increase its armaments in preparation against a possible provocation by the ROK and the United States, it is possible younger commanding officers in the North Korean military will launch a military provocation against the South out of desperation." They warn that the DPRK might well embark on such a provocation even if there is a chance that a limited war would escalate into "an accidental war" amounting to "a total, planned military provocation against the South". A spate of terrorism, subversion, as well as special and covert operations, fits very closely with both the DPRK's perception of a limited war, and the penchant of Kim Jong-Il and his "Troika" for the "dirty War. There is an aura of self-confidence and great anticipation at the highest levels in Pyongyang. In late March, rumours of a dramatic breakout were prevailing among senior DPRK officials with access to visiting foreigners (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) in Pyongyang. These DPRK officials anticipated that Kim Jong-Il would finally assume formal power in October 1995. They stressed the importance of the date as both commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the WPK, and, the national triumph in the aftermath of a great national achievement and overcoming of a major trial they are certain the DPRK will endure later this year. It should also be remembered that both Kim Il-Song and Kim Jong-Il declared 1995 to be the year of reunification.

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"The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal Is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With The US."

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy July 31, 1994 "The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal Is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With The US." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- North Korea and the United States were preparing, in August, to sign a deal which would "resolve their differences" over the DPRK's military nuclear development. But the deal is merely intended to save face for all concerned. North Korea -- the DPRK -- already has deployed a substantial number of nuclear weapons and the US is not prepared to confront the matter. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky has the details. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The US and the DPRK were due to agree in August the outline of a wide-ranging accord to resolve their differences on the North Korean nuclear programme. The essence of the deal is that the US will provide North Korea with a light-water reactor, "make arrangements for interim energy alternatives" for the DPRK (euphemism for supply of oil), and work to "reduce barriers to trade and investment" so as to generally improve the North Korean economy. In return, "upon receipt of US assurances" that the above conditions are being implemented, the DPRK "will freeze construction" of its bigger graphite-cooled reactors, "seal the Radiochemical Laboratory" (its main reprocessing facilities), "forego" processing of the 4,000 rods (even though the IAEA still will not have access to them), and accept a yet to be determined regime of IAEA inspections. The overriding principle of this new Geneva accord is not that North Korea is merely freezing some of its nuclear activities in return for a huge incentive package. None of the DPRK's nuclear installations would be destroyed, while the US and its allies would be providing another reactor as well as resolving many of the DPRK's endemic energy supply and economic problems. Washington seems to believe that once these measures are adopted, Pyongyang would no longer be able to procure nuclear weapons, save for the "one or two" devices it already has. Little could be further from reality. North Korea -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -- already has close to 10 operational nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, and two nuclear devices that can be carried by truck or transport aircraft. All the weapons are 50kt nuclear warheads, each weighing around 500kg �1,100 lb.|. All the DPRK's ballistic missiles can carry nuclear warheads. The DPRK already has over 120 NoDong-1s, and a few hundred NK-Scud- Bs and NK-Scud-Cs, in operational service. In late March 1993, the DPRK completed the development of the upgraded NoDong-1 "which may be equipped with nuclear warhead" with 1,300km range. The DPRK is also accelerating the development of a new SSM, the NoDong-2, estimated to have a range of 1,500-2,000km. The test launching of the first NoDong-2 prototypes is expected in 1994-95 and, barring a major setback, the NoDong-2 will become operational in 1996-97. Therefore, the NoDong-2 can be pressed into operational service under extreme conditions. The DPRK, along with the PRC and Iran, is also developing a new generation of ballistic missiles far more accurate than the NoDong-family and optimised for nuclear warheads. The SSMs, the TaepoDong-1 and the TaepoDong-2, will have ranges of 2,000km and 3,500km respectively. A modified TaepoDong-2 will be able reach a range of 9,600km. More advanced nuclear-tipped SSMs, such as the NoDong-X, are also near entry into operational service. The proposed closing down of the DPRK's 5mw reactor will have no impact whatsoever on the DPRK's current and near-term operational nuclear capabilities. This discrepancy between the White House's assessment and reality reflects the two fundamental approaches to intelligence analysis. The first relies primarily on finding and verification by technical means: from space-based collection systems to a variety of sensors and measuring systems of such international bodies as the IAEA. The second relies primarily on human sources: defectors, spies, intelligence officers and other resources. At the crux of the DPRK's nuclear "problem" is the amount of plutonium extracted from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. Washington insists that there is no verifiable evidence that plutonium was extracted but once in 1989. Therefore, the DPRK could not have the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. This approach has already failed two major tests. Since June 1992, activities intensified in the DPRK's primary nuclear weapons site at Yongbyon, an elaborate underground complex called Building 500. Pyongyang argued that the building was merely a nuclear waste storage site. In early 1993, the IAEA inspectors requested access to Building 500 to confirm what it was. The DPRK not only refused, but announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Korean People's Army (KPA) quickly established 40 military encampments, three