Korea Watch

Last Updated: April 1996
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Take heed, watch; for you do not know when the time will
come. It is like a man going on a journey, when he leaves home
and puts his servants in charge, each with his work, and
commands the doorkeeper to be on the watch. Watch therefore-
for you do not know when the master of the house will come, in
the evening, or at midnight, or at the cockcrow, or in the
morning- lest he come suddenly and find you asleep. And what I
say to you I say to all: Watch."
(Mark, chp.13; vs.33-37)

Below are articles and news updates from around the world.

MOST RECENT NEWS (2/97)

"War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is
inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to
attack. Our time will come in thirty or forty years. To win,
we shall need the element of surprise. The Western world will
need to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the
most spectacular peace movement on record. There shall be
electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The
capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to
cooperate to their own destruction. They will leap at another
chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall
smash them with our clenched fist."

(Dmitrii Z. Manuilskii)
(Lenin School of Political Warfare, Moscow, 1931)

Top of Watch

"The Rise Of The Trans-Asian Axis: Is It The Basis Of New Confrontation?"

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy September 30, 1994 (Asia; Pg.8) "The Rise Of The Trans-Asian Axis: Is It The Basis Of New Confrontation?" By Yossef Bodansky, Contributing Editor ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The clear lines of the East-West confrontation of the Cold War years were replaced, with the collapse of the USSR, by an array of small, medium and great powers. Now, some of the smaller and medium powers are gathering around the PRC in a new power bloc, emerging as the Trans-Asian Axis. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky looks at the Axis. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A new cohesive strategic global bloc is emerging amidst the fractured structure of the post-Cold War world. This bloc emerges from the consolidation of an essentially anti-US/anti-West alliance led and guided by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and stretching from North Africa to North East Asia. The Iran-led Islamic bloc is a major component of the Axis and is the main vehicle for the further spread of the alliance's influence into Africa. This new Trans-Asian Axis derives its might from the rapid collapse and ensuing radicalisation of much of the Third World. It is significant that the Axis has a growing dependence in international terrorism and subversion as instruments of statecraft. The Trans-Asian Axis stretches from North Korea (DPRK) and the PRC in the east and north-east, down into South-East Asia, including Myanmar and -- potentially -- the oil rich Spratly Islands. Its main westward arm -- the Islamic bloc along the Silk Road -- aims at integrating the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, and then continues into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (including Syrian occupied Lebanon). There is a growing Islamist influence in Turkey which could come under the Axis sway in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Islamic bloc which Iran intends to consolidate under its influence expands westwards into Africa: from the post-civil war Yemen, to Sudan (already a major hub of militant Islamism) and Somalia, as well as toward the Atlantic Ocean across North Africa. This has been demonstrated in the rapidly escalating Islamist subversion of Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, all of which face severe destabilisation from the covert violence being conducted against them. This geo-strategic surge is the outcome of several years of careful studies and deliberations in Beijing, Tehran, and, to some extent, Islamabad. Since mid-1991, the PRC High Command has anticipated an overall worsening situation in the post-Cold War world. A strategic study published in December 1991 concluded that events and emerging trends in many world regions already point to "the marked escalation of regional turmoil and conflicts". The PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) anticipates "the basic military situation of 'frequent small engagements but no major wars' will continue. However, the absence of major wars does not at all mean peace under heaven. Contrarily, the world will be even more turbulent and less peaceful." In January 1992, the High Command elaborated that Beijing was convinced that "wars and armed conflicts ─ould| continue to 'run amok' in some countries and regions, with strong discord remaining in the 'post-cold war' world." Beijing concluded that the optimal way to cope with the challenge was an all-out surge to evict the US and Western influence from the region coveted by the PRC and its allies. By now, Tehran and its allies were convinced that a major confrontation with the US was inevitable and imminent. In March 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, although apprehensive about growing challenges, the Islamists were determined to capitalise on the upheaval and rage to further their cause. Tehran and its allies were convinced that the time was uniquely ripe for the implementation of Iran's grand strategy. Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah explained that the Near East was providing incomparable circumstances and conditions for the resurrection of the Islamic Revolution on a global scale: "The Middle East is the base of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, which has expanded to reach various regional and world locations at interlinked levels of security, politics, and culture. The Middle East is a strategic region . . . Only the Middle East could unsettle the world's political centres and affect them adversely." Tehran's Institute of Strategic Studies under Hojjat-ol-Islam Mussavi-Khoi-niha was ordered to study Iran's future strategic posture and needs, as well as formulate Iran's long-term grand strategy. The results, as presented in a major conference in May 1991, still constitute the foundations of the Iranian grand strategy. In the conclusion of the conference, Mussavi-Khoiniha emphasised that the US threat would increase since Iran was emerging as "the only centre of national liberation movements in the world" committed to the cause of anti-US struggle. Iran, he said, should adopt a twin track strategy based on the interrelationship between regional hegemony made possible by undisputed Iranian military superiority and the leadership of the Third World's revolutionary (terrorist) struggle. In October 1991, in a subsequent international conference devoted to formulating a long- term strategy to confront the rise of Pax Americana, Iran's Ahmad Khomeini emphasised the fatefulness and uncompromising character of the inevitable struggle with the US: "We should realise that the world is hostile toward us only for ▊ur commitment to| Islam. After the fall of Marxism, Islam replaced it, and as long as Islam exists, US hostility exists, and as long as US hostility exists, the struggle exists." These principles determine the current strategy of Iran. It was in the context of this world view, that Tehran and its allies moved to significantly intensify their cooperation with the PRC. The Chinese strategic cooperation with both Iran and Pakistan intensified in the wake of the visit by PRC President Yang Shangkun in the Fall of 1991. In this visit, Beijing introduced this new grand strategy to its most important allies and won its commitment to close cooperation. In Islamabad, Yang discussed the expansion of defence cooperation with both Pakistan and Iran. Yang finalised the details of an "essential agreement on the signing of a joint pact" with both Pakistan and Iran aimed at countering the nuclear threats from the US and India. Pakistani and Iranian officials stressed at the time that the tripartite agreement would remain clandestine: "These three nations will not sign a treaty officially, but in the event of foreign aggression against the one of these nations, the other two will treat the aggression as aggression against itself and will rise to its defence." In Tehran, Yang dwelled on the expansion of Sino-Iranian relations in the context of the new strategic realities. Tehran explained that the legacy of the Gulf War "would certainly take the two countries' relations to a new height". A key to the new strategy is an alliance between the PRC, Pakistan and Iran: "The expansion of the three countries' cooperation and relations, while enabling those countries to reduce impressively the existing political and economic obstacles on the way of their political, economic, progress, would undoubtedly also establish a new system for the maintenance of regional security without the presence of the world powers, particularly the United States, in the form of defence and military cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, and China." Soon afterwards, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC: Pasdaran) Maj.-Gen. Mohsin Reza'i elaborated on the "strategic relationship" and objectives of the PRC-led alliance as a core for a wider Islamic bloc. He explained that "if there is unity among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, this will strengthen Muslim soliarity and enable the peoples of Soviet Central Asia and Kashmir to join in. China would also welcome such a development, but I am not sure about the Indian view, although there are a lot of people in India (ie: 150- million Muslims) who share a similar heritage with us." He urged a major mobilization of all the bloc's members in order to acquire the required military capabilities to face the US's "dangerous designs in the region, as America sees Islamic fundamentalism as a threat now after the collapse of communism." Reza'i was optimistic about the long term prospects of the Islamic bloc because, even though "unlike communism, Islamic fundamentalism has no such military might, America is still scared of it". By mid-1992, there was a clear globalisation of the strategic thinking of the leaders of the Islamic bloc. Tehran and its allies are genuinely convinced that they are already in the midst of a global confrontation with the US in which no compromise is possible. Reflecting Iran's perceptions, Syria argued in June 1992 that "World War III began with the Malta summit and has not yet ended. Civil, ethnic, and border wars are the bullets" of the war for US global hegemony. Therefore, "it is not in the US interest for the wars raging in several parts of the world ┤o| come to end because US control requires continuing tension". Thus, there is no escape from participation in the world war against the US. "In order not to lose the right and the future we have to give priority to our pan-Arab issues, prove to the world that we are a nation whose stage of division is over, and that we will not be the victim of the new world and the division caused by the Third ㏄orld| War which began with the Malta summit, and whose chapters have not ended yet," Damascus concluded. The spread and consolidation of the Beijing-led Trans-Asian Axis and, within it, the Tehran-led Islamic bloc is the Third World's main response to the World War III challenge. By early 1993, Tehran concluded that "an Iran-US clash" was likely because "Islam █s| at its most sensitive and that heightens our responsibilities more than ever". The West was bent on containing the spread of the Islamism, knowing that Iran was the bastion of the worldwide spread of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, Tehran realised, Washington had no alternative but to confront Iran and Islam in order to solve its own regional problems. "No matter how we look at it, the solution would be linked with the defeat of Iran as an important and potential regional and world power. . . . Iran is a repository of a very deep form of Islamism, which makes it an indicator of the future world order." Therefore, Tehran concluded, it was imperative that "the wave of Islamism is boosted abroad as one of the main pillars of our national security". Indeed, in an address to the IRGC, Ayatollah Khamene'i stressed that "Islam has proposed jihad against infidels and hypocrites as a solution and a defence against internal and external calamity." Meanwhile, the PRC High Command was studying the military aspects of the implementation of the strategic surge. The conclusions were presented in a June 1993 textbook of the PLA High Command called "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?". The PLA considers the US as the PRC's principal strategic adversary. Beijing concluded that "the conflict of strategic interests between China and the United States . . . is now surfacing steadily" to the point that Washington "absolutely cannot tolerate the rise of powerful adversary in East Asia". With the PRC determined to become the region's power, "the military antagonism between China and the United States" could reach the point of armed confrontation. Seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US, the PRC High Command identifies in "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", eight scenarios in which Beijing goes to war against the US in the near future to defend its vital interests. The optimal points of military clash with the US are at the extreme fringes of the Trans- Asian Axis -- Korea in the east and the Middle East in the west -- where Beijing's close allies (North Korea and Iran-Syria respectively) are willing to take on the US and its regional close allies on their own. Moreover, according to "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", the PLA considers India "the greatest potential threat" to the PRC, because the implementation of the PRC's Trans-Asian Axis strategy endangers India's vital interests and thus might very well lead to a military clash. The PLA stresses that they "see India as a potential adversary mainly because India's strategic focus remains on the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia". Therefore, it is imperative for Beijing to divert India's stretegic attention away from the Chinese strategic surge from the east, both on land and in the ocean. This strategic diversion is the role of Islamabad. Pakistan is thus instigating a major defence challenge to India from the west, ranging from subversion to a major military build-up. The aggregate effect of the Pakistani strategy should be a growing tension along the Indo-Pak border that would compel New Delhi to neglect blocking the PRC's surge until it is too late o reverse the new geo-strategic realities in Asia. Iran shares Beijing's apprehension of an impending confrontation with the US, primarily a localized military clash. In late September 1993, Reza'i defined a new strategic posture in which Iran found itself. He pointed out that the most credible threat to Iran is a US limited strike against key installations to reverse Iran's strategic posture in the region, as well as the Muslim world, without engaging Iran in a full war. "It is possible that the West may contemplate a partial military action against us in the long term." Reza'i warned Washington that "if it enters this military vortex, it will sustain irredeemable losses". Thus, as far as Tehran is concerned, even a retaliatory strike will inevitably escalate into a major war. Moreover, Reza'i warned, the routine US forces in the Near East "can be used for military purposese 糎gainst Iran| within moments". Meanwhile, Islamabad has become a critical linchpin of the Axis: the physical link between the PRC and Iran. Pakistan's role has become more active since the return to power of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto's Islamabad considers the opening of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan as the region's gateway to the Indian Ocean to be the key to the growth of Pakistan's commercial activities. Pakistani officials stressed in the late December 1993 that "the role of China in the construction of the Silk Route has made the bilateral relations as strong as the Karakoram Highway". By early 1994, Pakistan had in part already assumed a discreetly anti-US position. Islamabad's decision to intensify its involvement in the expansion and strengthening of both the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider Trans-Asian Axis alliance with the PRC and the DPRK took place immediately after Prime Minister Bhutto took office. It was during Prime Minister Bhutto's visits to Tehran, Beijing and Pyongyang in late 1993, that the emerging strategic posture of Pakistan was formulated. Starting in early January 1994, Islamabad intensified its participation in the joint anti-US radical front, both as an active member of the Iran-led Islamic bloc, and as a leading member of the PRC-led wider Trans-Asian Axis. This surge of activism was the consequence of a major study of US policy conducted by the ISI -- Inter-Services Intelligence, the principal Pakistani intelligence organisation -- and Pakistan's leading think tanks. Completed in late December 1993, the ISI's assessment, reportedly, was that a confrontation with Washington was inevitable. An ISI report stated that the US had already begun the close monitoring and targeting of nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim countries as a central part of "Washington's new anti-Islamic policy and strategy". That US policy replaced communism with Islam, and not without good reason, the ISI concluded. Consequently, by early January 1994, Islamabad had already defined a coherent world view in which Pakistan was an intended victim of a US-led effort aimed at restraining and constraining its ability to develop indigenous strategic capabilities -- primarily nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles -- so that they always remain at the mercy of the Western superpowers. The only way to reverse this trend was through a joint effort of all potential victims. "In this context the meetings of the leaders of Pakistan, China, and the DPRK have been particularly significant in that they have been resisting attempted subjugation from armed plutocratic powers. At this critical juncture Kim Il-Song's advice aimed at South-South cooperation is significant," explained senior Pakistani officials. Indeed, already in early January 1994, Islamabad began capitalising on the newly reaffirmed alliances in order to further its own policies. Islamabad started urging an activist policy against India by the Islamic bloc as an integral part of the radicals' steadfast resolve against the West. Meanwhile, Tehran was closely studying its future role and posture in the rapidly consolidated Trans-Asian Axis. As of the February 1994, Tehran began presenting itself as the centre of a global strategic axis with China. Tehran explained: "China considers Iran as a very important country in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf, which as a strategic role in maintaining peace and stability in the region." The growing cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, especially in the aftermath of Prime Minister Bhutto's visit to Tehran, was stressed in the context of the Trans-Asian Axis. Tehran and its closest allies were now so apprehensive about an impending major war with the US, that Beijing had to address their concerns. In late January 1994, official Beijing suddenly reported that Tehran "ruled out" the possibility of a US attack on Iran "before 1996". According to Iranian senior officials, "this action will not take place because the United States knows us better than other countries". Tehran believes it is aware of a US and Israeli design to strike Iran before 1996. "Our Government, our Army, and our people are ready for any kind of actions," the Iranian official stated. This Chinese report was essentially Beijing's endorsement of an Iranian warning of an impending crisis, to be blamed on the US and Israel, rather than Tehran's apprehension of an attack on Iran. Such a clash would serve Beijing's strategic interests for it would remove the US presence from a key flank of the Trans-Asian Axis. Iran began to actively urge for a Beijing-Tehran axis aimed at confronting the US and reducing its influence in the region. Toward this end, Tehran began floating in early March 1994 the idea of an all-Asian anti-US alliance centred on Iran, Pakistan, India and the PRC. The declared objective of this alliance was to counter "US hegemony over the world". The offer was a trap for India: an instrument of providing the proof that the essence of New Delhi's approach to relations with the West, mainly the US, was taking side against the Third World. Ultimately, the Iranian strategic plan is a further development and refinement of a strategic vision first raised by Iranian Surpeme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani during Prime Minister Bhutto's recent visit to Tehran. The Pakistani reaction to the Iranian offer was enthusiastic. Islamabad pointed out that the objective of the alliance proposed by Iran was "to eradicate the external influence from the region. This countries have resources which, if they were pooled, would enable them to check the interference of the great powers." However, predictably, Pakistan was apprehensive about the proposed inclusion of India the alliance. Islamabad went into great length to point out the long standing conflicts between India and China, India and Pakistan, and the oppression of Muslims in Kashmir, reminding Tehran that the origin of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's family was in Kashmir. Therefore, Islamabad concluded, India could not constitute a component of such an alliance, while Pakistan had already proven itself as a devoted and dedicated member. This is exactly what Tehran had in mind originally. By waving the Indian flag, Tehran got Islamabad to fully and wholly commit itself to participation in the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider anti-US Trans-Asian Axis. Indeed, Pakistan suggested a new Trans-Asian alliance comprised of an Islamic bloc and an East Asian bloc. Islamabad stressed that "if here can be a new alliance or bloc, then it should include Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, the Islamic countries of Central Asia, and Turkey. That will be a natural alliance... The Muslim countries, having common religious, historical, cultural and economic values and interests, should join a single platform and form a regional bloc. If China can be included in the present alliance, then there is no reason why US hegemony in the world could not be resisted." In this context, Pakistan should be he linking party between the PRC and the Muslim World in view of the unique and special relationship between Islamabad and Beijing. "The history of cooperation and friendship between Pakistan and China is enviable. The PRC has now offered to cooperate liberally with Pakistan to meet its weaponry needs. Pakistani tanks and missiles are also being manufactured in China. China did not even care for the US pressure in this regard. No-one will object to China's inclusion in the alliance of Muslim countries as China has not been seen to carry out aggression against any neighbouring country, nor has it claimed the territory of its neighbours." Tehran differs only in that its sees the development of this alliance with Iran assuming the leading coordinating role vis-a-vis the PRC, although with Pakistan playing an important role as well. Tehran explains that "the PRC sees it in the perspective if Iran and Pakistan, but Iran is more important". The key to the unique position of Iran in this alliance is the strategic maturity of Tehran. "Tehran's vantage point is totally different from that of Beijing and is extremely strategic. In view of the international military structure, the perception that the PRC is a durable regional and international politico-economic force is gaining ground among Iranian leaders." The Iranian leadership is committed to the long-range strategic alliance and special relations with the PRC because "Beijing is a relatively independent force on the international political and economic scene and its model of national expansion has drawn the attention of many Third World countries". Moreover, Tehran also sees the PRC as the key to future weapons technologies. "The Chinese have made immense advances in manufacturing of defensive weapons; and the not so complex technology of Chinese weapons (of course as compared to Western weapons) is capable of being absorbed into Iran's defence system." However, Iran also recognises that much of the transfer of the Chinese military production technologies, primarily in such sensitive areas as nuclear weapons, would be conducted via Pakistan, the long-term special ally of the PRC. Thus, Tehran concluded in the early Spring of 1994, the consolidation of an even stronger Trans-Asian Axis is the key to any strategic development capable of restraining the West, especially the US, and stabilising Iran's own place as the leader of the Muslim World. The key to the profound reinforcement of the Axis must be the inclusion of the newly independent Muslim states of Central Asia: the natural corridor between China and Persia along the historical Silk Road. Beijing shares Tehran's vision fully. Just how crucial the new Silk Road is to the PRC and its allies, primarily Iran and Pakistan, was recently clarified. In mid-April 1994, Premier Li Peng led the largest and most important Chinese delegation to have visited Central Asia on a 12 day tour in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgistan, and Kazakhstan. The primary objective of this trip was to revive China's traditional political economic hegemony in the region: the historical posture of China before the Russians started the slide into Muslim Central Asia in the 18th Century. "Now we want to build a new Silk Road to make our relations even more glorious," Li Peng said following a meeting with Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov. A major development in the formulation of the Trans-Asian Axis took place on August 29-31, 1994. Iranian First Vice-President Hassan Habibi led a delegation of 26 senior officials, including the entire elite of Iran's economic and industrial establishment, on a major visit to Beijing. Both Tehran and Beijing stressed that the visit was "at the official invitation of the Chinese Premier". Li Peng is perhaps the leading force behind the expansion of the Trans-Asian Axis as a cornerstone of the PRC's global strategy. Beijing quoted Habibi's expectations that his "visit to China will produce great impact upon further development of the ties between the two countries". In their statements at the beginning of the Sino- Iranian negotiations, both Li Peng and Habibi stressed historical themes. Li Peng stated that "Iran is a country with an ancient history and civilization which enjoys a special role in the region and across Asia." In his response, Habibi took the theme a step further: "For us, friendship with the people of China and cooperation with its Government is a fundamental strategic issue. We believe that, under present international conditions, Asia's civilised countries which enjoy a long history should increasingly cooperate with one another." While Habibi was still in Beijing, Tehran presented Habibi's vision of the future of Asia, specifically stating that these subjects were being clarified with Beijing at the moment: "The distinctive nature of the contemporary world, which is in a transitional period, demands that the power in the Asian region should forge closer constructive ties -- in short, strategic cooperation to guarantee their survival in the world of the 21st Century in all political, economic, and cultural fields. The experience of the Persian Gulf War clearly proved that, in view of US military power, giving all kinds of green lights to Washington or ignoring international developments results not only in attacks on one country or another, but can also prove catastrophic for the very existence of the Third World." "With the forging of new political alliances on the international level and the changes in international balances, strategic unions are vital and mandatory for all Asian countries that do not want to be in the orbits of US, European, or even Japanese pole, or be relegated to being marginal 'appendages'." "In fact, the era the United States envisions, where it will be the only power centre in the world, has not yet taken shape. Close and consistent cooperation among the bigger independent countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the PRC, Kazakhstan, and even Pakistan can be viewed in this context. High technology, unique manpower, limitless energy resources, and the enviable economic growth of these countries can all be molded into a firm and reliable 'fourth pole' in Asia with the advent of the 21st Century. Time is passing by swiftly; this opportunity should not be lost." Ultimately, the PRC remains the key to the long-term viability and success of the Trans-Asian Axis. The significance in the surge for, and the establishment of, the Trans-Asian Axis lies in that it is the main strategic policy of the younger generation of Chinese leaders. These leaders -- both civilians and military -- come from the next generation of leaders who will soon climb to supreme power in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. The leaders of the post-Deng generation are a sharp deviation from their elders. The very smooth and direct handover of power from one generation of leaders to the other should not mislead as to the extent of the profound difference between these two generations. Whereas the elder leaders were preoccuppied with the survival of the Chinese Revolution in a hostile world surrounding it, the younger leaders grew up in a communist China, and now come to power assertive and self- confident about a very strong China. They are preoccuppied with finding for their China the appropriate place at the top of world affairs. These younger Chinese leaders have a vision of a strong China reasserting itself as a world leader and a first-rank superpower. Their vision of the PRC is a combination of the 5,000-year legacy of China and a perceived role for Beijing as the natural leader for the up-and-coming Developing World. Beijing's rising leaders are fully cognisant that the pursuit of such national policy will place Beijing on a collision course with the West, particularly the US. The escalation of such a confrontation might even result in the removal of Western technology and economic investments from the PRC, as well as the closing down of China's export markets. They are convinced that the rise of China into global prominence is worthy of such a price. Moreover, the long-term forecasting in Beijing anticipates the marked decline of the importance of economic relations with the West to the PRC's economic and technological development. Beijing is convinced that the flow of technology and investments from Japan, the ROC (Taiwan), South Korea, and the rest of the East Asian states now recognising China's hegemony, will more than suffice to replace whatever the West will have taken away. With the entire scope of economic activities of the Far East "dragons" conducted under the clear regional hegemony of the PRC, Beijing will be in a position to dictate comfortable and preferable conditions for the regional economic cooperation. These younger leaders are far more open to economic "liberalism" (permission to get rich), including limited free market economy, than their predecessors. The conducive conditions for economic development and cooperation they intend to establish are bound to attract foreign investments regardless of the PRC's strategic posture and hegemonic designs. Beijing is also encouraged by the gradual revival of Tokyo's quest for sphere of influence -- this time based almost solely on economic might and dominance --because it is inherently anti-American simply because the US is Tokyo's main competition. In building this economic sphere of influence, Tokyo builds much of its strength on stressing common East Asian identity. Beijing is convinced that it will be able to convince, perhaps coerce, Tokyo into placing its economic sphere of influence within the framework of the Chinese strategic hegemonic umbrella. Tokyo's muted criticism of the PRC's military, primarily naval, build-up, as well as Beijing's heavy-handed handling of its claim for the Spratly Islands, reflect, as far as Beijing is concerned, initial signs of Japan's acceptance of the new role of the PRC. Tokyo's pleading with Beijing to restrain Pyongyang's nuclear reach, which is specifically aimed at Tokyo, provides Beijing with additional leverage over Tokyo. A critical question yet to be resolved is the role of Russia. Moscow has always considered "the Orient" as its primary zone of hegemony, and the drive South as its manifest destiny. Russia is working hard on the reintegration of the former Soviet Union, including Central Asia, while anticipating friction (at the very least) with the West. Moscow has no problems with the rise of China, as the myriad of recent and currently military deals demonstrate, as long as it does not interfere with the revival of Russia as a global superpower. The major question is the Islamists' reaction to the revival of Russian (neo-Soviet) hegemony in Central and South Asia. Moscow is convinced it can establish a strategic condominium with Beijing. Beijing is not hostile to such an eventually, especially once the Russophiles assume power in Moscow. In that case, Tehran and the Islamic bloc will have to cope with the new reality along the Trans-Asian Axis. Thus, a major geo-strategic development has been taking place in Asia since late 1993: a Chinese drive to consolidate an anti-US Trans- Asian Axis along the route of the historic Silk Road which connects the heartland of Islam with China and East Asia. This Trans-Asian Axis is already of major political, strategic and economic importance. Considering the Islamic character of the states of Central and South Asia, the PRC pursues this geo-strategic surge in close collaboration with the Iran-led Islamic bloc of which these states are members. The new alliance built around the Trans-Asian Axis is already a centre for military development and production (including nuclear weapons technologies), as well as financial centre for hard currency obtained through drug trade, counterfeiting US dollars, the acquisition of sophisticated Western technologies and industrial systems (both legally and illegally), as well as nuclear materials and sophisticated weapon systems from the former Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that most of the economic activities related to the Trans-Asian Axis are illegal -- when judged by international norms -- and so huge that they already have had a dramatic impact on the structure and functioning of organised crime all over the world. The Trans-Asian Axis already constitutes a clear military and strategic challenge to the US, a threat which will only increase in the immediate future. In 1992, key members of this alliance -- North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- actively prepared to launch a coordinated war against the US and its close allies in order to reverse the growing Western influence in the world. Beijing apparently gave its blessing and provided extensive military assistance. The plan was averted at the last minute because of internal problems in Pyongyang. Presently, the availability of operational nuclear weapons and regional delivery systems in the hands of the most radical elements of the Axis -- Iran and North Korea -- significantly increases their readiness to embark on a major confrontation with the US. The Trans-Asian Axis may soon, if the present pace of preparations and coordination continues, transform into the primary strategic challenge facing the West. The near-future evolution of the Trans- Asian Axis will have a direct impact on the global posture of such countries as Russia and Japan, as well as on the present form of existence of such countries as Israel, India, and South Korea.