airbases, a major ammunition depot, and deployed some 300 heavy anti-aircraft guns around the entire Yongbyon complex. The IAEA's continued insistence on inspecting Building 500 resulted in the DPRK's declaring the Semi-War State, ordering mobilisation of its armed forces. Presumably, North Korea would not have risked war over a dump site. In early May 1994, the DPRK violated the remnants of its agreement with the IAEA. Ignoring warnings from the US and the UN, including explicit threats of sanctions, the DPRK cancelled the IAEA inspections. The North Koreans quickly removed 4,000 fuel rods from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon, making it impossible to measure if any plutonium had ever been removed. Measuring the extent of a possible removal of plutonium from these fuel rods is the key to verifying through technical means the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. By theoretical calculations alone, the 5mw reactor could have produced since 1990 enough plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons. Defectors insist that plutonium had been extracted clandestinely over the years and used for the production of nuclear warheads. Therefore, only sampling and measurements of the fuel rods undertaken by IAEA inspectors on site in Yongbyon would have been able to either confirm or dispel the defectors' accounts about the size of the North Korean military nuclear programme. Pyongyang has repeatedly denied having any military nuclear programme, let alone weapons. Therefore, the DPRK's adamant refusal to allow any inspection and measurement of the rods to the point of escalating the crisis to the verge of UN sanctions and possible US military action cannot but indicate that the DPRK has something to hide. An explanation can be found in the persistent flow of information from North Korean defectors, as well as sources from Russia, the PRC, and other countries, about all aspects of the development of nuclear weapons in Yongbyon. The DPRK secretly and incrementally removed plutonium from the 5mw reactor. Kim Dai-Ho, a former official at a North Korean reprocessing plant in Yongbyon who defected in May 1994, reported that back in 1988 the DPRK had secretly removed 12 kg �26.4 lb| of plutonium from this reactor. This fuel was used to produce the first two nuclear devices completed in 1990-1. It was recently learned that the DPRK suspended the reactor operation annually since 1989. Stoppages were for 71 days in 1989, 30-odd days in 1990, and 50-odd days in 1991. In these three years alone, the DPRK could have extracted additional 22-27kg (48.4- 59.4lb) plutonium, enough for three to five weapons. Comparable quantities of plutonium were since then removed from the reactor incrementally and used in the production of the DPRK's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the DPRK succeeded to acquire 56kg (123.2lb) of plutonium from the CIS in early 1992, sufficient for the production of 10 additional warheads. The first of these was completed in the Spring of 1993. This data fits closely with a growing volume of information on the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. There is close agreement between the reports on the number of weapons and the reported extraction of plutonium. A KGB document of February 22, 1990, stated that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons and the "development of the first atomic explosive device ▇ad| been completed" in Yongbyon. The KGB added that Kim Jong-Il "personally controls" the DPRK's military nuclear programme which is aimed at "achieving military superiority over South Korea" as well as realising "the prestigious aim of becoming one of the states possessing such weapons." Yi Chung-Kuk, a Sergeant in a KPA chemical warfare unit who defected in mid-March 1994, disclosed that he had "heard on several occasions beginning in 1991 from high-ranking military cadres and his senior officers that North Korea has already completed nuclear weapons development." Ko Yong-Hwan, a high level official who defected in the Autumn of 1991, reported that Pyongyang expected to have a nuclear arsenal by 1993, at which point the DPRK would be able to produce three to five "small nuclear bombs" a year. Subsequent improvements raised the annual production rates to about five warheads from plutonium extracted at Yongbyon and another two to three warheads from the plutonium acquired from the CIS. On the basis of a great volume of data from multiple sources, it was possible to conclude in mid-1993 that the DPRK already had about six nuclear weapons in operational status. Four of them were 50kt warheads for the ballistic missiles. At the very least, the DPRK had already "virtually completed" these six nuclear weapons and they were stored at "laboratory nuclear devices" status. In early 1994 there were specific reports that these warheads were being readied for war. In order to confirm the status of the North Korean military nuclear capabilities, a high level delegation of West European diplomats and experts based in Beijing visited the DPRK in the early winter of 1993. Returning from Pyongyang in mid-December, the delegation reported that the DPRK had "several atomic bombs and the vehicles to launch them". The delegation confirmed much of the data provided by defectors, including that North Korea "has built several kilo-size bombs." On the basis of the DPRK's verified plutonium production at Yongbyon alone, the delegation concluded that the DPRK already had "at least half a dozen bombs" to be delivered by a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. The latest assessment of the magnitude of the North Korean nuclear arsenal was provided by Kang Myong-To, the son-in-law of Kang Song- San, the DPRK's prime minister, who defected in May 1994. He reported that the DPRK "already ▉ossessed| five nuclear warheads" in October 1993, and would have about 10 warheads by the end of 1994. The delivery platform is "long-range missiles." Kang Myong-To stressed that he had learned this information from "a responsible official of the State Security Department, who is in charge of security of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon." Thus, there is ample evidence that the DPRK currently has at least seven or eight nuclear warheads (as well as two devices) and that by the end of the year will have more than 10 warheads. It is noteworthy that the available multiple-source data about the extraction of plutonium, weapon production rates, and the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal closely fit. With this in mind, the value of the IAEA inspections should be questioned. Back in February 1990, the KGB already