Top of Watch

"AN UPDATE ON THE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA."

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy April 30, 1995 "AN UPDATE ON THE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA." (Pg. 10) "North Korea Continues, With Bellicosity, What Appear To Be Preparations For an Imminent War." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Kim Jong-II now has unfettered control over Noah Korea's military forces. He and his Troika of military advisers seem, with the collapse in April of the US-led coalition to contain North Korean nuclear ambitions, to be nowpushing for an excuse to begin armed conflict against South Korea. In the meantime, Pyongyang has successfully split the US away from other states in the diplomatic process. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky analyses the current events and players. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- THE UNITED STATES and the Republic of Korea) the ROK: South Korea) on April 8, 1995, took major confidence-building measures in order to pacify the North Korean (DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Government in Pyongyang. Despite the harsh position of the DPRK in previous negotiations, Washington agreed to resume contacts on April 12. In order to reassure the DPRK of the safety of the South Korean nuclear reactor technology promised by the US to the DPRK, Seoul announced that the ROK was willing to admit North Korean experts to its nuclear power reactor, a standard-model light-water reactors at the nuclear power plant city, Ulchin. Instead, the DPRK embarked on a series of moves which strongly suggest that Pyongyang was more interested in the escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, than its resolution. By the end of April, US-DPRK negotiations were virtually collapsed, but already on April 8, in response to the South Korean offer, Pyongyang formally declared: "South Korea will never be allowed to play a 'pivotal role' in the provision of the lightwater reactors and the scheme to provide South Korean-model light-water reactors will eventually go bankrupt." Pyongyang stressed that the reactor issue was a profound political and strategic issue aimed at consolidating US- DPRK relations. "The DPRK has never invited South Korea to take part in the delivery of the light-water reactors nor expected it to play a 'role,'" Pyongyang asserted. "The South Korean puppets have no justification nor qualification to poke their nose into the DPRK-US negotiations." Moreover, in order to increase pressure, Pyongyang formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, a United Nations agency) that it "was preparing to refuel a five- megawatt reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex." IAEA Director-General Hans Blix acknowledged that the DPRK had the right to do so considering that the implementation of the October 1994 agreement was off schedule. This political rhetoric and brinkmanship would have been just that, had Kim Jong-II not led the DPRK through profound military reforms which significantly enhance his ability to instigate crisis and even war. Even as he is avoiding the formal assumption of the leadership titles, Kim Jong-II is rapidly implementing drastic reforms in the DPRK. Most important is the recent completion of the streamlining and modernisation of the High Command of the KPA (Korean People's Army) at the national-strategic level. As presently organised, the KPA High Command is better organised to go into action on the basis of the whims of Kim Jong-Il, with special emphasis put on special operations, covert actions, and international terrorism. Although these reforms have been gradually evolving since mid-1993, in the aftermath of the "Semi-War State'; it took a dramatic event to bring about their completion. On February 25, 1995, O Chin-U -- the last of the genuinely powerful leaders of Kim Il-Song's generation -- died after a long struggle with cancer. Marshal O Chin-U was much more than Minister of Defence as well as senior member in a host of key defence and political bodies: he was the only man Kim Il-Song truly and wholly trusted since the early 1980s. Indeed, O Chin-U was trusted and revered by Kim Jong-II, who considered him as a father-like figure, an extremely important relationship in a society that places special emphasis on old age and wisdom. Indeed, on February 24, when it was dear that O Chin-U had only a few hours left, Kim Jong-Il paid him a farewell visit at his bedside. This visit was more than a clear expression of the unique place of O Chin-U in Pyongyang. Kim Jongo Il spent several hours with the dying O Chin-U. Reportedly, he emerged from the hospital with expressions of deep sadness on his face, and visible signs of crying. Significantly, it was not only O Chin-U who remained in power even as he was dying from cancer, but with him remained the entire institutions from which he was deriving political power. Thus, with the death of Marshal O Chin-U -- "the most faithful revolutionary warrior of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-Song" (according to the obituary) -- the last impediment for the transformation of the KPA into Kim Jong-Il's military was removed. It is obvious that preparations for this day had long been in the works, for within a couple of weeks a new streamlined High Command -- befitting Kim Jong-II's personality -- emerged with manyyotmger generals in prominent positions. THE SIGNIFICANCE and potential ramifications of the new military reforms in Pyongyang must be assessed in the context of the personality and government style of Kim Jong-Il. Taking into considerations the peculiarities of his personality, the reason for these reforms becomes clear. The Kim Jong-Il in power in Pyongyang is an individual who has been groomed and prepared to assume power for several decades, but whose personality has been altered since suffering brain damage in 1993. Kim Jong-Il suffered some brain damage in September 1993 in a traffic accident, when he crashed his car while speeding and probably drunk. According to Chinese military medical experts, including senior brain surgeons, Kim Jong-Il even suffered damage to the skull bones in this car crash. These injuries came on top of a severe head injury which Kim Jong-Il suffered around June 1993 as a result of falling off a horse. Western medical experts suggest that such a succession of blows to the brain may result in dropping of brain cells, early atrophy, or even some shrinking of the brain. Such a condition leads to mood swings in the affected individual. A very unstable individual will display a greater tendency to lose his temper. With time, the impairment may grow further, but the individual will not notice the change. This danger is more acute especially if the affected individual is surrounded by sycophants. Thus, the individual in question can act irrationally, primarily if there is no external restraint on him. Most important, individuals so affected tend to lose sense of continuity. They tend to concentrate on immediate actions in order to deliver immediate gratification. They gradually lose any sense of consequence or anticipation of results of one's actions. These injuries are not known to have afected the overall routine performance of Kim Jong-Il as either a leader in the waiting, let alone as the de facto supreme leader. Indeed, since the early 1990s, Kim Jong-I1 has been maintaining his usual daily schedule. He is working until very late at night, usually the pre-dawn hours, and then sleeps late. During the day he makes frequent breaks in the work schedule in order to receive "special treatment and enjoyment" from a "pleasure-giving team" under dose and specific medical supervision. He also continues to watch foreign movies spedally imported from the West for himself and dose colleagues. Most important are the many late night sessions in which Kim Jong- Il and a few of his most trusted loyalists debate key issues while enjoying the company of pretty women. Well-informed Japanese sources believe that the question of initiating a war with South Korea has been raised in these sessions during 1993-94. The discussion between Kim Jong-II and his confidantes reached the point of contemplating specific scenarios for provoking a major milltan/dash with the South all the way to launching a surprise attack and a major regional war. Moreover, since he asstuned responsibilities for defence and foreign affairs in the early 1990s, Kim Jong-Il has developed a unique "reception-centre political style" -- similar to an informal kitchen cabinet -- made up of a few loyalists and confidantes whom he trusts most. It is noteworthy that these include mainly technocrats, experts, military people, scientists, and other professionals whose expertise can support state affairs. Kim Jong-Il dearly values their expertise and knowledge. Their late night discussion sessions are reportedly conducted in a relatively relaxed environment which promotes the free exchange of opinions. Ultimatdy, Kim Jong-Il is being portrayed as being far less troubled by formalities ┤han his father|, a more open personality, who is preoccupied with substance. He does have political ability and was properly groomed for decision'makings and crisis management. However, at the same time, these loyalists continue to display flattery in their relations with Kim Jong-Il. In view of Kim Jong- Il's mental condition, and the sensitivity to lack of external restraint, the question remains how free, how objective, and how effective these sessions are. Furthermore, there remains the question of Kim Jong-Il's own decisionmaking capabilities, and especially the possibility of a growing tendency to take bold gambles for immediate effect, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and war. IN MARCH 1995, the DPRK's Ministry of the Armed Forces was formally downgraded from an organisation of the National Defenc Commission, chaired by Kim Jong-Il, to an agency of the State Administration Council. For as long as Kim Jong-Il-Song was alive but Kim Jong-Il was actually in power, the Defence Ministry was listed under the National Defence Commission chaired by Kim Jong-Il who was answering directly to Kim II-Song. Now that Kim Jong-Il is in firm control of the party, military and Government, there is no longer any need for the DPRK to have such an extraordinary committee manned by the older guard, mainly O Chin-U's people. Thus, in March, Pyongyang reshaped the military bureaucracy to fit Kim Jong-Il's cementing his grip on the vitally important armed forces. What is very important is the technical change in the military structure, which does not mean a change in the importance or role of the military. It amounts to Kirn Jong-Il's assuming unchallengeable control over the KPA. This is a reflection of his growing confidence in the running of the country. Indeed, the new High Command is a small group of senior officers, all of them younger, answering directly to Kim Jong-Il as a kind of a Soviet Stavka, a wartime high command that cuts through all institutional constraints. Consequently, the military assumes responsibility to additional segments and aspects of the nation's economy and other functions. Indeed, there has been an increase in the prestige and centrality of the KPA elite, as demonstrated in the recent KPA conferences. Moreover, there is a streamlining in the military chain of command, enabling Kim Jong-Il to get results quickly. ESSENTIALLY, since Kim Jong-Il was largely dominating the personnel system of the military since 1973 via the "three revolution teams", his loyalists have already grown inside the system. Therefore, there has been a smooth transition from one generation of senior officers to the other. Since Kim Jong-Il has controlled the military for a long time, there will not be drastic changes in doctrine or basic military concepts. The only major development since the death of O Chin-U is the clear expression of loyalty to Kim Jong-Il and the younger generation of the High Command. Ultimately, Kim Jong-Il relies on technocrats who are personally loyal to him, and whom he knows and trusts professionally and politically. Of the 1,200 generaIs in the KPA, ouly 60 really have power. All of them are very dose to and personally loyal to Kim Jong- Il. Most, but not all, of them are younger. At the very top of the military and intelligence/special operations establishment there is the "Troika" of the people most loyal to, and trusted by, Kim Jong-II: Generals O Kuk-Yol, Kim Tu-Nam, and Kim Kang-Hwan. Marshal Choe Kwang is also trusted fully, but not like the "Troika". * General O Kuk-Yol (64) is the military confidant and right hand man of Kim Jong-Il. A highly educated former Chief of the General Staff, he is considered a leading expert in modern warfare and nuclear weapons. In mid-1993, O Kuk-Yol emerged as one of DPRK's most senior intelligence functionaries -- the Director of the Operations Department -- a most important intelligence arm. Under O Kuk-Yol, the North Korean intelligence system has undergone major changes which significantly increased its capabilities to operate in and against South Korea, conducting a host of activities ranging from data collection to widespread special operations and covert warfare. * General Kim Tu-Nam (67) is "the military professor" of Kim Jong- Il, his special military tutor who prepared him for leadership and the High Command. Kim Tu-Nam developed a "special relationship" with his student. Subsequently Kim Tu-Nam carried out special projects on the behest of Kim Jong-Il. Most recently, Kim Tu-Nam was responsible for the modernisation of the irregular forces and the light infantry (special forces). * Col.-Gen. Kim Kang-Hwan (63) is an aide and confidante of Kim Tu-Nam who worked with him when he was Kim Jong-Il's tutor. As deputy chief of the general staff, Kim Kang-Hwan took over many tasks from Kim Tu-Nam, especially the development of strategy and operational plans including the use of the intelligence and special forces in a host of possible contingencies ranging from covert actions to a major war. The overall character of the "Troika" of Kim Jong-II -- his closest confidants and senior commanders -- is that they really believe in the practice of special operations, international terrorism, covert operations, and other forms of "dirty war". * The KPA Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Choe Kwang (77), is a rising political-military force in the DPRK. In 1988, Choe Kwang, a Kim Il-Song devotee, was suddenly promoted and nominated Chief of the General Staff. While in office, Choe Kwang proved himself as "a key supporter of Kim Jong-Il" all the way to the reorganisation of the DPRK's national military elite. Choe Kwang is known as "a believer in weapons" and "an expert on modern warfare". He is often described as "a man absolutely fixated on weapons and as such is a specialist with a keen understanding of modern warfare". Choe Kwang was the motivating force behind the DPRK's acquisition and production of new weapons. Kim Jong-Il respects Choe Kwang not just because of his devotion and loyalty, but because of his close relations with Kim Il-Song and O Chin-U. This special reverence was demonstrated during the funeral of O Chin-U. Although Kim Jong-Il was present in the funeral, Marshal Choe Kwang delivered the main eulogy speech. On the basis of his performance in O Chin-U's funeral and the KPA conferences of mid- March, Choe Kwang emerges as the likely successor to O Chin-U as the Minister of Defence. The other key defence officials around Kim Jong-II -- those taking part in his "reception-centre political style" as needed -- are: * Vice Marshal Kim Kwang-Chin (68) enjoys "the highest confidence of Kim Jong-Il". He is an artillery and rocket expert, distinguished in cooperation with the PRC on the development of the supergun and with the USSR on the development of the heavy MRBM with CBW warheads. The initial deployment of both projects was completed successfully in the Autumn of 1994. * Kim Chol-Su (50 or 51) is an intelhgence/special forces/terrorism senior official. Officially he belongs to the General Security Bureau -- Kim Jong-II's body guards -- but that force also carries out highly sensitive covert operations on Kim Jong-Il's behalf. His sudden and meteoric rise, as with the elevation of O Kuk-Yol in the intelligence and special forces, is an expression of Kirn Jong-Il's penchant for the "dirty war". Irrespective of the precise definition of his position, he holds a very important and sensitive position in the military/security forces. Kim Chol-Su is reported to be the eldest son of Kim Yong-Chu, Kim Il-Song's brother and presently a vice president of the DPRK. * General Yi Pong-Won (70) is a military ideological expert, and a candidate for director of General Political Bureau. * General Cho Myong-Nok (65) is the commander of the Air Force and an expert on modern warfare. He is also instrumental in the strategic cooperation with Iran, as well as the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. * General Kim Il-Chol (67) is the commander of the Navy and expert on submarines and cruise missiles. He started his distinguished career as the commander of the seizure of the USS Pueblo. * Chon Pyong-Ho (69) is not a military man but an expert in national economy, mobilisation and production. The force behind the DPRK's war economy, he is responsible for the marked expansion of the munitions and military industries. * General Yi Ha-Il (65) is the director of the Party's Military Department and enjoys the confidence of Kim Jong-Il, as well as that of the younger military leaders. He was instrumental in establishing the Kim Jong-Il personality cult system in the military. A former commander of a Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Brigade, he was promoted by Kim Jong-Il by several ranks. * General Chang Song-U (67) is the director of Political Department of the Ministry of Public Security. He is Kim Jong-Il's loyalist and confidante in the ranks of the internal security apparatus. He also rose in the ranks of the intelligence and special forces. * Kim Ha-Kyu (50s) is akind of military aide to Kim Jong-Il who was noted escorting him during visits to military units. Other rising stars who are yet to enjoy the same trust the senior officers above do include: O Yong-Bang, Kim Pong-Yul, Kim Myong-Kuk, Pak Chae-Kyong, Kim Chong-Kak, Yong Ho-Kyun, Yi Ul-Sol, and Kim Ha- Kyu. The only public appearance of the DPRK High Command was at the KPA conference in mid-March. There, the key senior officers on the rostrum were Marshal Choe Kwang, Vice Marshals Kim Kwang-Chin and Kim Pong-Yul, Generals Yi Ha-Il, Cho Myong-Nok, Kim Il-Chol, Pak Ki-So, Yi Pong-Won, Kim Myong-Kuk, and Col.-Gen. Pak Chae-Kyong. These senior officers are believed to be "the rising stars" of the KPA and confidants of Kim Jong-Il. They seem to have operational control, for they escorted Kim Jong-Il on some of his l0 visits to frontline units in early 1995. THE DPRK LEAVES no doubt that it has resumed the active preparations for war. Since last Winter, the DPRK has been conducting the largest and most vigorous military exercises in recent years. These exercises are purely offensive, and demonstrated impressive capabilities to conduct swift deep offensive (blitzkrieg). These exercises began in December 1994 and were peaking toward March 1995 as the weather was improving. In mid-March, the exercises not only accelerated, but assumed a distinct Kim Jong-Il character. The KPA Air Force embarked on a major war exercise, the largest since 1991. It was purely offensive in character. Most important were deep air strikes by fighter bombers, low-altitude night deep penetration by light aircraft (mainly An-2s delivering special forces), day and night mass para-drops and desant landings, as well as diversified deep bombing and aerial strikes missions. The aerial operations coincided with the wrapping up of a series of intense and rigorous special forces and naval exercises. At the same time, there was a sudden expansion and escalation of the brigade-level combined arms exercises, mainly combined arms deep offensive in terrain similar to South Korea. It is ironic, but these exercises were largely made possible by the US delivery of oil in accordance with the October 1994 Geneva Agreement. Consequently, the DPRK could release large quantities of oil from its strategic military reserves to these exercises. Indeed, there is yet to be a discernible improvement in the availability of electricity to the North Korean civilian population for whom this US- supplied oil is intended. Meanwhile, in recent months there has been an overall marked and discernible improvement in the non-nuclear capabilities of the DPRK Armed Forces. Among the main developments are the activation of a dozen or so ballistic missile bases, the deployment of over 20 "superguns" and some 40 heavy multiple-barrel rocket sites. Most of these long range artillery systems are aimed at the Seoul area. Moreover, in late March, the DPRK fired several up-graded anti-ship cruise missiles -- a Silkworm follow-up with a range of around 85km -- into the Sea of Japan. Japanese officials suggested that these missiles "were fired as part of a routine practice", even though the DPRK had not carried out missile launches of such magnitude since mid- 1993. BY MID-MARCH, the KPA High Command began implementing Kim Jong-II's reforms and guidelines. On March 13, 1995, the KPA High Command had a milestone conference. Officially, the meeting was in commemoration of the 20th anniversary and the fifth anniversary of training programmes introduced by Kim Jong-Il. In reality, it was a milestone conference aimed at briefing the North Korean general rank officers on organising and consolidating Kim Jong-Il's High Command, and the activation of a new streamlined military system under his tight control. The conference was chaired by Marshal Choe Kwang and Generals Kim Pong-Yul and Kim Kwang-Chin. The opening speech was by Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, one of the fast- rising younger generals. He stressed that "the People's Army should repeatedly train itself and strengthen its combat ability in every way, so as to fulfil its sublime revolutionary mission for the times, the revolution, the fatherland, and the people." Col.-Gen. Kim Chung- Kak anticipates troubles and crises for the DPRK in the immediate future due to external threats, but expresses confidence in the ability of the KPA to successfully resolve all challenges. "Although our revolutionary situation has been complicated in the past few days, our People's Army has crushed every one of the provocative moves of the US imperialists and the South Korean military fascist clique, and credibly defended the security of the socialist motherland and the happiness of the people." Col.-Gen. Kim Chung-Kak, and other speakers, stressed that the DPRK was once again on the verge of a major crisis in which the KPA might be called upon to save the motherland: that is, to fight the enemies of the DPRK. On March 15, the conference was expanded into a mass gathering of "company commanders and company political officers": that is, the prime of the KPA tactical command echelons. It was a huge crowd. The opening session of the conference was attended by Kim Jong-Il, expressing the importance of the event. Satting at the rostrum with him were Choe Kwang, Kim Kwang-Chin, Kim Pong-Yul, and Yi Ha-Il. The opening statement was delivered by General Yi Pong-Won. He stressed the growing challenges facing the DPRK, and military loyalty to Kim Jong-Il as the source of salvation. The main address was delivered by Choe Kwang. It was a professional presentation, with Choe Kwang specifically stressing the military challenges facing the DPRK, and the urgent need to train strenuously to deal with impending challenges. Choe Kwang told the tactical commanders to prepare their troops to "live and fight in the revolutionary spirit of unconditionally fulfilling the orders of the supreme commander to the letter and complete the combat preparations of the companies to emerge ever victorious in the fight with the enemy". Kim Kwang-Chin also delivered a professional report to the conference. He stressed the modernisation of the KPA companies, the increase in military might, and the growing importance of combined arms and high maneuvrability offensive operations at the tactical level. He also delved on the ability of the tactical units to defend their own bunkers and other fortified installations against overwhelming forces. There was an important sign in his speech. He emphasised that troops should be prepared to carry out missions at any price. He called on the commanders and political officers to embark on an indoctrination campaign in order to prepare their troops to sustain heavy losses and hardships. This kind of indoctrination is usually delivered at the last minute in order to prepare the soldiers for the challenges ahead, but simultaneously so as to prevent soldiers (young men) from delving on the prospects of imminent death for too long, a phenomena known to be drastically decreasing the troops' morale and combat capabilities. Therefore, Kim Kwang-Chin's preoccupation with the subject dearly reflects Pyongyang's belief that a major crisis is imminent. INDEED, THERE HAS been a corresponding change in the political education of both the KPA and the North Korean population as a whole. Since early March, there has been a rapid resumption of the anti-US propaganda in the DPRK, again biting the drums of war. On March 1, Pyongyang announced that the intensified US aerial intelligence gathering activities from South Korea were a sure sign that "the US imperialists are watching for a chance to invade the North", despite Pyongyang's "forthcoming policies". On March 10, Pyongyang attacked the US strategy in East Ash as the spark for a major conflagration. An "expert analysis" by a senior official concluded that the US was determined to go to war. The US Asia-Pacific strategy for the 21 st Century leaves no doubt that "the US ambition to stifle the DPRK with strength and dominate the world remains unchanged" despite political dynamics in the region. The US decision to keep forces in South Korea even after North Korea completely abandoned its military nuclear programme was proof that the US had no intention of complying with the October 1994 agreement. The senior official stated Pyongyang's conclusion: "The "security strategy" is aimed at permanently occupying South Korea and invading the DPRK. It is also a strategy for a military aggression to realise the US dominationist purpose." Pyongyang then introduced its own alternative to the new Korean War. In mid-March, the DPRK revived its call for "reunification through confederation" as the key for the immediate reunification of Korea. Pyongyang cited at great length the specific writings of Kim Il-Song on the subject, thus giving the proposal the highest possible authority and importance. The new element added in the March 1995 proposal was Pyongyang's assertion that the people of South Korea were yearning for such a unification, but only the US was pressuring Seoul by force of arms not to continue on the path to reunification. By late March, Pyongyang further developed the theme of an impending crisis, and possibly a new Korean War, despite the stern efforts by the DPRK to make peace. On March 24, Pyongyang formally warned that Washington's Korean policy was leading toward war. An expert analysis by a senior official warned that "The reckless military moves of the United States still leave the Korean peninsula in a state of military confrontation and bring tension to a higher pitch. The US outcries about 'threat' from the DPRK is nothing but a pretext used to justify its war moves." The analyst warned that conditions on the Peninsula were ripe for an eruption. "The DPRK and the United States are still in a belligerent state," he explained. Therefore, he warned, "the war gamble of the United States may develop into a war any moment". The senior official concluded with a threat. "The United States should ponder over the ensuing grave consequences of the reckless military adventure and quit acting rashly." MEANWHILE, Pyongyang embarked on another course to improve its overall strategic posture in the brewing crisis. Pyongyang decided to remove Japan from the US-led coalition against it. In mid-March, Pyongyang formally added Japan to the list of potential military threats. Pyongyang explained that Japan changed its ostensibly defensive national doctrine to that of "pre-emptive attack" with emphasis on "long-distance attack capacity" of the air force, navy, and other quality arms. Pyongyang has no doubt who is the sole objective of this military modernisation. "The Japanese reactionaries now direct the sharp edge of overseas aggression to the Korean peninsula. They dream of invading Korea and, with it as the springboard, staging a comeback to Asia. This is, however, a foolish dream. Asia today is not what it was yesterday." Pyongyang concluded with a warning to Tokyo that the DPRK would not be able to sit idle as the regional balance of forces is changing so adversely. Significantly, this virtual ultimatum came just as Tokyo was actually considering the resumption of talks on normalisation of relations with the DPRK. The Japanese Government was reluctant to pursue the talks while facing intense pressure from Washington to join and increase the sanctions and pressure on the DPRK in connection with the stalemated nuclear deal of October 1994. And then, on the morning of March 20, still unknown terrorists distributed Sarin nerve agents in the Tokyo subway. Irrespective of whom the actual perpetrators were, the Japanese Government suddenly remembered the DPRK. Within days, a Japanese delegation headed by former Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe arrived in Pyongyang. The Il-member group included lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its partners in the coalition, the Socialists and the Sakigake Party. Officially, their mission was "to resume talks aimed at normalising relations" between their parties and the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). There was no effort to hide their true objective. "Now is a good time for the two governments to resume negotiations aimed at normalising relations," Watanabe told Kim Yong-sun, WPK Secretary. Official Tokyo left no doubt that the Japanese Government knew exactly what it was doing. On March 28, Japanese officials acknowledged that "the current visit could hamper international efforts to break a deadlock over the ￥PRK's| nuclear programme". A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said that Tokyo was "hoping that the delegation will not do anything to encourage North Korea to harden its stance . . . The timing is very delicate and important." Official Tokyo was quick to raise a smoke screen. On March 29, Tokyo acknowledged that "Japanese and North Korean politicians are close to signing a declaration on restartlag efforts to normalise diplomatic relations between their two countries". Japanese politicians in Pyongyang acknowledged that "the two sides had agreed in principle that formal bilateral talks on setting up diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo should restart". The Japanese also reported that the "North Koreans said they needed to discuss ┤he proposed agreement| before deciding whether to accept the Japanese proposal". Indeed, Japan and the DPRK had already reached an agreement on March 28. Ostensibly, it was an agreement between the WPK and the coalition of Japanese political parties. In this agreement, North Korea dropped its demands for massive reparations for the colonial era and World War II in return for quick tangible gains, especially anti- US activities. Significantly, Tokyo promised to help Pyongyang resist Washington's pressure in the row over what type of light-water reactor the DPRK will get. Tokyo will also assist Pyongyang to overcome the present economic crisis and food shortages as a humanitarian gesture and without any linkage to the nuclear crisis. Since Japan had to carry most of the burden of this agreement, Tokyo expected some political concessions from Pyongyang. However, once in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation "suddenly" decided not to challenge the DPRK's proposals and quickly reached an agreement. Indeed, officials in Seoul and Tokyo believe that "Japan and North Korea have already concluded a secret agreement on normalisation. PYONGYANG WAS AWARE Of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations with the Watanabe delegation: that is, that there would soon be major cracks in the US-led coalition against the DPRK from the very beginning. This knowledge can explain Pyongyang's steadfast refusal to break the deadlock on the implementation of the October 1994 agreement. The impasse reached new height in the intense but ultimately futile negotiations on-March 25-27 in Berlin. The North Koreans adamantly refused to accept reactors manufactured in South Korea. US officials insist the only possibility is South Korean reactors since Seoul was expected to foot most of the bill. However, on March 29, Pyongyang announced that it had submitted an "epochal proposal" in Berlin in order to resolve the reactor and all other issues. Official Pyongyang stressed that "the matter was now in the hands of the United States". Pyongyang left no doubt that the very existence of the agreement now depends on Washington's acquiescence to its proposal. "At the negotiations, the DPRK side set forth an epochal proposal to tide over the present deadlocks concerning the question of hght water reactor model and the US side promised to study our proposal," Pyongyang explained. "Since we have made our best for the progress of the negotiations, prospect for the solution of the question entirely depends on the sincerity of our dialogue partner." According to Japanese and South Korean sources, the essence of the North Korean "epochal proposal" is for the US to impose the reunification of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the "reunification through confederation" program Pyongyang revived in mid-March. Essentially, Pyongyang argued that the only way a reactor made in Korea could be built in the North is if it is the product of a single, unified Korea. The precondition for such a reunification is the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK and the establishment of a peace and security pact between Pyongyang and Washington. "The basic strategy to implement the ￡eneva| Agreement is to pull out US troops from South Korea, a major reason behind the military confrontation between the US and the DPRK, and to set up a new peace and security status between the US and the DPRK," a North Korean official told a Japanese counterpart. Once the US troops are withdrawn, Pyongyang is confident the road would be open for a quick "reunification". The pact with Washington would prevent the US from actively intervening in the "reunification process", especially through the use of military means. On March 30, Pyongyang pointed out the alternative, accusing Washington of instigating a war in Korea. Pyongyang argued that recent US military activities prove that Washington "is to make a fait accompli the provocation for a new Korean War by the United States and that the United States is hurrying its preparations". The DPRK stressed that the military solution was acceptable for Pyongyang. "We are ready for dialogue as well as war," Pyongyang said. "The United States must by no means doubt our people's steadfast will. If the United States continues to move toward the adventurous road of war by clinging to the policy of strength as it was regardless of our repeated warning, it will have to be wholly responsible for all consequences arising therefrom." Of course, Pyongyang would love to see Washington acquiescing to the "epochal proposal" and the ensuing "reunification through confederation" of the Korean Peninsula. However, Kim Jong-II's Pyongyang knows better. The real objective of DPRK negotiation tactics is to instigate the catalyst and excuse for the crisis they really seek in order to break the deadlock in the region. Such a strategy fits dosely with Kjm Jong-Il's personality and approach to decisionmaking. As discussed above, there is a growing tendency in Kim Jong-Il to take bold gambles for immediate gratification, even though such steps may unleash a crisis and even a war. Meanwhile, South Korean experts are increasingly worried that the DPRK might "provoke a limited war" in the near future. They base their analysis on the characteristics of the recent military exercises and build-up in the DPRK, as well as the latest reforms in the KPA High Command. These experts believe that Pyongyang is reluctant to embark on a full-scale war unless the economic isolation becomes intolerable to the point that it threatens the stability of Kim Jong- Il. The deal with Tokyo significantly reduces this possibility. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il is determined to reach a quick and dramatic breakout of the deadlock. According to the South Korean experts, Pyongyang believes that "a limited war will be possible if North Korea feels it necessary to create tension for pohtical purposes: to remove factors leading to its own internal unrest." "Since North Korea is now imputing its own economic difficulties to having to increase its armaments in preparation against a possible provocation by the ROK and the United States, it is possible younger commanding officers in the North Korean military will launch a military provocation against the South out of desperation." They warn that the DPRK might well embark on such a provocation even if there is a chance that a limited war would escalate into "an accidental war" amounting to "a total, planned military provocation against the South". A spate of terrorism, subversion, as well as special and covert operations, fits very closely with both the DPRK's perception of a limited war, and the penchant of Kim Jong-Il and his "Troika" for the "dirty War. There is an aura of self-confidence and great anticipation at the highest levels in Pyongyang. In late March, rumours of a dramatic breakout were prevailing among senior DPRK officials with access to visiting foreigners (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) in Pyongyang. These DPRK officials anticipated that Kim Jong-Il would finally assume formal power in October 1995. They stressed the importance of the date as both commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the WPK, and, the national triumph in the aftermath of a great national achievement and overcoming of a major trial they are certain the DPRK will endure later this year. It should also be remembered that both Kim Il-Song and Kim Jong-Il declared 1995 to be the year of reunification.