stressed Pyongyang's "interest of concealing from world opinion and from the controlling international organisations the actual fact of the production of nuclear weapons in the DPRK". In late January 1994, a highly informed Chinese official reported that he had "recently heard from a senior North Korean official that North Korea is hiding nuclear weapons in an underground warehouse in the mountains near Pyongyang and that any thorough inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities by the United States will fail to locate them". Yi Chung-Kuk also learned "from his senior officer that it will be of no use to inspect Yongbyon because nuclear weapons are being produced at another place." It is known from other sources that the work on the warheads made from the plutonium acquired in the CIS is conducted away from Pyongyang. In the fall of 1993, a defector reported the existence of "a dreadful underground nuclear plant in the Chagang-Do province in the northern area" where the most sensitive weapon-related activities take place. Indeed, high-level North Korean defectors have always questioned the validity of the negotiations with the US. Ko Yong-Hwan warned already in mid-1991 that as far as Pyongyang was concered "negotiations for nuclear safeguards are only a delaying tactic". He explained that the highest levels in Pyongyang concluded in around 1985-86 that they "cannot cope with the situation with conventional (classic) weapons; therefore nuclear weapons must be developed . . . 糎s| the last means for preserving their political system". Kang Myong-To has a similar explanation. "North Korea's nuclear development is not intended as a bargaining chip as seen by the Western world, but for the maintenance of its system under the circumstances in which it is faced with economic difficulties and a situation following the collapse of Eastern Europe. Therefore, I think that until at least 10 nuclear warheads are produced, Kim Jong- Il will continue to adopt delaying tactics." Kang Myong-To stressed that the DPRK acquired its nuclear weapons "to secure an advantageous position in its talks with the United States and Japan. North Korea believes the United States would not be able to attack it then because of nuclear ─eapons|". Therefore, he concluded, in no way would the DPRK give up its military nuclear capabilities, because Pyongyang "sees nuclear development as the only means to maintain Kim Jong-Il's regime". Pyongyang's commitment to acquire nuclear weapons has always had a direct and immediate impact on the KPA. According to KPA Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Cpt. Shin Chung-Chol, since 1980, the KPA officers at the Kim Il-Song Military Academy, the DPRK's highest military institution, "attended a lecture on the 'offensive by the army corps with nuclear attacks' in the tactics course of the college". Cpt. Shin stressed that "the lecture was given in anticipation of North Korea's nuclear attacks against enemies". In early 1994, he added that considering the emphasis put on nuclear warfare among the KPA's elite officers by the early 1980s, "there is no doubt that North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons". Other former North Korean officers who defected recently portray a chilling scenario for the possible use of the DPRK's nuclear warheads in case of a major crisis. They believe that Pyongyang will order a pre-emptive launch of nuclear strikes against a few select objectives in Japan. "As a pre-emptive strike, nuclear would attack US military bases in Japan and then launch air raids on Japan's major military bases," explained an officer who defected in 1993. According to another former KPA officer who defected in the fall of 1992, it is virtually common knowledge among the elite units of the KPA that their country has nuclear weapons and that "our missiles could destroy even Japan, the United States, or South Korea." More likely and no less complex is the potential introduction of a North Korean nuclear ultimatum in the context of a surprise non- nuclear invasion of South Korea. A threat from Pyongyang to hit Japan, including Tokyo, and perhaps Russia, Vladivostok for example, with nuclear weapons in caset he United States decides to further intervene in the war is bound to attract attention in Washington. At the very least, deliberations in Washington on the appropriate reaction to the North Korean invasion and the new nuclear threats will take long enough for the KPA, by Pyongyang's own worst case calculations, to complete the encirclement of the Korean Peninsula. At this point, Pyongyang is convinced, the US will give up the war. A senior official at the South Korean Ministry of Defence concurs that Pyongyang's strategy is "to initiate surprise attack on the South and occupy some territory and negotiate for the termination of war, or to deny US reinforcement by threatening to use nuclear weapons." Another disturbing aspect of the Geneva negotiations is the preoccupation with the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. The DPRK has numerous other reactors and nuclear facilities the contribution of which to the military nuclear effort is far larger than that of the small old reactor in Yongbyon. In September 1980, the DPRK began construction on a then 30mw gas cooled reactor, a configuration extremely efficient for producing plutonium. Most construction was completed in 1984, and the reactor was activated in February 1987. The US-educated Prof. Kyong Won Ha is one of the key scientists and engineers behind the 30-50mw reactor in Yongbyon and its configuration into a source of plutonium. In 1984, the DPRK began the construction of a major new military nuclear complex in the Yongbyon area built around a new reactor estimated at the 50-200mw range, and dedicated for weapons production. Construction was near completion in 1989 and the reactor was tentatively activated in 1992. The construction of auxilliary installations for this reactor was expected to be completed in 1994, in the aftermath of a crash programme begun in 1993. Within two years after its full activation, now expected to take place in 1995 at the latest, this reactor alone will be producing enough plutonium for 10- 12 weapons a year. As of late-1991, the DPRK began digging deep tunnels near Yongbyon to shield and conceal the key components of its military nuclear programme. A new air defense system was deployed in November 1991, and above ground facilities are being hardened. Meanwhile, a prototype reprocessing facility was completed in 1987 and is producing some 15 kgs �33 lb| of plutonium annually. The work on a reprocessing facility for nuclear fuels began around 1988 and it is