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"The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal Is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With The US."

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy July 31, 1994 "The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal Is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With The US." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- North Korea and the United States were preparing, in August, to sign a deal which would "resolve their differences" over the DPRK's military nuclear development. But the deal is merely intended to save face for all concerned. North Korea -- the DPRK -- already has deployed a substantial number of nuclear weapons and the US is not prepared to confront the matter. Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky has the details. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The US and the DPRK were due to agree in August the outline of a wide-ranging accord to resolve their differences on the North Korean nuclear programme. The essence of the deal is that the US will provide North Korea with a light-water reactor, "make arrangements for interim energy alternatives" for the DPRK (euphemism for supply of oil), and work to "reduce barriers to trade and investment" so as to generally improve the North Korean economy. In return, "upon receipt of US assurances" that the above conditions are being implemented, the DPRK "will freeze construction" of its bigger graphite-cooled reactors, "seal the Radiochemical Laboratory" (its main reprocessing facilities), "forego" processing of the 4,000 rods (even though the IAEA still will not have access to them), and accept a yet to be determined regime of IAEA inspections. The overriding principle of this new Geneva accord is not that North Korea is merely freezing some of its nuclear activities in return for a huge incentive package. None of the DPRK's nuclear installations would be destroyed, while the US and its allies would be providing another reactor as well as resolving many of the DPRK's endemic energy supply and economic problems. Washington seems to believe that once these measures are adopted, Pyongyang would no longer be able to procure nuclear weapons, save for the "one or two" devices it already has. Little could be further from reality. North Korea -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -- already has close to 10 operational nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, and two nuclear devices that can be carried by truck or transport aircraft. All the weapons are 50kt nuclear warheads, each weighing around 500kg �1,100 lb.|. All the DPRK's ballistic missiles can carry nuclear warheads. The DPRK already has over 120 NoDong-1s, and a few hundred NK-Scud- Bs and NK-Scud-Cs, in operational service. In late March 1993, the DPRK completed the development of the upgraded NoDong-1 "which may be equipped with nuclear warhead" with 1,300km range. The DPRK is also accelerating the development of a new SSM, the NoDong-2, estimated to have a range of 1,500-2,000km. The test launching of the first NoDong-2 prototypes is expected in 1994-95 and, barring a major setback, the NoDong-2 will become operational in 1996-97. Therefore, the NoDong-2 can be pressed into operational service under extreme conditions. The DPRK, along with the PRC and Iran, is also developing a new generation of ballistic missiles far more accurate than the NoDong-family and optimised for nuclear warheads. The SSMs, the TaepoDong-1 and the TaepoDong-2, will have ranges of 2,000km and 3,500km respectively. A modified TaepoDong-2 will be able reach a range of 9,600km. More advanced nuclear-tipped SSMs, such as the NoDong-X, are also near entry into operational service. The proposed closing down of the DPRK's 5mw reactor will have no impact whatsoever on the DPRK's current and near-term operational nuclear capabilities. This discrepancy between the White House's assessment and reality reflects the two fundamental approaches to intelligence analysis. The first relies primarily on finding and verification by technical means: from space-based collection systems to a variety of sensors and measuring systems of such international bodies as the IAEA. The second relies primarily on human sources: defectors, spies, intelligence officers and other resources. At the crux of the DPRK's nuclear "problem" is the amount of plutonium extracted from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. Washington insists that there is no verifiable evidence that plutonium was extracted but once in 1989. Therefore, the DPRK could not have the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. This approach has already failed two major tests. Since June 1992, activities intensified in the DPRK's primary nuclear weapons site at Yongbyon, an elaborate underground complex called Building 500. Pyongyang argued that the building was merely a nuclear waste storage site. In early 1993, the IAEA inspectors requested access to Building 500 to confirm what it was. The DPRK not only refused, but announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Korean People's Army (KPA) quickly established 40 military encampments, three airbases, a major ammunition depot, and deployed some 300 heavy anti-aircraft guns around the entire Yongbyon complex. The IAEA's continued insistence on inspecting Building 500 resulted in the DPRK's declaring the Semi-War State, ordering mobilisation of its armed forces. Presumably, North Korea would not have risked war over a dump site. In early May 1994, the DPRK violated the remnants of its agreement with the IAEA. Ignoring warnings from the US and the UN, including explicit threats of sanctions, the DPRK cancelled the IAEA inspections. The North Koreans quickly removed 4,000 fuel rods from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon, making it impossible to measure if any plutonium had ever been removed. Measuring the extent of a possible removal of plutonium from these fuel rods is the key to verifying through technical means the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. By theoretical calculations alone, the 5mw reactor could have produced since 1990 enough plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons. Defectors insist that plutonium had been extracted clandestinely over the years and used for the production of nuclear warheads. Therefore, only sampling and measurements of the fuel rods undertaken by IAEA inspectors on site in Yongbyon would have been able to either confirm or dispel the defectors' accounts about the size of the North Korean military nuclear programme. Pyongyang has repeatedly denied having any military nuclear programme, let alone weapons. Therefore, the DPRK's adamant refusal to allow any inspection and measurement of the rods to the point of escalating the crisis to the verge of UN sanctions and possible US military action cannot but indicate that the DPRK has something to hide. An explanation can be found in the persistent flow of information from North Korean defectors, as well as sources from Russia, the PRC, and other countries, about all aspects of the development of nuclear weapons in Yongbyon. The DPRK secretly and incrementally removed plutonium from the 5mw reactor. Kim Dai-Ho, a former official at a North Korean reprocessing plant in Yongbyon who defected in May 1994, reported that back in 1988 the DPRK had secretly removed 12 kg �26.4 lb| of plutonium from this reactor. This fuel was used to produce the first two nuclear devices completed in 1990-1. It was recently learned that the DPRK suspended the reactor operation annually since 1989. Stoppages were for 71 days in 1989, 30-odd days in 1990, and 50-odd days in 1991. In these three years alone, the DPRK could have extracted additional 22-27kg (48.4- 59.4lb) plutonium, enough for three to five weapons. Comparable quantities of plutonium were since then removed from the reactor incrementally and used in the production of the DPRK's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the DPRK succeeded to acquire 56kg (123.2lb) of plutonium from the CIS in early 1992, sufficient for the production of 10 additional warheads. The first of these was completed in the Spring of 1993. This data fits closely with a growing volume of information on the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. There is close agreement between the reports on the number of weapons and the reported extraction of plutonium. A KGB document of February 22, 1990, stated that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons and the "development of the first atomic explosive device ▇ad| been completed" in Yongbyon. The KGB added that Kim Jong-Il "personally controls" the DPRK's military nuclear programme which is aimed at "achieving military superiority over South Korea" as well as realising "the prestigious aim of becoming one of the states possessing such weapons." Yi Chung-Kuk, a Sergeant in a KPA chemical warfare unit who defected in mid-March 1994, disclosed that he had "heard on several occasions beginning in 1991 from high-ranking military cadres and his senior officers that North Korea has already completed nuclear weapons development." Ko Yong-Hwan, a high level official who defected in the Autumn of 1991, reported that Pyongyang expected to have a nuclear arsenal by 1993, at which point the DPRK would be able to produce three to five "small nuclear bombs" a year. Subsequent improvements raised the annual production rates to about five warheads from plutonium extracted at Yongbyon and another two to three warheads from the plutonium acquired from the CIS. On the basis of a great volume of data from multiple sources, it was possible to conclude in mid-1993 that the DPRK already had about six nuclear weapons in operational status. Four of them were 50kt warheads for the ballistic missiles. At the very least, the DPRK had already "virtually completed" these six nuclear weapons and they were stored at "laboratory nuclear devices" status. In early 1994 there were specific reports that these warheads were being readied for war. In order to confirm the status of the North Korean military nuclear capabilities, a high level delegation of West European diplomats and experts based in Beijing visited the DPRK in the early winter of 1993. Returning from Pyongyang in mid-December, the delegation reported that the DPRK had "several atomic bombs and the vehicles to launch them". The delegation confirmed much of the data provided by defectors, including that North Korea "has built several kilo-size bombs." On the basis of the DPRK's verified plutonium production at Yongbyon alone, the delegation concluded that the DPRK already had "at least half a dozen bombs" to be delivered by a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. The latest assessment of the magnitude of the North Korean nuclear arsenal was provided by Kang Myong-To, the son-in-law of Kang Song- San, the DPRK's prime minister, who defected in May 1994. He reported that the DPRK "already ▉ossessed| five nuclear warheads" in October 1993, and would have about 10 warheads by the end of 1994. The delivery platform is "long-range missiles." Kang Myong-To stressed that he had learned this information from "a responsible official of the State Security Department, who is in charge of security of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon." Thus, there is ample evidence that the DPRK currently has at least seven or eight nuclear warheads (as well as two devices) and that by the end of the year will have more than 10 warheads. It is noteworthy that the available multiple-source data about the extraction of plutonium, weapon production rates, and the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal closely fit. With this in mind, the value of the IAEA inspections should be questioned. Back in February 1990, the KGB already stressed Pyongyang's "interest of concealing from world opinion and from the controlling international organisations the actual fact of the production of nuclear weapons in the DPRK". In late January 1994, a highly informed Chinese official reported that he had "recently heard from a senior North Korean official that North Korea is hiding nuclear weapons in an underground warehouse in the mountains near Pyongyang and that any thorough inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities by the United States will fail to locate them". Yi Chung-Kuk also learned "from his senior officer that it will be of no use to inspect Yongbyon because nuclear weapons are being produced at another place." It is known from other sources that the work on the warheads made from the plutonium acquired in the CIS is conducted away from Pyongyang. In the fall of 1993, a defector reported the existence of "a dreadful underground nuclear plant in the Chagang-Do province in the northern area" where the most sensitive weapon-related activities take place. Indeed, high-level North Korean defectors have always questioned the validity of the negotiations with the US. Ko Yong-Hwan warned already in mid-1991 that as far as Pyongyang was concered "negotiations for nuclear safeguards are only a delaying tactic". He explained that the highest levels in Pyongyang concluded in around 1985-86 that they "cannot cope with the situation with conventional (classic) weapons; therefore nuclear weapons must be developed . . . 糎s| the last means for preserving their political system". Kang Myong-To has a similar explanation. "North Korea's nuclear development is not intended as a bargaining chip as seen by the Western world, but for the maintenance of its system under the circumstances in which it is faced with economic difficulties and a situation following the collapse of Eastern Europe. Therefore, I think that until at least 10 nuclear warheads are produced, Kim Jong- Il will continue to adopt delaying tactics." Kang Myong-To stressed that the DPRK acquired its nuclear weapons "to secure an advantageous position in its talks with the United States and Japan. North Korea believes the United States would not be able to attack it then because of nuclear ─eapons|". Therefore, he concluded, in no way would the DPRK give up its military nuclear capabilities, because Pyongyang "sees nuclear development as the only means to maintain Kim Jong-Il's regime". Pyongyang's commitment to acquire nuclear weapons has always had a direct and immediate impact on the KPA. According to KPA Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Cpt. Shin Chung-Chol, since 1980, the KPA officers at the Kim Il-Song Military Academy, the DPRK's highest military institution, "attended a lecture on the 'offensive by the army corps with nuclear attacks' in the tactics course of the college". Cpt. Shin stressed that "the lecture was given in anticipation of North Korea's nuclear attacks against enemies". In early 1994, he added that considering the emphasis put on nuclear warfare among the KPA's elite officers by the early 1980s, "there is no doubt that North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons". Other former North Korean officers who defected recently portray a chilling scenario for the possible use of the DPRK's nuclear warheads in case of a major crisis. They believe that Pyongyang will order a pre-emptive launch of nuclear strikes against a few select objectives in Japan. "As a pre-emptive strike, nuclear would attack US military bases in Japan and then launch air raids on Japan's major military bases," explained an officer who defected in 1993. According to another former KPA officer who defected in the fall of 1992, it is virtually common knowledge among the elite units of the KPA that their country has nuclear weapons and that "our missiles could destroy even Japan, the United States, or South Korea." More likely and no less complex is the potential introduction of a North Korean nuclear ultimatum in the context of a surprise non- nuclear invasion of South Korea. A threat from Pyongyang to hit Japan, including Tokyo, and perhaps Russia, Vladivostok for example, with nuclear weapons in caset he United States decides to further intervene in the war is bound to attract attention in Washington. At the very least, deliberations in Washington on the appropriate reaction to the North Korean invasion and the new nuclear threats will take long enough for the KPA, by Pyongyang's own worst case calculations, to complete the encirclement of the Korean Peninsula. At this point, Pyongyang is convinced, the US will give up the war. A senior official at the South Korean Ministry of Defence concurs that Pyongyang's strategy is "to initiate surprise attack on the South and occupy some territory and negotiate for the termination of war, or to deny US reinforcement by threatening to use nuclear weapons." Another disturbing aspect of the Geneva negotiations is the preoccupation with the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. The DPRK has numerous other reactors and nuclear facilities the contribution of which to the military nuclear effort is far larger than that of the small old reactor in Yongbyon. In September 1980, the DPRK began construction on a then 30mw gas cooled reactor, a configuration extremely efficient for producing plutonium. Most construction was completed in 1984, and the reactor was activated in February 1987. The US-educated Prof. Kyong Won Ha is one of the key scientists and engineers behind the 30-50mw reactor in Yongbyon and its configuration into a source of plutonium. In 1984, the DPRK began the construction of a major new military nuclear complex in the Yongbyon area built around a new reactor estimated at the 50-200mw range, and dedicated for weapons production. Construction was near completion in 1989 and the reactor was tentatively activated in 1992. The construction of auxilliary installations for this reactor was expected to be completed in 1994, in the aftermath of a crash programme begun in 1993. Within two years after its full activation, now expected to take place in 1995 at the latest, this reactor alone will be producing enough plutonium for 10- 12 weapons a year. As of late-1991, the DPRK began digging deep tunnels near Yongbyon to shield and conceal the key components of its military nuclear programme. A new air defense system was deployed in November 1991, and above ground facilities are being hardened. Meanwhile, a prototype reprocessing facility was completed in 1987 and is producing some 15 kgs �33 lb| of plutonium annually. The work on a reprocessing facility for nuclear fuels began around 1988 and it is expected to become operational around 1994. The clandestine plutonium factory for the nuclear weapons, which is called by the DPRK "radiological laboratory," is a single story building constructed on top the main plutonium reprocessing facility that is now buried deep underground. Meanwhile, since mid 1993, the DPRK has doubled its capacity to produce plutonium by installing a second production line in the main reprocessing facility. Moreover, the DPRK also built highly secret underground facilities in Pakchon. Since underground facilities are extremely difficult to reconstruct, the mere fact that the DPRK has committed itself to underground military nuclear facilities reflects self-confidence in its technological capabilities. Meanwhile, since the early 1980s, the DPRK gained access to both Iranian Western-educated scientists and the Libyan clandestine procurement infrastructure for Western technology. Tehran and Tripoli convinced Pyongyang to significantly expand its military nuclear programme even before the initial phase was complete. Consequently, in the mid-1980s, the DPRK had access to Western nuclear technology, mainly West German, through the strategic cooperation between the DPRK, Libya, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, Ko Yong-Hwan confirmed that the North Korean nuclear programme utilized diversified technology from West European sources. Indeed, key components of the DPRK's new 50mw research reactor, built near the submarine base in Sinpo, are German- made. Like the Yongbyon complex, the Sinpo reactor is the center of a large scale underground complex. Simultaneously, in May 1989, the DPRK and the GDR signed a comprehensive agreement on the transfer of "substantial" amounts of German nuclear technology and nuclear weapons materials, including enriched uranium, to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to expand its already large nuclear infrastructure. By late 1993, some 20 facilities related to nuclear development were identified and there are not yet fully confirmed reports about several other facilities. Telling is the ongoing construction of large scale reactors, such as the 200mw reactor in Taechon and the 635mw reactor in Simpo. Ostensibly built as commercial-purpose reactors, these are old-type graphite-moderated and gas cooled reactors that are relatively unsafe and their efficiency relatively low when compared to more modern technologies long used in the West. However, reactors of this design produce extremely large quantities of plutonium, the key ingredient in nuclear weapons, as a by-product of their activities even with natural, low-quality uranium. Thus, the reactor building programme of the DPRK testifies to Pyongyang's commitment to markedly expand its nuclear weapons programme in the very near future, for a few large reactors are expected to become "hot" in the next few years. Completely disregarding the real magnitude of the North Korean military nuclear effort, the US-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issues were scheduled to resume in Geneva in early August 1994. They are still based on the premise that no North Korean extraction of plutonium from the 5mw reactor has been confirmed except for one case in 1989. The negotiations continue even though the DPRK stresses that it would not permit access to Building 500 or an IAEA examination of the fuel rods (even though all evidence of extraction had already been destroyed). Moreover, the DPRK informed the US that it will continue to expand its nuclear programme and complete the 50mw and 200mw reactors in Yongbyon, until it gets a Russian-made modern light-water reactor and other economic incentives. The accord expected to be reached in Geneva in August changes none of these provisions. The Geneva accord constitutes a profound change in US policy concerning the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Washington gave up on preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear power. Washington even no longer insists on verifying the extent of the North Korean arsenal through IAEA inspection. Instead, the Us opted to appease and bribe North Korea with the hope that Pyongyang will freeze its nuclear build-up. Washington is buying time while maintaining the charade that the DPRK does not have nuclear weapons. Consequently, the US and its allies have settled into the do-nothing-for-now mode, merely postponing the hour of reckoning. All that time, Washington is getting used to the fact, although without acknowledging it publicly, that the threat of North Korean nuclear blackmail is already pending. Meanwhile, the economic crisis in North Korea continues to grow. Only drastic measures can reverse the imminent economic collapse. Currently, Pyongyang has two viable options: to attempt a regional nuclear extortion, demanding that the US, Japan and ROK rebuilds its economy, or to launch an all out effort at the realisation of the sacred unification by force. The Geneva accord seems to be an implicit surrender to Pyongyang's extortion. However, the North Korean economy is in such a dismal state, that the West cannot afford the investments required for a short term reversal, even at the price of a debilitating recession in the US and the Pacific Rim. The Geneva accord simply creates false expectations and pushes the hour for drastic measures further away. Kang Myong-To relayed that, according to the above cited official of the State Security Department, Pyongyang's position is that "by 1994, if we are capable of possessing about 10 ▋uclear weapons|, we will be able to make it known to the international community, and to hold the North-US talks or South-North summit talks from a position of advantage." Left unclear is in what form will such announcement take place. Given the overall context of Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is quite likely that the announcement will come as a nuclear ultimatum, perhaps during an invasion. Moreover, even if the Geneva record is implemented, and even if there is no new Korean War in 1994, the North Korean nuclear threat to the US will only continue to rise. Most important, by the mid to late 1990s the DPRK will field the nuclear-tipped NoDong-X ICBM that, with a range of over 6,000 km, is capable of reaching the continental US. Considering the intensity of the development work, barring a major setback, early models of the NoDong-X may become operational as early as 1996-97. This fact alone will introduce a whole new dimension to the crisis in Korea. Hence, the looming spectre of the new Korean War, with its nuclear component, remains with us for as long as Kim Jong-Il and his Administration remain in power in Pyongyang.

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"South Korea places troops on enhanced alert."

Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 7, 1995 "South Korea places troops on enhanced alert." South Korea placed its 650,000 troops on an enhanced state of alertness Thursday in response to what it called "military provocation" by communist North Korea. "There are fears that North Korea, which is currently undergoing a leadership crisis, may judge the situation the South Korea incorrectly and be tempted to military provocation," Defence Minister Lee Yang Ho told troop commanders. North Korea has been without an officially designated leader since the death of President Kim Il Sung in July 1994. Lats week Lee placed his forces on alert, appealing to them to be particularly vigilant along the almost 250 kilometre-border along the 38th parallel. The defence minister said the poor supply situation and uncertain leadership in Pyoengyang might prompt North Korea to act militarily as a diversion. In South Korea the recent arrest of two former presidents, Roh Tae Woo on corruption charges and his predecessor Chun Choo Hwan for allegedly mastering a 1979 failed coup, has unsettled the country. Officials at the South Korean Defence Minister said Thursday that North Korea was expanding the number of airforce and artillery units on its side of the border. Seoul believes North Korea has deployed most of its 1.1 million-strong armed forces close to the border. South Korea says North Korean troops are involved along the border in comprehensive winter exercises. The communist north has also stepped up the propaganda war against the south and launched a campaign to abrogate the Korean ceasefire agreement drawn up after the Korean War (1950-53). A peace pact was never signed. Around 36,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea.

Top of Watch "US AND S KOREA CONTINUE ANTI-PHYONGYANG MILITARY EXERCISES." BY IVAN ZAKHARCHENKO

The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS December 8, 1995, Friday "US AND S KOREA CONTINUE ANTI-PHYONGYANG MILITARY EXERCISES." BY IVAN ZAKHARCHENKO DOZENS OF WARPLANES, FLOWN FROM THE AMERICAN MILITARY BASES ON THE JAPANESE ISLANDS, HAVE TAKEN PART THIS WEEK IN MILITARY EXERCISES IN SOUTH KOREA, WHICH, IT IS REPORTED TODAY IN PHYONGYANG, WERE SPEARHEADED AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THESE WARPLANES, WHICH INCLUDED VERTICAL-TAKEOFF FIGHTERS AND ASSAULT PLANES, HAVE PRACTICED NIGHTTIME BLOWS AT NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY. THESE EXERCISES, STAGED ON DECEMBER 5 WITH THE USE OF A REFUELING PLANE, PURSUED THE PURPOSE OF "PREPARING AN URGENT DISPATCH OF PLANES FROM THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET TO THE ZONE OF HOSTILITIES AND DEALING BLOWS AT KEY TARGETS IN NORTH KOREA" , THE CENTRAL TELEGRAPH AGENCY REPORTS WITH REFERENCE TO UNINDICATED MILITARY SOURCES. ON THE SAME DAY, AN P-3 PATROL PLANE AND A STRATEGIC U-2 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FILMED THE SEA ANDSHELF OFF THE COAST OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ALSO SOME PARTS OF ITS HINTERLAND. NOT ONLY SUCH MILITARY EXERCISES ALARM PHYONGYANG TODAY. PHYONGYANG NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY VEHICLES WAS NOTED ON DECEMBER 5 AND 6 IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE,WHICH IS FOUR KILOMETRES BROAD, WHERE NO ARMAMENTS ALLOWED. NORTH KOREA DENIES THE CLAIMS OF SEOUL AND WASHINGTON THAT IT COULD STAGE MILITARY PROVOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER "NODONG SHIMOON", SOUTH KOREA NEEDS ACCUSATIONS AGAINST PHYONGYANG AND HEIGHTENED TENSIONS TO OVERCOME THE POLITICAL CRISIS, TRIGGERED BY THE SCANDAL AROUND THE SECRET CASH FUNDS BUILT UP BY SOUTH KOREA EX- PRESIDENT ROH DAE WOO.

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"South's army increases readiness against 'possible infiltration, surprise attack'."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 10, 1995 "South's army increases readiness against 'possible infiltration, surprise attack'." (Source: Yonhap news agency, Seoul, in English 0136 gmt 9 Dec 95) Seoul, 9th December: The army decided Saturday 9th December to step up its readiness against possible infiltration operations by the North Korean military, strengthening vigils along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and shorelines. The decision was made at a meeting of division and above level commanders presided over by Chief of Staff Gen Yun Yong-nam at army headquarters in Kyeryongdae near Taejon. In his address, Gen Yun instructed his commanders to take increased measures against infiltration operations by Pyongyang and maintain thorough preparedness for winter operations that would be launched in the case of an emergency, warning of the national security system's vulnerability during the first half of next year. North Korea, maintaining its isolation from the international community despite a severe economic crisis, is pursuing a military- first policy to strengthen its readiness for war by increasing the offensive power of its armed forces and appointing conservative hard- liners to major military posts, according to the army. In spite of its severe fuel shortages, the North Korean armed forces have recently increased their combat training programmes, while deploying fighters, long-range artillery and other offensive weapons in bases closer to the DMZ in an attempt to create conditions for a surprise attack.

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"North Korea warns against US military adventurism."

Agence France Presse December 12, 1995 "North Korea warns against US military adventurism." North Korea on Tuesday threatened to take "countermeasures" after accusing the United States, South Korea and Japan, of plotting an attack. "Now that the United States is scheming to bring the military adventure against our system into practice together with South Korea and Japan, we cannot but feel exposed to threat and will unavoidably have to take countermeasures," the North's foreign ministry warned in a statement. It did not say what the countermeasures would be. The statement, carried by the North's official mouthpiece Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), came as South Korean armed forces are on a five-month alert against feared attacks from North Korea. On Monday, South Korean President Kim Young-Sam said the North's military has the final say on important issues as President Kim Il- Sung's son Kim Jong-Il has not yet officially succeeded his father, who died in July of 1994. "It has been more than one year since the death of Kim Il-Sung but no one has succeeded him. This means the military has taken power in North Korea, " the president said. He said people should be ready for a possible emergency on the Korean peninsula, saying that North Korea had deployed nearly 100 war planes at three front-line air bases, which can reach Seoul in just five minutes. "The North is starving and poor," the president said, adding that the north's capital, Pyongyang, is not illuminated at night because of a lack of fuel.

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"China sees danger of N. Korea invading S. Korea."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "China sees danger of N. Korea invading S. Korea." China is concerned about a possible North Korean invasion of South Korea, a South Korean newspaper reported in its early Thursday edition. The Chosun Ilbo said that top Chinese government and military officials drew up a report in a recent secret meeting that points to the possibility that North Korea may invade its southern neighbor amid the current political turmoil. The report says the Pyongyang regime could come to a conclusion that it should start a war with South Korea now because of North Korea's economic hardships, food shortage, the poor health conditions of the country's de facto leader Kim Jong Il, as well as the current political situation in Seoul. China may tell North Korea that it does not want a war on the Korean Peninsula, which would hurt the Chinese economy, according to the daily.

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"S. Korea steps up guard against unusual moves in North."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "S. Korea steps up guard against unusual moves in North." South Korea has stepped up its already strict guard against North Korean military provocation amid signs of unusual movements in the country, such as forward deployment of attack weapons, a South Korean source said Wednesday. The level of Seoul's surveillance system for North Korea has already been upgraded from 'Watch Condition 4' to 'Watch Condition 3,' the source said. North Korea conducted unusually large-scale military drills Oct. 21 and 22, mobilizing about 400 airplanes, almost half of all the planes it possesses, according to the source. Of the planes used in the exercises, about 80, including MiG-19s and MiG-21s, have been deployed southward at three bases 30-40 kilometers closer to North-South border, other military analysts said. They observed that with such a forward deployment of aircraft, it will take only six minutes for North Korean fighters to reach Seoul. North Korea has also moved long-range artillery closer to the border area so as to have Seoul within a firing range. Ever since its energy shortage seriously worsened around 1990, Pyongyang has tried to cut down on the size and number of its military drills. But last year it began holding its military exercises to the average level of the past years and started increasing the scale and number of such drills this year. North Korea carried out a sweeping reshuffle in the key posts of the 1.1-million-strong armed forces in October, promoting the former chief of the general staff of the People's Army, Choe Kwang, to minister of the People's Armed Forces. Other key military posts were filled by Vice Marshall Kim Yong Chun, named as new chief of the general staff of the People's Army, and Vice Marshall Kim Gwang Jin, named as First Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces. Meanwhile, South Korean President Kim Young Sam indicated Monday that the military in North Korea might have taken charge. He said that the absence of an official leader in North Korea seems to have been prolonged since the death of President Kim Il Sung in July last year because the military seems to have everything under its control. North Korea's de facto leader Kim Jong Il has not yet officially assumed the top leadership posts, leaving vacant the posts of president and head of the ruling Workers Party of (North) Korea for almost a year and a half since his father Kim Il Sung's death. Other analysts pointed to the possibility that North Korea, already faced with a serious food shortage, may try to divert the people's attention from its internal crisis to possible armed conflict with the South.

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"Japan spokesman tones down reported N. Korean move."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "Japan spokesman tones down reported N. Korean move." Japan's top government spokesman toned down reports Wednesday that the North Korean military has advanced southward toward the border with South Korea. Chief Cabinet Secretary Koken Nosaka told a press conference that he has heard rumors about such a move, but he said he does not think anything would happen. Nosaka said he bases his opinion judging from North Korea's troublesome situation over the summer floods and subsequent food shortage and the fact that de facto leader Kim Jong Il is not yet atop the state and the ruling Workers Party of Korea. A senior U.S. defense official conceded Tuesday that North Korea has made some advance southward in the past month, but he said that the United States sees the move as signs of internal disorder rather than that of an imminent crisis.

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"S. Korea, U.S. agree to be prepared for N. Korean crisis."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "S. Korea, U.S. agree to be prepared for N. Korean crisis." Amid signs of unusual activity in North Korea, South Korea and the United States have reconfirmed their pact to remain prepared at all times for any North Korean situation, Yonhap News Agency reported Wednesday. South Korea and the U.S. held high-level security talks Tuesday in Washington and discussed ways to cope with possible contingencies in North Korea, Yonhap reported in a dispatch from Washington. However, Yim Sung Joon, director general of the American affairs bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said afterward the two countries did not discuss provocative actions by North Korea, according to the report. The South Korean delegation was headed by Vice Foreign Minister Lee See Young, and the U.S. team by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Referring to the dire food shortage in North Korea, Kim said the two allies agreed to discuss offering aid to help North Korea cope with the food crisis caused by floods in August, which devastated much cropland and left half a million people homeless. 'However, South Korea and the U.S. shared a common view that provision of any aid to the North will be possible only when North Korea first changes its hostile stance against South Korea,' Yim was quoted as saying. South Korea and the U.S. also reaffirmed the importance of continuing to press North Korea to pursue openness and change, the report said. Yim said inter-Korean dialogue is vitally important to encourage North Korea to open up. Seoul and Washington further agreed that the stability of North Korea does not seem threatened by an internal power struggle. North Korea's de facto leader Kim Jong Il has not yet officially assumed the nation's top leadership posts since the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, almost a year and a half ago. The prolonged absence of an official leader in North Korea has sparked much speculation that Kim Jong Il is either seriously ill or faces internal resistance, especially from the military.

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"U.S. official concedes N. Korean southward move."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 13, 1995, WEDNESDAY "U.S. official concedes N. Korean southward move." By Kohei Murayama A senior U.S. defense official conceded Tuesday that North Korea has made some advance southward in the past month, but he said that the United States sees the move as signs of internal disorder instead of an imminent crisis. 'Probably in the last month...there's been some movement, small movement, southward' along the North-South demarcation zone in the Korean Peninsula, the senior Defense Department official told Kyodo News Service on condition of anonymity. But the official spoke cautiously about overly reacting to the situation in referring to recent Japanese press reports that some Japanese intelligence analysts have expressed concerns over the North Korean military situation. 'We are concerned, but not alarmed,' the official said, adding, 'Our intelligence community at this juncture feels that there are no signs of imminent crisis or action from the North.' 'Many of the signs that we have seen in the last several weeks are ambiguous,' he said. 'They may indicate signs of internal disorder.' 'Remember, we continue to read reports of flooding, of famine, of a lack of food, (it is) very hard to know,' he said. 'We're not talking about clear preparations for some sort of an attack. What we're talking about are some unusual communications, some unusual movements,' he said. But describing the North Korean government as 'one of the most difficult regimes to understand in the world,' the official said, 'We have a very large interest in not underestimating the potential conflict.' 'All we can judge is that the regime is experiencing tremendous tension,' he said. Against this backdrop, the official said, 'We continue to watch the situation very closely' together with the Japanese and South Korean governments. He said U.S. troops are 'at high level of readiness' at approximately the same alert level, with some units at a higher state than others. 'It could be attributed to those issues, but it's not unusual that certain units at certain times will go to a higher alert level,' the official said. Meanwhile, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters Tuesday, 'We do not believe that the military situation on the peninsula has changed significantly over the past few weeks.' Noting that Washington would not normally comment in detail on matters like this, Burns said, 'I can assure you that through every means...we watch the situation very carefully, and if there is anything that was dramatically different, we would of course bring that to the attention of the North Koreans as well as to our ally (South Korea).'

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"Tokyo perceives no crisis in North Korea."

Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 13, 1995 07:36 Central European Time "Tokyo perceives no crisis in North Korea." Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Koken Nosaka said Wednesday that Tokyo perceives no crisis in North Korea despite media reports saying North Korean troops are moving southward and massing near the border with South Korea. Speaking at a news conference, Nosaka said he had heard "rumours" about Pyongyang moving up troops but he did not think anything would happen. In view of a recent natural disaster, worsening food supplies in North Korea and the fact that Kim Jong Il has not yet formally become top leader of the state, no such thing would occur, he said. A senior U.S. defence official conceded Tuesday that North Korea has made some advance southward in the past month but he said that the United States sees the move as a sign of internal disorder rather than of an imminent international crisis. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported Wednesday that South Korea and the U.S. authorities have reconfirmed their pact to remain prepared at all times for any North Korean crisis. South Korea and the U.S. held high-level security talks Tuesday in Washington and discussed ways to cope with possible contingencies in North Korea, Yonap said in a report. However, Yim Sung Joo, director-general of the American Affairs bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said afterwards that the two countries did not discuss provocative actions by North Korea, according to the Washington-datelined report.