expected to become operational around 1994. The clandestine plutonium factory for the nuclear weapons, which is called by the DPRK "radiological laboratory," is a single story building constructed on top the main plutonium reprocessing facility that is now buried deep underground. Meanwhile, since mid 1993, the DPRK has doubled its capacity to produce plutonium by installing a second production line in the main reprocessing facility. Moreover, the DPRK also built highly secret underground facilities in Pakchon. Since underground facilities are extremely difficult to reconstruct, the mere fact that the DPRK has committed itself to underground military nuclear facilities reflects self-confidence in its technological capabilities. Meanwhile, since the early 1980s, the DPRK gained access to both Iranian Western-educated scientists and the Libyan clandestine procurement infrastructure for Western technology. Tehran and Tripoli convinced Pyongyang to significantly expand its military nuclear programme even before the initial phase was complete. Consequently, in the mid-1980s, the DPRK had access to Western nuclear technology, mainly West German, through the strategic cooperation between the DPRK, Libya, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, Ko Yong-Hwan confirmed that the North Korean nuclear programme utilized diversified technology from West European sources. Indeed, key components of the DPRK's new 50mw research reactor, built near the submarine base in Sinpo, are German- made. Like the Yongbyon complex, the Sinpo reactor is the center of a large scale underground complex. Simultaneously, in May 1989, the DPRK and the GDR signed a comprehensive agreement on the transfer of "substantial" amounts of German nuclear technology and nuclear weapons materials, including enriched uranium, to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to expand its already large nuclear infrastructure. By late 1993, some 20 facilities related to nuclear development were identified and there are not yet fully confirmed reports about several other facilities. Telling is the ongoing construction of large scale reactors, such as the 200mw reactor in Taechon and the 635mw reactor in Simpo. Ostensibly built as commercial-purpose reactors, these are old-type graphite-moderated and gas cooled reactors that are relatively unsafe and their efficiency relatively low when compared to more modern technologies long used in the West. However, reactors of this design produce extremely large quantities of plutonium, the key ingredient in nuclear weapons, as a by-product of their activities even with natural, low-quality uranium. Thus, the reactor building programme of the DPRK testifies to Pyongyang's commitment to markedly expand its nuclear weapons programme in the very near future, for a few large reactors are expected to become "hot" in the next few years. Completely disregarding the real magnitude of the North Korean military nuclear effort, the US-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issues were scheduled to resume in Geneva in early August 1994. They are still based on the premise that no North Korean extraction of plutonium from the 5mw reactor has been confirmed except for one case in 1989. The negotiations continue even though the DPRK stresses that it would not permit access to Building 500 or an IAEA examination of the fuel rods (even though all evidence of extraction had already been destroyed). Moreover, the DPRK informed the US that it will continue to expand its nuclear programme and complete the 50mw and 200mw reactors in Yongbyon, until it gets a Russian-made modern light-water reactor and other economic incentives. The accord expected to be reached in Geneva in August changes none of these provisions. The Geneva accord constitutes a profound change in US policy concerning the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Washington gave up on preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear power. Washington even no longer insists on verifying the extent of the North Korean arsenal through IAEA inspection. Instead, the Us opted to appease and bribe North Korea with the hope that Pyongyang will freeze its nuclear build-up. Washington is buying time while maintaining the charade that the DPRK does not have nuclear weapons. Consequently, the US and its allies have settled into the do-nothing-for-now mode, merely postponing the hour of reckoning. All that time, Washington is getting used to the fact, although without acknowledging it publicly, that the threat of North Korean nuclear blackmail is already pending. Meanwhile, the economic crisis in North Korea continues to grow. Only drastic measures can reverse the imminent economic collapse. Currently, Pyongyang has two viable options: to attempt a regional nuclear extortion, demanding that the US, Japan and ROK rebuilds its economy, or to launch an all out effort at the realisation of the sacred unification by force. The Geneva accord seems to be an implicit surrender to Pyongyang's extortion. However, the North Korean economy is in such a dismal state, that the West cannot afford the investments required for a short term reversal, even at the price of a debilitating recession in the US and the Pacific Rim. The Geneva accord simply creates false expectations and pushes the hour for drastic measures further away. Kang Myong-To relayed that, according to the above cited official of the State Security Department, Pyongyang's position is that "by 1994, if we are capable of possessing about 10 ▋uclear weapons|, we will be able to make it known to the international community, and to hold the North-US talks or South-North summit talks from a position of advantage." Left unclear is in what form will such announcement take place. Given the overall context of Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is quite likely that the announcement will come as a nuclear ultimatum, perhaps during an invasion. Moreover, even if the Geneva record is implemented, and even if there is no new Korean War in 1994, the North Korean nuclear threat to the US will only continue to rise. Most important, by the mid to late 1990s the DPRK will field the nuclear-tipped NoDong-X ICBM that, with a range of over 6,000 km, is capable of reaching the continental US. Considering the intensity of the development work, barring a major setback, early models of the NoDong-X may become operational as early as 1996-97. This fact alone will introduce a whole new dimension to the crisis in Korea. Hence, the looming spectre of the new Korean War, with its nuclear component, remains with us for as long as Kim Jong-Il and his Administration remain in power in Pyongyang.