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"Korean People's Army holds Kim Chong-il in 'high esteem'."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 13, 1995, Wednesday "Korean People's Army holds Kim Chong-il in 'high esteem'." (Text of report by the North Korean news agency KCNA.) Pyongyang, 13th December: It is the unshakable determination and will of all the Korean People's Army KPA officers and men and the Korean people to accomplish the revolutionary cause of chuche, holding the great Comrade Kim Chong-il in high esteem as the supreme commander forever, says Nodong Sinmun' in a signed article today. It is thanks to the brilliant foresightedness of the fatherly leader Comrade Kim Il-sung and the distinguished greatness and ability of Comrade Kim Chong-il that they hold respected Comrade Kim Chong-il in high esteem as the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, the authors of the article say, and continues: The position of Comrade Kim Chong-il as the supreme commander is steadfast and absolute. He is a veteran and tested supreme commander who has long led the cause of army building with Comrade Kim Il-sung. The article quotes Comrade Kim Chong-il as saying: "Neither the revolutionary character of the People's Army nor its proud history and glorious tomorrow are thinkable without the leadership of the leader and the party." It further says: The chuche-based military ideas and war method formulated by Comrade Kim Il-sung shine with the intelligence of Comrade Kim Chong-il. And the programme of modelling the whole army on the chuche idea which was advanced by Comrade Kim Chong-il is associated with the intention of Comrade Kim Il-sung. The images of the two great men who always worked together for the building of the revolutionary armed forces remain a symbol of all victories in the hearts of the officers and men of the People's Army. The People's Army was, is and will be the army of the great Comrade Kim Il-sung and the supreme commander of the revolutionary armed forces will always be respected Comrade Kim Chong-il, who has led the building of the revolutionary armed forces with Comrade Kim Il-sung. This is an absolute truth which cannot waver under any circumstances as long as the revolution continues and the People's Army exists. Comrade Kim Chong-il is the supreme commander who enjoys an absolute authority for the undying exploits and particularly rich experience he has accumulated in the building of revolutionary armed forces with his distinguished ability. He enjoys absolute authority and prestige as the supreme commander, which cannot be impaired by any force. Comrade Kim Chong-il's is a high authority based on his undying exploits, performed with his own strength, while leading the building of the revolutionary armed forces for a long period. It is also an absolute authority based on his outstanding commanding art, with which he skilfully commands all services and arms and wins victories at all times. Comrade Kim Chong-il's leadership of army building has a history of more than 30 years. He is a sagacious supreme commander who is possessed of distinguished gifts as an unrivaled general. No other military strategists can match Comrade Kim Chong-il in the military qualifications and ability - the clairvoyant military intelligence and resources - with which he formulates wonderful strategies and tactics and methods after deeply penetrating into unfathomably complicated military moves, profound military knowledge of all war experience and methods in the world and the invincible commanding art with which he skilfully leads the revolutionary armed forces as a whole. His grit is a great boldness. He brings the enemy to his knees without vacillation before the attack of millions of enemy troops and even in face of the threat of nuclear weapons. He mercilessly strikes the enemy without a slightest vacillation once he is determined. Thanks to this unparalleled grit and will of Comrade Kim Chong-il, our People's Army and people are a heroic army and heroic people who are ever-victorious under any circumstances. Comrade Kim Chong-il is the greatest general gifted with the talents as the supreme commander . He is the most intimate supreme commander whom all the People's Army officers and men and people boundlessly trust and follow. They are blessed with great generals, supreme commanders, because they had Comrade Kim Il-sung as the supreme commander of the revolutionary armed forces from the days of the anti-Japanese struggle and because they are now holding Comrade Kim Chong-il in high esteem as the supreme commander. Very bright is the future of the Korean revolution because it is blessed with great generals, supreme commanders.

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"Japanese TV quotes US intelligence on North Korean military movements."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 13, 1995, Wednesday "Japanese TV quotes US intelligence on North Korean military movements." (Source: NHK TV, Tokyo, in Japanese 1025 gmt 11 Dec 95) Recent unusual military movements by DPRK forces have been revealed. Units have been reorganized and placed on what appears to be a wartime footing. US intelligence authorities have been carefully analysing the DPRK's intentions. US intelligence authorities have told NHK that more than 200 DPRK fighters and bombers were in the air during a two-day period in late October, and that some of them deployed in three bases near the ROK border are ready to make a sortie at any time. US authorities said that during the two-day flight, the DPRK aircraft maintained radio silence to hide their movements from other countries. In early November, military units were reorganized and placed on what appears to be a wartime footing: Coastal and boarder guards were incorporated into the regular forces under the command of the People' s Armed Forces Ministry, and a number of new units were created. The new units have conducted repeated exercises since then. US intelligence authorities said it is unlikely that the DPRK will undertake military actions in the near future. Nevertheless, the recent military movements are the biggest in such a short time period since the end of the Korean war. Some experts say there may be growing discontent among the DPRK people and military amid severe food and fuel shortages, which have shaken the political and social situation in the DPRK. US intelligence authorities are working in close cooperation with Japan and the ROK to analyse the DPRK's intentions carefully.

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"North Korea comments on planned military exercise in South."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 13, 1995, Wednesday "North Korea comments on planned military exercise in South." (Text of report by the North Korean news agency KCNA) Pyongyang, 13th December: The South Korean puppets on Tuesday 12th December made public a plan of military exercise to be held in the area around Mt Kwanak in Seoul, with the participation of the units under the "Capital Defence Command" of the puppet army, a Seoul-based radio said. The exercise, to be lasted until 15th December, will reportedly include a tactical training with the use of blank shots. And, the puppet joint staff headquarters noticed that armed forces will move in Seoul on Tuesday afternoon, with regard to a joint training of the puppet army and police against infiltration. Nowadays, the Kim Yong-sam group are conducting war moves against the North more frantically than ever to save themselves from uneasy position driven to a wall. Moreover, they are more frequently staging such military exercises in Seoul. Their anti-national crime clearly indicates that their desperate last-ditch efforts have entered into a reckless phase.

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"N. Korea warns U.S. about confrontation."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 14, 1995, THURSDAY "N. Korea warns U.S. about confrontation." North Korea criticized the United States over its 'continued propaganda' about a military threat, suggesting it may have to consider 'countermeasures,' the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Thursday. The KCNA dispatch, monitored in Tokyo, also accused the U.S. of trying to justify its 'military occupation of South Korea and Japan' in the wake of the unfolding slush fund scandal in Seoul and the trial of three U.S. servicemen in Okinawa for the rape of a local schoolgirl. 'By persistently peddling the rumor about 'threat from North Korea, ' the United States intends to find a pretext for justifying the U.S. military presence in South Korea and Japan,' KCNA reported, quoting the Workers Party of Korea daily Rodong Sinmun. The Rodong Sinmun analyst warned that the 'moves of the United States will aggravate the military confrontation between ( North Korea) and the U.S. and drive the situation around the Korean Peninsula to a new grave phase,' KCNA reported. In recent weeks, the South Korean and Japanese media have carried a number of reports about the movements of the North Korean military near the demilitarized zone dividing the peninsula. Some of the reports have cited U.S. intelligence sources and officials. After large-scale military exercises in October, military analysts reported that a number of North Korean fighter aircraft were moved to within 5-6 minutes' striking distance from Seoul, while long-range artillery was also moved within firing distance of the South Korean capital. Some analysts have suggested that North Korea, faced with increasingly serious food and energy shortages as the harsh Korean winter sets in, may attempt to divert the people's attention from its internal crises with an armed conflict with South Korea. Earlier this week, South Korean President Kim Young Sam further remarked that he thought the North Korean military had assumed power in Pyongyang since heir apparent Kim Jong Il had yet to officially assume the top leadership posts following the death of his father in July 1994.

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"N. Korean war preparations said being completed."

Japan Economic Newswire DECEMBER 15, 1995, FRIDAY "N. Korean war preparations said being completed." The head of South Korea's Agency for National Security Planning said Friday that North Korea was completing its preparations for war, suggesting that winter was the most likely time for an attack. Kwon Young Hae said that despite North Korea's economic crisis, 'War preparations are already being completed.' 'It is a dangerous situation in which a provocation can occur against (South Korea) on the order of ( North Korea's de facto leader) Kim Jong Il or the military leaders,' Kwon told a committee of the National Assembly. Kwon appeared to intend to arouse the vigilance of the South Korean people and put an end to the arguments of some optimists that North Korea was unlikely to attack. He said war preparations are being enhanced, adding 'This winter and the early part of spring when nothing is in the ground is the most important time to manage the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.' Kwon reported that in October some 420 northern fighter aircraft and bombers were moved to bases near the demilitarized zone dividing the peninsula. The bombers have the capability of reaching Seoul in five minutes, suggested Kwon, adding that he thought North Korea would first attack with a wave of old MiG-17s followed by a wave of the newest model MiG- 29 fighters.

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"South says North has 'finished war preparations'."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 15, 1995, Friday "South says North has 'finished war preparations'." (Text of report by the South Korean news agency Yonhap) Seoul, 15th December: Despite its grave economic crisis, North Korea has finished preparations to wage war and is now ready to provoke South Korea at any time if its de facto leader Kim Chong-il and its military intend to, the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) said Friday 15th December . In his reports at a closed session of the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee Friday afternoon, NSP director Kwon Yong-hae was quoted as saying, "This winter and next year's spring food-short season will be critical periods in managing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula." Kwon's remarks were partly relayed to reporters after the meeting by committee Chairman Rep Shin Sang-wu. Last October, Kwon reportedly said, North Korea relocated some 420 military aircraft in frontline and rear areas, moving more than 90 of them to three reserve bases in Taetan, Nuchonni and Kueupni, located just 40 km away from the Demilitarized Zone. Kwon revealed that a regiment of Il-28 bombers have been moved from Uiju to a base in Taetan, from which the bombers can reach Seoul in just five minutes. "As long as the North Korean leadership sees the current circumstances as turning in favour of their communization scheme, the most potential danger could be coming from a combination of North Korea's internal crises and its military adventurism," he was known to have said. He continued that the Stalinist country has supplemented its war command system on Kim Chong-il's instruction and stored war materials in some 200 underground tunnels enough to wage a war for three months. The intelligence chief also noted that Pyongyang authorities have openly executed some 100 criminals, surmising that such harsh measures have apparently been designed to keep its tense readiness for general mobilization.

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"North Korea reportedly conducting large-scale military exercise."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 15, 1995, Friday "North Korea reportedly conducting large-scale military exercise." (Text of report by South Korean newspaper Munhwa Ilbo) A senior information official of the government on 15th December said that the North Korean army is conducting a large-scale winter mobile exercise along the DMZ by mobilizing some 100,000 troops, a size of troops equivalent to several army corps, thus heightening military tension between the North and the South. The North Korean army is conducting this mobile exercise along with a large-scale aircraft take-off and landing exercise, and the size of the troops mobilized in the exercise is the largest in several years. According to the official, the North Korean army forward deployed some 100 fighters and long-range artillery near the DMZ last month, and this month has been conducting large-scale winter mobile exercises, by mobilizing ground forces. The official said that the North Korean army has rapidly increased the frequency of the southward broadcast and the loudspeaker broadcast since October, thus stepping up its psychological warfare against the south. Therefore, the index calculated by the ROK-US Combined Forces Command CFC based on some 80 signs of provocation by the North Korean army which are under surveillance, has risen overall from the alert level of "Wichicon 4" to "Wichicon 3" . Hence, the CFC is stepping up intelligence gathering activities with the spy satellite and U-2 flights, the official said. The National Assembly will hold an Information Committee meeting this afternoon and listen to a report by Kwon Yong-hae, director of the Agency for National Security Planning, on the unusual moves of the North Korean army.

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"US official's remarks on Pyongyang "threat" denounced."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 15, 1995, Friday "US official's remarks on Pyongyang "threat" denounced." (Source: Central Broadcasting Station, Pyongyang, in Korean 1223 gmt 14 Dec 95) North Korean radio has denounced US offical Joseph Nye's comments on the threat posed to peace by North Korea. Nye's comments hide the fact that the US wants an excuse to continue its "occupation" of Asia, the radio says. The following is the text of the report. The US warmongers'anti-DPRK policy of crushing DPRK is becoming more undisguised with each passing day. The gibberish presented by Joseph Nye, US assistant secretary of defence, about the so-called threat from North Korea in an interview with the Washington Post' some time ago, is a good example. Earlier, in the so-called report on the US defence strategy on Asia, he raved that the plan for the gradual reduction of US Armed Forces in Asia had been cancelled because of the North Korean situation. This is indeed a shameless brigandish theory reversing black and white. As today's South Korean situation shows, threat is not inflicted on the United States by us but it is inflicted on us by the United States. Tens of thousands of US troops armed with nuclear weapons constantly remain in South Korea. They are staging war exercises one after another against us, thus straining the situation on the Korean Peninsula to an extreme pitch. This is a fact well known even to the US assistant secretary of defence. Not satisfied with this, the United States is continually bringing in South Korea numerous sophisticated nuclear weapons equipped with ultramodern technology. By babbling about the so-called emergency on the Korean Peninsula, Shalikashvili, chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that one or more carrier fleets, aircraft and Marine Corps troops, will be reinforced in order to strengthen the rapid deterrent force. Moreover, beginning this year, the United States has carried out numerous war exercises against us together with South Korean puppets. The Ulchi Focus-Lens and Foal Eagle-95 military exercises are their representative example. This being the situation, the gibberish made by the US assistant secretary of defence that we impose a threat shows that his shamelessness has reached to an extreme degree. The problem is that such a nonsensical remark does not merely reflect his own opinion. As for Joseph Nye, he is a high-ranking government official within the US Defence Department, who is in charge of US military policy towards East Asia, including Korea and Japan. We must think that his gibberish about our nonexistent threat represents not only the view of the US Defence Department but also that of the US Administration. We have sufficient basis for this. It was well known to the world that some time ago, high-ranking US Administration officials attempted to include the content on threat from North Korea in the joint document to readjust the Japan-US Security Agreement. Furthermore, during a Japan-US joint cabinet meeting held in September, the US delegation claimed that North Korea is the source of threat. The similar voices have been frequently presented from within the US State Department. Joseph Nye's gibberish that the plan for reduction of US forces in Asia was cancelled because of the so-called North Korean situation is a preposterous sophism. As the entire world knows, despite the fact that the United States and South Korean authorities are rendering the situation on the Korean Peninsula to confrontation and war, we are taking all possible initiatives and steps to lead it to detente and peace by all means. This is officially recognized by the world. Nevertheless, the act of slandering others by claiming that the plan to reduce US troops was cancelled because of the North Korean situation is a filthy one that can be committed only by US warmongers who are accustomed to such practices. Another issue to consider is why Nye is picking a quarrel with us by distorting such solemn reality. His true intention is to find a pretext for the US imperialist aggressor forces' permanent occupation of Asia and to turn their situation, which is becoming more unfavourable in Korea and other Eastern Asian areas. As is known to all, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Cold War has ended. As a result, the United States has lost its excuse for keeping its enormous troops in Asia, including South Korea and Japan. Moreover, with the issue on the position of US armed forces stationed in Japan, the United States is falling into a more difficult situation each day. Besides, with the demand for a probe into the slush fund scandal and 18th May 1990 massacre incident in South Korea, the United States, which supported the puppet regime, is being driven into more difficult situation, and is no longer able to put forward the pretext for continually keeping US forces. The United States, feeling uneasy about this, needed the excuse for continually keeping US troops in East Asia, including Korea and Japan, in order to realize its consistent strategic aims in Asian and Pacific area. What the United States has designed out of such purpose is the very theory on threat of North Korea. All facts show that there is no change whatsoever in the US policy to oppress us with strength. However, such anachronistic Korean policy by the United States can never be achieved. Since the United States attempts to crush us with strength, we will be forced to take steps corresponding to this. We clarified more than once that we will never allow anyone to infringe upon our sovereignty. The United States should act with discretion by taking a correct view of our firm will.

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"Foreign ministry official briefs reporters on South Korea-US strategic dialogue."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 15, 1995, Friday "Foreign ministry official briefs reporters on South Korea-US strategic dialogue." (Source: Yonhap news agency, Seoul, in English 0055 gmt 13 Dec 95) In their senior strategy dialogue in Washington on 12th December, South Korea and the United States did not particularly discuss the issue of possible provocation from North Korea, the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported. The agency quoted the Foreign Ministry's America Bureau Director-General Yim Song-chun as saying during a news briefing that although the North Korean situation was unstable because of the power succession issue, it was not considered to be dangerous on that account and it was unnecessary to attach special significance to when Kim Chong-il will formally assume power. On North Korea's food shortages the agency quoted Yim as saying that the two countries have agreed to handle support for Pyongyang through their channel of consultation but that they concurred that such support could be offered only if Pyongyang retracted its policy of hostility towards the South.

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"North Korea, KEDO sign accord for supply of nuclear reactors."

AFX News December 15, 1995, Friday - 11:47 Eastern Time - "North Korea, KEDO sign accord for supply of nuclear reactors." NEW YORK (AFX) - The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and North Korea have signed an accord for the supply of two light-water nuclear reactors to North Korea in a deal involving a halt to North Korea's existing nuclear program, officials said. The meeting initially was announced in Seoul by a South Korean government official after the cabinet approved providing 70 pct of the financing for the reactors, an estimated 4.5 bln dlrs.

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KEEP SCROLLING DOWN TO SEE ARTICLES... BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 10, 1996, Wednesday "ARMISTICE AGREEMENT CRISIS; North Korean radio explains withdrawal from Armistice Agreement" (Source: Central Broadcasting Station, Pyongyang, for South Korea in Korean 1250 gmt 5 Apr 96) North Korean radio has reviewed the reasons for the North Korean withdrawal from the Armistice Agreement on 4th April. The radio said North Korea was entitled to act in self-defence because the South was bringing heavy weapons and armed troops into the Demilitarized Zone. Furthermore, the North's proposals on establishing a new peace mechanism had not received their due response. The following is a commentary by Kim Ho-sam entitled: "A due self-defensive measure". As has been reported, on 4th April the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army KPA issued its spokesman's press statement in connection with the fact that the South Korean puppets have made the Military Demarcation Line MDL and the Demilitarized Zone DMZ a lawless area Korean: mubop chonji by outrageously trampling underfoot the order of conduct haengdong chilso for this area, agreed upon by the two sides to the agreement. In the press statement, the spokesman announced that the KPA would renounce its duty concerning the maintenance and management of the MDL and DMZ and that, as a follow-up step to the renunciation of the above-mentioned duty, our side's personnel and vehicles will bear no distinctive insignia and markings when they enter the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom and the DMZ. Such a step is our due self-defensive measure in response to the extremely dangerous military situation created in the MDL and the DMZ. A very dangerous situation has been created recently in the area of the MDL and the DMZ and, consequently, an incident evoking great worry in our people and throughout the world is taking place. The DMZ is literally a zone devoid of arms and a buffer zone established under an international treaty or under an agreement between the parties concerned. Therefore, such a zone should become a zone where existing military facilities are removed, new military facilities can no longer be established, and the two sides in hostilities choktaejok kyojon ssangbang withdraw their troops to prevent a conflict between them. The Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates that heavy and automatic weapons and no more than 1,000 military personnel shall be brought into the DMZ. This is a key clause of the agreement to preserve safety in the DMZ and to preserve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, this clause must be strictly respected in the DMZ, because the DMZ is an extremely sensitive area temporarily separating the two sides in hostilities from one another. Nevertheless, the South Korean war maniacs have systematically violated this clause with the support of the USA. They have continued to bring all kinds of machine guns, heavy weapons such as 90-mm recoilless guns and armed troops into the DMZ. They have turned the DMZ into a position from which to carry out a pre-emptive attack against us. In these circumstances, for more than five years our republic has continued to propose to the parties concerned, including the USA migugul pirotan yugwanchuktul , that negotiations be held to remove the dangers to security in the DMZ and on the Korean Peninsula. But the USA has never responded to this proposal. This being the situation, we put forth an epochal proposal in April 1994 to establish a new peace mechanism in place of the obsolete Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula and, based on this proposal, we withdrew the members of our side to the Military Armistice Commission to create a new systematic mechanism. Then we established the KPA Panmunjom Mission to fill the vacancy. Thanks to this, contacts could be held between generals of the DPRK and the USA. However, nothing was achieved and the contacts eventually ended in a rupture. As a result, there is today no military mechanism that can preserve the cease-fire on the Korean Peninsula and the situation is such that another war could break out at any time. Recently, the South Korean puppets have become even more frenzied in bringing military equipment and personnel into the DMZ. They are even openly building large military structures in areas only 100 metres away from the MDL. The South Korea puppets no longer bind themselves to the maintenance and management of the DMZ and the order of conduct agreed upon between the two sides. They are simply running amok irrationally. Thus no-one knows when the South Korean puppets will cock the launching mechanism against us namjoson koeroeduli kuonje urirul hyanghaeso kyokpalgirul tanggilchi nuga algesumnika . In circumstances in which it has become clearer that the puppets have decided on a real war and it is only a matter of time until they produce the sound of gunfire, it is understandable that we cannot just watch the development of the situation with folded arms, as if we were watching a fire across the river. We cannot indefinitely continue to stick to the bundle of invalid documents regarding the maintenance and management of the DMZ and continue to watch the development of the situation. As we have already declared, it is the nature of our People's Army and the firm will of our republic to answer fire with fire and a stick with a stick. No-one should ever doubt this. It is entirely because of the war maniacs of Kim Yong-sam in South Korea and the USA that the DMZ situation has become as grave as it is today. We don't like empty talk. We invariably do what we say we will do. The South Korean war maniacs will surely bear the responsibility for the situation in the DMZ, which has become as dangerous as it is today, and will pay the due price. Traitor Kim Yong-sam must examine his own behaviour before accusing anyone else. History has many examples of those traitors who suffered miserable fates by miscalculating the situation and recklessly running amok like fools who rush in where angels fear to tread. The destiny of the Kim Yong-sam war maniacs cannot be otherwise.

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 10, 1996, Wednesday "INTERNAL AFFAIRS; Kim Chong-il's election as defence chairman honoured by nation." (SOURCE: Sources:KCNA news agency, Pyongyang, in English 0333 gmt 10 Apr 96) Units of the Korean People's Army held rallies on 9th April to mark the third anniversary of the election of Kim Chong-il as chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, the North Korean news agency KCNA reported. The election of Kim as defence chairman "was a magnificent event which met the aspiration and wish of the Korean people and the officers and men of the People's Army to have their leader at the head of the national defence forces and follow him and a great historic event in further strengthening the defence capabilities of the country and victoriously advancing the Korean revolution" , the agency commented. "The great Comrade Kim Chong-il has strengthened the country's defence forces as firm as rock, regarding defence of the country as the most important of national affairs," the report continued. "No one on earth can match our people and People's Army advancing under his leadership." Meetings and performances were also held throughout North Korea to celebrate the anniversary, the North Korean news agency KCNA reported: "Performers put on the stage art pieces impressively showing the noble traits of the respected supreme commander Comrade Kim Chong-il and the invariable faith of the Korean people and the officers and men of the People's Army to accomplish the cause of the country's reunification and the chuche revolution without fail, firmly united around him."

International Herald Tribune April 10, 1996 "North Korea's DMZ Message Is a Mystery, U.S. Says." By Steven Erlanger U.S. officials, while playing down the threat posed by North Korea's sudden round of violations of the military armistice that keeps the peace between the two Koreas, say they are baffled by the message that Pyongyang is trying to send. They presume that North Korean troop movements inside the demilitarized zone are part of a continuing effort to undermine the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement and push the United States into bilateral peace negotiations with Pyongyang. Yet, they think the timing is symbolic, possibly aimed at the parliamentary elections Thursday in South Korea and a brief visit there planned for next week by President Bill Clinton. But without direct contact with the secretive Pyongyang government, relatively faceless after the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994 and the slow emergence of his successor and son, Kim Jong Il, American officials do not really know. "I think they're trying to coerce the United States to sit down with them and negotiate a peace treaty without Seoul, and we have no intention of doing that," a senior Pentagon official said. The good news, he and others said, was that after three nights of armed incursions, North Korean troops did not enter the demilitarized zone on Monday night, showing an encouraging degree of restraint and political control in a country with severe economic problems and food shortages. "But as to why they did it to begin with," the Pentagon official said, "we probably won't know that until we ask them." And asking them is problematic, he said, since the North Koreans no longer attend meetings at the DMZ and the last meeting between North Korean and American diplomats occurred late last year at an undisclosed location. In every meeting with Pyongyang officials, the United States has rejected any idea of peace talks with the North Koreans that would cut out Seoul, U.S. officials said. They emphasized that peace was a question primarily for the North and South Koreans to settle among themselves. While the United States can play "a supportive role," the officials said, the original Military Armistice Agreement was signed between Pyongyang and the United Nations, not the United States. That position was repeated Monday by the State Department spokesman, Glyn Davies, who urged the North Koreans to abide by the armistice agreement. Still, some officials suggest that Washington's willingness to negotiate directly with North Korea over its nuclear program in October 1994 gave some impetus to North Korea's efforts, which began that February, before Kim Il Sung's death was announced in July, to replace the 43-year-old agreement through talks between Pyongyang and Washington. The nuclear agreement promised future bilateral relations, including the establishment of interest sections, between Pyongyang and Washington Q but only after other commitments were met, U.S. officials emphasized, including constructive dialogue between North and South Korea, a message "repeated at every opportunity." But in December 1994, the Americans negotiated with Pyongyang again for the return of a helicopter pilot shot down over the DMZ. In each case, the South Koreans were kept informed, the Americans say. Last Thursday, North Korea announced that it would no longer honor the terms of the Military Armistice Agreement and North Korean troops stripped off their required armbands. On Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights they moved an increasing number of soldiers Q up to 300 Q into the demilitarized zone 30 miles north of Seoul, setting up offensive positions with mortars before leaving. The movements violated the armistice, which calls for no more than 35 soldiers and 5 officers to enter the demilitarized zone. At the same time, Pentagon officials said, there has been no North Korean military activity elsewhere that would indicate any imminent invasion or aggression. On Friday, the officials said, the first day of the incursions, there was no military ground or air movement in North Korea at all, which the Americans understood as a message not to overreact. And in what may be a reflection of North Korea's dire economic straits, the Pentagon officials said, the normal military training period of December to March was marked by "virtually no training that we could see." "April is a critical month for them and they don't have much to harvest, as we understand it, and we don't know what their food stocks are like," a Pentagon official said. Those concerns were articulated by Defense Secretary William J. Perry after a speech on Monday. He called the incursions "provocative" and added: "The second and broader concern is that the North Korea economy is in terrible shape now. And this is causing, as you can imagine, tremendous tensions and conflicts within the country. "We have a continuing concern that the government in North Korea might respond in some sort of an irrational way to the problem they see in trying to simply keep themselves, keep the regime, in power because of these great internal tensions," he added.

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 9, 1996, Tuesday "KIM CHONG-IL ANNIVERSARY; Military chief warns that army will 'annihilate' invaders." (Source: KCNA news agency, Pyongyang, in English 1110 gmt 9 Apr 96) Pyongyang, 9th April: A national rally was held at the 25th April House of Culture here today to mark the third anniversary of the election of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Chong-il as chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (9th April 1993). It was attended by Yi Chong-ok and Pak Song-chol, Politburo members of the Korean Workers'Party Central Committee and vice-presidents of the DPRK; Kim Pyong-sik, chairman of the Korean Social-Democratic Party Central Committee and vice-president of the DPRK; KPA Marshal Choe Kwang, Politburo member of the KWP Central Committee, vice- chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK and minister of the People's Armed Forces; and other senior officials of the party and the state; senior officials of party and government bodies and working people's organizations; anti-Japanese revolutionary veterans; soldiers of the Korean People's Army KPA ; and working people in the city. KPA Vice-Marshal Kim Kwang-chin, member of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, made a report titled "Our people and people's army will be ever-victorious under Great Leader" . The reporter said: With the respected Supreme Commander Comrade Kim Chong-il at the head of the self-reliant defence forces, the chuche revolution could reliably be guaranteed generation after generation, and our country and revolution and the cause of army building could have a bright prospect for eternal victory. Under the wise leadership and meticulous care of the great General Kim Chong-il, the military equipment of the KPA has become strengthened and modernized to suit the demands of modern warfare so that our revolutionary armed forces have grown into invincible combat units equipped with powerful means of attack and defence, able to defeat any formidable enemy at one stroke in any time and any place. Our militia forces including the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have grown to be so strong that in case of emergency, they can defeat the invaders and defend their worksites and villages independently as well as in cooperation with the People' s Army. The whole country has turned into an impregnable fortress. Our people and People's Army soldiers always feel reassured and are fully optimistic and confident that they can defeat any imperialist aggressors at one stroke as they are led by Comrade Kim Chong-il, an iron-willed brilliant commander who has turned our socialist country into a powerful state in terms of politics, ideology and military affairs with his great ideas and tested leadership, so that the dignity and prestige of Kim Il-sung's Korea and the Kim Il-sung nation are demonstrated all over the world. The reporter quoted Comrade Kim Chong-il as saying: "We must continue to strictly implement the party's self-reliant military line and increase the defence capabilities of the country with a high sense of pride and self-confidence. When the enemy dares mount an attack, we must fight in high spirits and demonstrate the invincible strength of the heroic Korean people all over the world once again." The reporter went on: The South Korean puppets have decided to start a real war and the ultra-rightist conservatives of the United States zealously encourage their reckless war preparations behind the scenes. Under this grim situation, it is only too natural that the People's Army should adopt a countermeasure. The mission of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK to safeguard the security of the country and the gains of the revolution is not confined to defence in face of aggression. The habit of the KPA is to counter fire with fire and stick with stick. The People's Army soldiers, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards, the Young Red Guards and all other people are sharply watching every movement of the enemy. If the US imperialists and the South Korean puppets intrude into our territory, our airspace and our waters even an inch, we will annihilate the invaders with a strong self-defensive measure and uproot the source of war on the Korean Peninsula. The US imperialists and their stooges must not mistake the firm, resolute position of our people and Revolutionary Armed Forces but act with discretion, mindful of the fatal consequences they will suffer from their anti-DPRK campaign and new war preparations. No matter how desperately the imperialists and all other reactionaries of history may try to spoil the red flag of our revolution, the banner of chuche socialism, our People's Army and people led by General Kim Chong-il, the brilliant commander of Mt Paektu type, will never hoist down the red flag of revolution in any adversity but will defeat the enemy, reunify the country and complete the chuche revolution at any cost.

Russian Press Digest April 9, 1996 "Pyongyang Puts Korean Peninsula On The Verge Of A New War." By Maksim Yusin (SOURCE: IZVESTIA, p.1) Commenting on North Korea's repeated recent violations of its post-war truce agreement with South Korea, IZVESTIA quotes high- ranking Russian Foreign Ministry officials, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Panov among others, as saying that North Korea is in for a military disaster should it start an armed conflict with South Korea. It was intimated that Moscow did not consider giving military aid to its former ally even as a theoretical possibility. Alexander Panov remarked in this connection that the Russian Foreign Ministry had expressed its deep concern over Pyongyang's desire to repeal the accords on the status of the demilitarized zone at the end of March. Russia admitted that the truce agreement was out of date but it would insist that North Korea comply with it "pending the drafting of new documents due to provide for security in the Peninsula." In the opinion of Russian diplomats, Pyongyang had plunged into a very dangerous gamble, though most experts agreed that it would hardly risk starting a direct aggression. By all appearances, the North Korean leaders wanted to force the United States into entering into direct talks with themselves bypassing the Seoul authorities. Yet another probable explanation was that North Korea was facing the prospects of famine on account of its crop failure last summer, with the authorities seeking to avoid a social explosion by conjuring up the external threat, says the paper in conclusion.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch April 9, 1996, Tuesday "NORTH KOREA MAY WANT PEACE DEAL; TROOP ACTION SEEKS TO FORCE U.S. HAND, OBSERVERS BELIEVE." By sending armed soldiers into the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea in violation of their armistice, North Korea appears to be trying, oddly, to achieve peace. At issue is a treaty that would finally and officially end the Korean W ar, 46 years after it began with a North Korean invasion of South Korea. North Korea wants a peace treaty with the United States, one that would cut South Korea out of the action. The United States would like one, too, but between the two Koreas. But North Korea refuses to negotiate with what it calls a puppet state, and has been badgering the United States to come to the bargaining table for two years. The United States has resolutely declined the invitation and is unlikely to change its position, reiterated Monday by Jim Coles, the chief U.S. military spokesman in Seoul. "The United States will not do anything that works to the detriment of the Republic of Korea. The U.S. government has stated many times that it will not conduct separate peace talks with Pyongyang." It's a position President Bill Clinton is sure to stress when he meets April 17 with President Kim Young-sam on the South Korean resort island of Cheju. Last month, North Korea said it would take "final steps" to prove that the armistice - which halted the fighting but didn't officially end the war - was ineffective and needed to be replaced by a permanent treaty. Then, Friday evening, North Korea sent about 130 heavily armed soldiers into the northern part of Panmunjom, the village straddling the demilitarized zone where the armistice was signed in 1953. They didn't stay long, marching out again about 2 1/2 hours later without incident. -Ruling Party Gets Lift- North Korea repeated the almost theatrical exercise Saturday and Sunday nights, stirring up concerns for national security in South Korea only days before its national legislative elections - concerns that the ruling conservative party is stressing in its closing campaign. But while it appeared that North Korea would continue the stunt over the next several days, if not weeks, no incursions took place Monday. North Korea accused South Korea of being the first to violate the armistice by illegally introducing men, tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons into the buffer zone - a charge South Korea denied. North Korea contended that it was acting defensively. But aside from the nightly incidents at Panmunjom, there was no sign of increased military activity on the northern side of the 151-mile-long demilitarized zone. So if the North Korean exercises aren't truly defensive, what are they? North Korea's "main intention undoubtedly is to sign a peace treaty with the United States," Park Young-kyu, a senior analyst at the Research Institute for National Unification, a South Korean government think tank, said Monday. -Diversion Tactic- But Park said North Korea also may be trying to divert attention from its domestic problems, including a severe food shortage aggravated by devastating floods last year that ruined thousands of acres of cropland and left 500, 000 people homeless. Other observers suggested that North Korea might be trying to strengthen its bargaining position in advance of talks April 19-20 with the United States in Berlin on the questions of North Korea's development of long-range missiles and its arms shipments to the Middle East. The United States wants both halted.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch April 9, 1996, Tuesday "SHORTAGES MAY TOPPLE N. KOREA; TROOP DISPATCH PROMPTS FEAR OF LAST-GASP INVASION." Worsening food and fuel shortages in North Korea could cause the collapse of one of the world's last communist regimes, U.S. officials said Monday. Although U.S. intelligence officials are reluctant to predict that the North Korean government is on the verge of crumbling, U.S. military planners say collapse is likely in the coming months. The temporary dispatch of North Korean soldiers inside the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas three times over the weekend has revived concerns that North Korea could launch an invasion as a last gasp of political control. On Monday, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry condemned the movement of North Korean soldiers into the DMZ, which was established in 1953 at the end of the Korean War. Now 37,000 U.S. soldiers are in South Korea to support its armed forces. "We have continual concern that the government in North Korea might respond in some sort of an irrational way," Perry said. The North Koreans did not return to the DMZ Monday. But on three con secutive days, about 180 or more North Korean soldiers with machine guns and mortars took up positions in Panmunjom in the DMZ. U.S. officials viewed the military action as aimed at South Korea. Diplomats representing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il have sought to have the United States, Russia and China seek concessions from South Korea to help ease shortages of food and fuel in North Korea. But South Korea, with national legislative elections scheduled later this week, has taken a hard line toward North Korea. "Some in South Korea are against any rescues for North Korea, " a senior U.S. official said. South Korean officials "want to step back and let the government of North Korea fall." In response to South Korea's hard line, North Korea has moved combat aircraft closer to the DMZ, joining 1 million North Korean soldiers based there and primed to attack South Korea on short notice. But instead of an invasion, U.S. officials say a more likely scenario is an internal collapse of political control in North Korea with thousands fleeing the country for food. "The consensus today is that there will be an implosion inside North Korea, not an explosion with a military offensive," a senior Pentagon official said. Recent aerial reconnaissance has shown hillsides stripped of trees and bushes. Towns and villages are without electricity, and most of the population of 24 million have only clothes and bedding to keep warm. Treeless fields suffered widespread erosion from last summer's floods, which destroyed crops, another in a series of agricultural disasters in North Korea. And Russia has abandoned its role as a financial patron of the communist government. "People are starving, and the problem is getting worse every day," said one senior Pentagon official. "Attempts to provide famine relief are not working, so things are getting out of control." Deaths from starvation, particularly among children and the elderly, are increasing; panic is spreading among the population. North Korea's appeals for food supplies have failed to produce adequate quantities. An estimated 3 million metric tons are needed, according to international relief agencies. So far, only a small fraction of that has arrived at North Korean ports. Part of North Korea's problem is continued spending on its military forces. A third of North Korea's shrinking cash supply is spent on military personnel, tanks and combat aircraft, according to Pentagon officials. The plight of North Korea will be on President Bill Clinton's agenda in meetings in South Korea next week. Perry also will be visiting Seoul and meeting with military commanders.