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"South Korea places troops on enhanced alert."

Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 7, 1995 "South Korea places troops on enhanced alert." South Korea placed its 650,000 troops on an enhanced state of alertness Thursday in response to what it called "military provocation" by communist North Korea. "There are fears that North Korea, which is currently undergoing a leadership crisis, may judge the situation the South Korea incorrectly and be tempted to military provocation," Defence Minister Lee Yang Ho told troop commanders. North Korea has been without an officially designated leader since the death of President Kim Il Sung in July 1994. Lats week Lee placed his forces on alert, appealing to them to be particularly vigilant along the almost 250 kilometre-border along the 38th parallel. The defence minister said the poor supply situation and uncertain leadership in Pyoengyang might prompt North Korea to act militarily as a diversion. In South Korea the recent arrest of two former presidents, Roh Tae Woo on corruption charges and his predecessor Chun Choo Hwan for allegedly mastering a 1979 failed coup, has unsettled the country. Officials at the South Korean Defence Minister said Thursday that North Korea was expanding the number of airforce and artillery units on its side of the border. Seoul believes North Korea has deployed most of its 1.1 million-strong armed forces close to the border. South Korea says North Korean troops are involved along the border in comprehensive winter exercises. The communist north has also stepped up the propaganda war against the south and launched a campaign to abrogate the Korean ceasefire agreement drawn up after the Korean War (1950-53). A peace pact was never signed. Around 36,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea.

Top of Watch "US AND S KOREA CONTINUE ANTI-PHYONGYANG MILITARY EXERCISES." BY IVAN ZAKHARCHENKO

The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS December 8, 1995, Friday "US AND S KOREA CONTINUE ANTI-PHYONGYANG MILITARY EXERCISES." BY IVAN ZAKHARCHENKO DOZENS OF WARPLANES, FLOWN FROM THE AMERICAN MILITARY BASES ON THE JAPANESE ISLANDS, HAVE TAKEN PART THIS WEEK IN MILITARY EXERCISES IN SOUTH KOREA, WHICH, IT IS REPORTED TODAY IN PHYONGYANG, WERE SPEARHEADED AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THESE WARPLANES, WHICH INCLUDED VERTICAL-TAKEOFF FIGHTERS AND ASSAULT PLANES, HAVE PRACTICED NIGHTTIME BLOWS AT NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY. THESE EXERCISES, STAGED ON DECEMBER 5 WITH THE USE OF A REFUELING PLANE, PURSUED THE PURPOSE OF "PREPARING AN URGENT DISPATCH OF PLANES FROM THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET TO THE ZONE OF HOSTILITIES AND DEALING BLOWS AT KEY TARGETS IN NORTH KOREA" , THE CENTRAL TELEGRAPH AGENCY REPORTS WITH REFERENCE TO UNINDICATED MILITARY SOURCES. ON THE SAME DAY, AN P-3 PATROL PLANE AND A STRATEGIC U-2 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FILMED THE SEA ANDSHELF OFF THE COAST OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ALSO SOME PARTS OF ITS HINTERLAND. NOT ONLY SUCH MILITARY EXERCISES ALARM PHYONGYANG TODAY. PHYONGYANG NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY VEHICLES WAS NOTED ON DECEMBER 5 AND 6 IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE,WHICH IS FOUR KILOMETRES BROAD, WHERE NO ARMAMENTS ALLOWED. NORTH KOREA DENIES THE CLAIMS OF SEOUL AND WASHINGTON THAT IT COULD STAGE MILITARY PROVOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER "NODONG SHIMOON", SOUTH KOREA NEEDS ACCUSATIONS AGAINST PHYONGYANG AND HEIGHTENED TENSIONS TO OVERCOME THE POLITICAL CRISIS, TRIGGERED BY THE SCANDAL AROUND THE SECRET CASH FUNDS BUILT UP BY SOUTH KOREA EX- PRESIDENT ROH DAE WOO.

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"South's army increases readiness against 'possible infiltration, surprise attack'."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 10, 1995 "South's army increases readiness against 'possible infiltration, surprise attack'." (Source: Yonhap news agency, Seoul, in English 0136 gmt 9 Dec 95) Seoul, 9th December: The army decided Saturday 9th December to step up its readiness against possible infiltration operations by the North Korean military, strengthening vigils along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and shorelines. The decision was made at a meeting of division and above level commanders presided over by Chief of Staff Gen Yun Yong-nam at army headquarters in Kyeryongdae near Taejon. In his address, Gen Yun instructed his commanders to take increased measures against infiltration operations by Pyongyang and maintain thorough preparedness for winter operations that would be launched in the case of an emergency, warning of the national security system's vulnerability during the first half of next year. North Korea, maintaining its isolation from the international community despite a severe economic crisis, is pursuing a military- first policy to strengthen its readiness for war by increasing the offensive power of its armed forces and appointing conservative hard- liners to major military posts, according to the army. In spite of its severe fuel shortages, the North Korean armed forces have recently increased their combat training programmes, while deploying fighters, long-range artillery and other offensive weapons in bases closer to the DMZ in an attempt to create conditions for a surprise attack.

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"North Korea warns against US military adventurism."

Agence France Presse December 12, 1995 "North Korea warns against US military adventurism." North Korea on Tuesday threatened to take "countermeasures" after accusing the United States, South Korea and Japan, of plotting an attack. "Now that the United States is scheming to bring the military adventure against our system into practice together with South Korea and Japan, we cannot but feel exposed to threat and will unavoidably have to take countermeasures," the North's foreign ministry warned in a statement. It did not say what the countermeasures would be. The statement, carried by the North's official mouthpiece Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), came as South Korean armed forces are on a five-month alert against feared attacks from North Korea. On Monday, South Korean President Kim Young-Sam said the North's military has the final say on important issues as President Kim Il- Sung's son Kim Jong-Il has not yet officially succeeded his father, who died in July of 1994. "It has been more than one year since the death of Kim Il-Sung but no one has succeeded him. This means the military has taken power in North Korea, " the president said. He said people should be ready for a possible emergency on the Korean peninsula, saying that North Korea had deployed nearly 100 war planes at three front-line air bases, which can reach Seoul in just five minutes. "The North is starving and poor," the president said, adding that the north's capital, Pyongyang, is not illuminated at night because of a lack of fuel.

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"China sees danger of N. Korea invading S. Korea."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "China sees danger of N. Korea invading S. Korea." China is concerned about a possible North Korean invasion of South Korea, a South Korean newspaper reported in its early Thursday edition. The Chosun Ilbo said that top Chinese government and military officials drew up a report in a recent secret meeting that points to the possibility that North Korea may invade its southern neighbor amid the current political turmoil. The report says the Pyongyang regime could come to a conclusion that it should start a war with South Korea now because of North Korea's economic hardships, food shortage, the poor health conditions of the country's de facto leader Kim Jong Il, as well as the current political situation in Seoul. China may tell North Korea that it does not want a war on the Korean Peninsula, which would hurt the Chinese economy, according to the daily.

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"S. Korea steps up guard against unusual moves in North."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "S. Korea steps up guard against unusual moves in North." South Korea has stepped up its already strict guard against North Korean military provocation amid signs of unusual movements in the country, such as forward deployment of attack weapons, a South Korean source said Wednesday. The level of Seoul's surveillance system for North Korea has already been upgraded from 'Watch Condition 4' to 'Watch Condition 3,' the source said. North Korea conducted unusually large-scale military drills Oct. 21 and 22, mobilizing about 400 airplanes, almost half of all the planes it possesses, according to the source. Of the planes used in the exercises, about 80, including MiG-19s and MiG-21s, have been deployed southward at three bases 30-40 kilometers closer to North-South border, other military analysts said. They observed that with such a forward deployment of aircraft, it will take only six minutes for North Korean fighters to reach Seoul. North Korea has also moved long-range artillery closer to the border area so as to have Seoul within a firing range. Ever since its energy shortage seriously worsened around 1990, Pyongyang has tried to cut down on the size and number of its military drills. But last year it began holding its military exercises to the average level of the past years and started increasing the scale and number of such drills this year. North Korea carried out a sweeping reshuffle in the key posts of the 1.1-million-strong armed forces in October, promoting the former chief of the general staff of the People's Army, Choe Kwang, to minister of the People's Armed Forces. Other key military posts were filled by Vice Marshall Kim Yong Chun, named as new chief of the general staff of the People's Army, and Vice Marshall Kim Gwang Jin, named as First Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces. Meanwhile, South Korean President Kim Young Sam indicated Monday that the military in North Korea might have taken charge. He said that the absence of an official leader in North Korea seems to have been prolonged since the death of President Kim Il Sung in July last year because the military seems to have everything under its control. North Korea's de facto leader Kim Jong Il has not yet officially assumed the top leadership posts, leaving vacant the posts of president and head of the ruling Workers Party of (North) Korea for almost a year and a half since his father Kim Il Sung's death. Other analysts pointed to the possibility that North Korea, already faced with a serious food shortage, may try to divert the people's attention from its internal crisis to possible armed conflict with the South.

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"Japan spokesman tones down reported N. Korean move."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "Japan spokesman tones down reported N. Korean move." Japan's top government spokesman toned down reports Wednesday that the North Korean military has advanced southward toward the border with South Korea. Chief Cabinet Secretary Koken Nosaka told a press conference that he has heard rumors about such a move, but he said he does not think anything would happen. Nosaka said he bases his opinion judging from North Korea's troublesome situation over the summer floods and subsequent food shortage and the fact that de facto leader Kim Jong Il is not yet atop the state and the ruling Workers Party of Korea. A senior U.S. defense official conceded Tuesday that North Korea has made some advance southward in the past month, but he said that the United States sees the move as signs of internal disorder rather than that of an imminent crisis.

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"S. Korea, U.S. agree to be prepared for N. Korean crisis."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "S. Korea, U.S. agree to be prepared for N. Korean crisis." Amid signs of unusual activity in North Korea, South Korea and the United States have reconfirmed their pact to remain prepared at all times for any North Korean situation, Yonhap News Agency reported Wednesday. South Korea and the U.S. held high-level security talks Tuesday in Washington and discussed ways to cope with possible contingencies in North Korea, Yonhap reported in a dispatch from Washington. However, Yim Sung Joon, director general of the American affairs bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said afterward the two countries did not discuss provocative actions by North Korea, according to the report. The South Korean delegation was headed by Vice Foreign Minister Lee See Young, and the U.S. team by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Referring to the dire food shortage in North Korea, Kim said the two allies agreed to discuss offering aid to help North Korea cope with the food crisis caused by floods in August, which devastated much cropland and left half a million people homeless. 'However, South Korea and the U.S. shared a common view that provision of any aid to the North will be possible only when North Korea first changes its hostile stance against South Korea,' Yim was quoted as saying. South Korea and the U.S. also reaffirmed the importance of continuing to press North Korea to pursue openness and change, the report said. Yim said inter-Korean dialogue is vitally important to encourage North Korea to open up. Seoul and Washington further agreed that the stability of North Korea does not seem threatened by an internal power struggle. North Korea's de facto leader Kim Jong Il has not yet officially assumed the nation's top leadership posts since the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, almost a year and a half ago. The prolonged absence of an official leader in North Korea has sparked much speculation that Kim Jong Il is either seriously ill or faces internal resistance, especially from the military.

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"U.S. official concedes N. Korean southward move."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "U.S. official concedes N. Korean southward move." By Kohei Murayama A senior U.S. defense official conceded Tuesday that North Korea has made some advance southward in the past month, but he said that the United States sees the move as signs of internal disorder instead of an imminent crisis. 'Probably in the last month...there's been some movement, small mov

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Last Updated: April 1996 (Go to main list of global war articles.)

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Last Updated: April 1996
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