Reuters World Service April 9, 1996, Tuesday "Russian officials head to Korea." By Alastair Macdonald Russia sent a senior diplomat to North Korea on Tuesday in a bid to prevent Moscow's communist former ally provoking an armed conflict with its southern neighbour. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Panov, a leading Far East specialist, told Interfax news agency he would sound out Pyongyang on a Russian suggestion of an international conference to build up trust on the divided peninsula. Panov, who said a conference was the "very best option," did not rule out "armed incidents" after Pyongyang breached the ceasefire that ended the 1950-53 Korean War by sending troops into the demilitarised zone between the two Koreas. "But we hope that it won't come to that," Panov said, recalling that in 1993 Moscow had unilaterally scrapped the section of a Soviet- era treaty with Pyongyang that bound it to come to North Korea's aid automatically in the event of war. Russia's Izvestia newspaper said on Tuesday Foreign Ministry sources had clearly indicated that "the idea of giving military aid to yesterday's ally was not being considered, even theoretically, in Moscow." "We ourselves...will decide whether or not to take part in a conflict on the side of North Korea if it suffers an unprovoked attack," Panov said. Itar-Tass news agency quoted Panov as saying he would be seeking a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. "We would want such meeting to take place," Panov told Tass. Apart from Panov another top Moscow official, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Ignatenko, was also expected to fly to Pyongyang late on Tuesday to take part in a two-day session of a joint committee on trade and economic cooperation, Tass said. The Soviet Union, which occupied the northern part of the Korean peninsula at the end of World War Two, supported the North's communist leadership when it invaded U.S.-allied South Korea in 1950. But relations cooled after the communists lost power in Moscow and President Boris Yeltsin has sought investment from economically booming South Korea. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a news briefing on Tuesday that Russia felt "a certain unease" over the incursions by North Korean troops into the buffer zone. "We consider the decision of the DPRK ( North Korea) to relieve itself of the obligation to maintain the status of the Demilitarized Zone is a step toward the dismantling of the security system in the peninsula," Demurin said. Russia has called on North Korea to show restraint and urged a negotiated settlement of its differences with Seoul. Izvestia said the foreign ministry believed the authorities in Pyongyang had embarked on "an extremely dangerous game." "If Pyongyang goes ahead all the same and pushes the matter into a conflict with Seoul and Washington, then, the foreign ministry believes, the DPRK is in for a military disaster," the paper added.

The Washington Post April 09, 1996, Tuesday "For 500 U.N. Troops, the DMZ Is Home; Americans, S. Koreans Brave Razor Wire, Land Mines As Human 'Speed Bump' in Case of N. Korean Attack." By Kevin Sullivan No one knows the danger of North Korea's recent military provocations better than the 500 U.N. soldiers stationed here at this country's northernmost military base. The 230 American and 270 South Korean soldiers live just 440 yards south of the Demilitarized Zone in a cluster of low buildings surrounded by double and triple coils of razor wire, fields of land mines and machine-gun bunkers reinforced with sandbags. The North Korean threat is as close as their skin. In a North Korean invasion, they would be the first obstacle on the only road to Seoul. "Hell, we're just a speed bump up here," said one soldier, using gallows humor to describe the base's location in the path of the 1.1-million-man North Korean army. Newcomers to the camp must learn to sleep at night with communist propaganda blaring at them from loudspeakers three stories high, just over the ridge. The camp's tiny, one-hole golf course, surrounded on three sides by mine fields, is known as "the world's most dangerous golf hole." The camp motto is "In front of them all." For the past three nights, the North Koreans have ratcheted up the tension even higher. Leaders in Pyongyang announced that they would no longer abide by the DMZ rules that have been in place since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, which allow only a few lightly armed soldiers from each side in the DMZ. Each night since Friday, hundreds of North Korean troops have conducted military exercises in the DMZ, hauling in machine guns and mortars and pointing them southward. Today South Korea threatened to shoot any North Korean troops crossing the border that runs down the middle of the DMZ, according to Seoul's Yonhap news agency. "I think there is more tension than there was a week ago," said U.S. Army Capt. John R. Toth, 28, of suburban Pittsburgh, a spokesman for the U.N. troops at Camp Bonifas. "At the same time, I have not seen soldiers breaking down, or soldiers worrying, or not being able to do their jobs. It's just something we're prepared to handle." U.S. officials have minimized the seriousness of North Korea's recent actions. They say the North Koreans are merely trying to alarm Washington into opening a more direct relationship with Pyongyang to improve its international stature and to annoy South Korea. At bases just south of Camp Bonifas, soldiers in gray U.S. Army- issue shorts and T-shirts played soccer and volleyball and tossed a football around. Buses carrying tourists still visited the area, and there were few signs of heightened security. Several soldiers at Camp Bonifas said they had been ordered not to discuss the situation. But they acknowledged the camp is uneasy. "Everybody is a little more stressed than usual, but we try to keep it as smooth as possible," one said. "But you never know what could happen, and that's the hard part." East "Germany is gone, so this is about as real as it gets," said another. "We've still got two countries who don't like each other, and we've got to play referee." Thirty miles to the south, in Seoul, South Korean President Kim Young Sam continued blasting the North Korean moves as "reckless provocations." Kim met again today with his military leaders to urge them to be ready to "repel any provocation." Today, North Korea offered its first statements on its recent actions, although they fell short of a full explanation. The official state news agency said South Korea was preparing to invade the North, and that Seoul was being "manipulated by bellicose quarters in the United States. "The South Korean puppets must know that if they regard the North's warning as empty talk and display war hysterics, they will face an irrevocable disaster," the agency said, adding cryptically, "Repentance always comes late." The DMZ splits the Korean peninsula for 151 miles from coast to coast. If the North Koreans invaded, they would have to cross two electrified fences topped with razor wire, a minefield and a huge concrete antitank wall, plus 650,000 South Korean troops and 37,000 U.S. soldiers. The danger is palpable. More than 50 Americans and 1,000 South Koreans have died here in clashes since the 1953 cease-fire that ended the Korean War. In perhaps the most notorious incident, two U.S. servicemen attempting to trim a tree near a security outpost were killed when dozens of North Korean soldiers crossed into U.N. territory and mauled them with axes. Those axes are still on display in the North Korean Peace Museum, which is visible to tourists who look into North Korean territory from Panmunjom, the "truce village" where North Korean and U.N. officials meet. The DMZ is also home to a fair amount of silliness. On the hillsides visible from U.N. guard posts, the North Koreans have erected huge, propagandistic signs in Korean. They say, "Anti- American," "Yankee Go Home" and "self-reliance," the North Korean motto. Another says, "We have the best president," although North Korea currently has no president. Although Kim Jong Il is in charge, he has not formally assumed the title of president from his father, Kim Il Sung, who died nearly two years ago. The North's propaganda loudspeakers blast music and speeches six to 12 hours a day. The U.N. soldiers respond with their own brand of propaganda, blasting Hootie and the Blowfish or Pink Floyd into the MTV-less North. At Panmunjom, U.N. and North Korean officials meet in a series of simple one-story buildings that straddle the military line between the two countries. Inside the buildings, microphone cords running down the middle of the conference tables serve as the international boundary. Tourists are allowed to visit these buildings with military escorts. Whenever a group of tourists shows up, North Korean soldiers in olive-green uniforms stand outside, inches from the windows. Some glare; some smile and try to get the visitors' attention; some take pictures. The antics of the North Korean soldiers can seem childish, but they are powerful for some. A South Korean woman visiting the building recently began sobbing in fear and hid behind U.N. soldiers when the North Korean soldiers came close to the window. There are two villages in the DMZ, Taesongdong in the South and Kijongdong in the North. About 240 people live and work in Taesongdong, while Kijongdong is, according to U.N. officials, nothing more than a collection of empty buildings designed to give the impression that North Korea is modern and thriving. The two villages are most notable for their flagpoles. The pole in Taesongdong is 328 feet tall and towers over everything else in the DMZ -- except the 525-foot pole in Kijongdong, which is almost as tall as the Washington Monument. The two sides built and rebuilt their poles for years, refusing to allow the other's to be taller. But South Korea eventually gave up in the face of North Korean persistence and one simple truth: Nobody does propaganda like the Communists. At Camp Bonifas, the young U.S. and South Korean soldiers endure the danger and the slapstick without complaint. Still, U.S. Army helicopter pilot Walker W. Scott said he wasn't going to miss the DMZ. "I got 18 days left here," he said, "then I'm going home to my wife."

The Independent April 8, 1996, Monday "N. Korea mounts new troop incursion." By Richard Lloyd Parry For the third time in three days, armed North Korean troops yesterday entered the demilitarised zone (DMZ) which divides the North and South. The incident violated the increasingly hollow Armistice Agreement, and increased friction at the beginning of what will be an unusually tense week. Just after 8pm on Sunday evening, about 300 soldiers of the North's Korean People's Army (KPA) drove into the 800-yard wide Joint Security Area (JSA), the only crossing point on the heavily fortified border, which remains the last Cold War flashpoint in the world. Similar incursions occurred on Friday and Saturday when as many as 260 soldiers, armed with rifles and machine guns, arrived in army trucks to take up battle positions and install mortars on the North Korean side. Under the 1953 Armistice Agreement between Pyongyang and the United Nations, which brought to an end the Korean War, a maximum of 35 military police from either side are allowed into the JSA, armed with nothing larger than hand guns. Last Thursday, in a move that had been anticipated for several weeks, Pyongyang renounced its "duty" in the area, and said that its forces would no longer bear the required special insignia. The announcement was accompanied by bellicose rhetoric from both North and South; in the latter, fiercely fought elections to the National Assembly will be held next week. American forces in South Korea went on the highest military watch alert in 15 years. But, far from being a prelude to invasion and war, Pyongyang's strategy appears, by many reckonings, to be aimed at a peace treaty. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea's industrial and agricultural output, infrastructure and economic growth have rusted almost to a standstill. Structurally, many of the components of a prospering economy are in place; crucially, what Pyongyang lacks is foreign investment. For five years, it has pinned its hopes for national survival on the greatest geo-political prize of all: a peace treaty with the US. In seeking this, it has few tools at its disposal. On paper at least, the KPA is an alarming adversary: its million troops, supported by chemical, and perhaps nuclear, warheads outnumber the 650,000- strong South Korean army and its 37,000 American allies. But technologically, the KPA is a period piece. Much of its equipment is pre-war, fuel is scarce, and it has ranged against it the same potential force unleashed in the Gulf War. If Pyongyang chose to mobilise fully, it could certainly inflict horrible casualties on the South and its allies; it could also initiate lesser hostilities, from acts of terrorism to a limited invasion, in an attempt to force concessions. But it would be a potentially suicidal strategy. An all- out war would in the long-term be the one strategy guaranteed to bring down the North Korean government. Its only other bargaining chip is the Armistice and, for five years, Pyongyang has been slowly whittling it away. In 1991 it suspended meetings of the supervisory Military Armistice Commission. Two years later, it expelled from its side of the DMZ neutral observers from Czechoslovakia, soon followed by the Polish delegation. Last month, North Korea diplomats began to speak of "final and decisive" steps towards annulling the Armistice, unless Washington agreed to talks. Last week's announcement, and the sabre- rattling over the weekend are the fulfilment of this promise. Its chances of success do not appear high. South Korea is terrified of being excluded from a treaty. The Americans, publicly at least, insist that they are not interested, and that the Korean Cold War must be brought to an end by the Koreans themselves. The closest things to concessions, ironically, are coming from Pyongyang: recently it began hinting that, even after a treaty, it could tolerate a certain number of US troops on the peninsula. If the rebuffs continue, the North will be left with fewer and fewer options and most of those that remain do not bear thinking about.

Reuters April 8, 1996 "U.S. sees no imminent attack by North Korea." By Gene Gibbons The United States sees no imminent threat North Korea will invade the South despite incursions by troops from the North into the Demilitarized Zone that separates them, the White House said Monday. White House spokesman Mike McCurry said President Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young-sam will discuss tensions on the peninsula at a meeting in the South Korean coastal city of Cheju next Tuesday. Asked if recent North Korean incursions into the DMZ were a prelude to war, McCurry said: "We haven't seen anything that indicates an offensive buildup that implies hostilities of that nature." McCurry seemed to discount the incursions ahead of South Korea parliamentary elections this month as a new gambit by Pyongyang in a war of nerves with Seoul. Defense Secretary William Perry said combined U.S. and South Korean military power would deter any such attack but that Washington was still worried about any irrational move by the North because of its "terrible" economic situation. The State Department also expressed concern and called on North Korea to resume its commitments under the 1953 Korean armistice agreement, which Pyongyang said last week it would no longer honor, and avoid provocative actions. North Korea Sunday sent more than 300 soldiers into the DMZ in the biggest of three incursions in as many days. The U.S.-led United Nations Command described the latest intrusion as a "significant violation" of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War but said there was no cause for alarm. Perry, responding to questions after a speech at Howard University in Washington, called the incursions "a provocative political action" and added: "The second and the broader concern is that the North Korea economy is in terrible shape now. It is so bad that there is really not enough food distributed to feed all the people. And this is causing, as you can imagine, tremendous tensions and conflicts within the country. "We have a continuing concern that the government in North Korea might respond in some sort of an irrational way to the problem they see in trying to simply keep themselves, keep the regime in power because of these great internal tensions." But Perry said he was confident the U.S.-South Korean policy of maintaining very strong forces "will continue to be sufficient to deter any war on the Korean peninsula." "There have been months and months of disagreements about the nature of the armistice and that's why the United States has continued to encourage peaceful discussions between the North and South to resolve issues related to the security of the peninsula," McCurry said at the White House. "The current status of forces along the DMZ will no doubt be a subject that the president will review with President Kim," he added. At the State Department, spokesman Glyn Davies called the North Korean violations "a cause for concern," telling reporters, "We believe that for more than 43 years ... the Military Armistice Agreement has helped to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. And we believe further that ... the North Koreans should abide by their responsibilities under the armistice and avoid provocative action." Davies ruled out direct U.S. negotiations with Pyongyang on a peace treaty to bring the war to a formal end and said it was up to the two Koreas to work out a reconciliation.

Reuters April 8, 1996 "N.Korea resumes DMZ warnings, blames South, U.S." North Korea on Monday broke a nearly two-day silence over heightened tension in the Korean Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), again blaming the crisis on South Korea and adding "bellicose quarters of the United States" to its list of troublemakers. A commentary in the communist party newspaper Rodong Sinmun said South Korea faced an "irrevocable disaster" if it ignored Pyongyang's warning against what it said were Seoul's war preparations to invade North Korea. It was North Korea's first statement since Saturday night on a crisis set off by Pyongyang's decision last week to no longer honour its obligations under the armistice which ended the 1950-1953 Korean War, including duties in the DMZ. "The South Korean puppets must know that if they regard the North's warning as empty talk and display war hysterics, they will face an irrevocable disaster. Repentance always comes late," said the Rodong Sinmun article, carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) monitored in Tokyo. "It goes without saying that their reckless war preparations are manipulated by the bellicose quarters of the United States," the article added. North Korea on Sunday sent about 180 soldiers into the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, the only crossing point in the DMZ dividing the Korean peninsula. It was the third incursion in as many days. In Seoul, South Korean President Kim Young-sam told military leaders on Monday that "reckless provocations" from North Korea would not be tolerated, a presidential spokesman said. Analysts in Seoul and Tokyo said North Korea's almost theatrical incursions into Panmunjom at night appeared to be more diplomatic than military and aimed at pressing Washington to agree to military talks with Pyongyang. Pyongyang has long wanted to wash its hands completely of the truce agreement and sign a peace treaty with Washington, bypassing the Seoul government, which it calls a U.S. "puppet." "The Korean peninsula is in the worst situation due to the dangerous military activities of South Korea that can be seen on the eve of war. The situation compelled the North to take a self-defensive measure," Rodong Sinmun said in explaining the North's DMZ actions. "It is our unshakable position and principle to make no concession in the matters relating to our sovereignty and dignity. We, too, have the right to choose. The South Korean puppets had better act with discretion," the commentary concluded.

Reuters World Service April 7, 1996, Sunday "Seoul on alert as Pyongyang defies truce." By Moon Ihlwan South Korean President Kim Young-sam ordered "iron-tight" defence on Saturday after 120 North Korean soldiers with heavy weapons marched into the Demilitarised Zone to shatter a truce agreement. A North Korean newspaper accused Seoul of preparing an invasion and said Korea was on the "eve of war." As U.S. and South Korean forces went on the highest alert for 15 years, Kim called a meeting of security chiefs and ministers to discuss Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from an armistice agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War. "As North Korea has recently overtly threatened provocation, we should have heightened, iron-tight defence," a presidential spokesman quoted Kim as telling the meeting. A spokesman for the United Nations Command, which oversees the truce, said North Korea deployed troops and weapons in the most sensitive area of the buffer zone late on Friday. Jim Coles said the weapons, including 82-mm recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and light and heavy machine-guns, were brought into the small Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, the only crossing point between the two Koreas. The weapons were withdrawn after about two hours, he said. "About 120 North Korean soldiers appeared to be involved in illegal action on the North Korean side of the Joint Security Area," Coles said. Under the truce accord only 35 military police from each side are allowed to enter the security area, where only side arms are permitted. A South Korean government statement said the security meeting discussed countermeasures to the North Korean move, announced on Thursday, to give up its duties in the Demilitarised Zone under the armistice accord. Pyongyang said at the time its soldiers and vehicles entering the four km (2.5 mile) zone would no longer bear the insignia demanded by the truce agreement. Kim said Pyongyang's decision was a dangerous development. "A series of recent moves made by North Korea represented a deliberate act of provocation that, unlike any provocative moves in the past, stem from the North's elaborate and long-term scheme," the statement quoted him saying. North Korea's Minju Joson daily defended the withdrawal from the truce pact as a "legitimate countermeasure." "Kim Young-sam's group have ceaselessly staged military exercises against the North and turned the southern portion of the demilitarised zone...into a militarised zone and a starting position for invasion of the North," the paper said in a report carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. "It is self-evident that our people and People's Army cannot remain an onlooker to the situation that can be seen on the eve of war and cannot but take a countermeasure." "We do not make empty talk but carry into practice what we have said once. If the South Korean puppets ignite a war, we will deal an annihilating blow to them," the paper said. A U.N. command official said North Korea had refused a meeting to discuss the incursion. U.S. ambassador to Seoul James Laney met foreign minister Gong Ro- myung to express concern over the incursion of North Korean troops, Yonhap news agency reported. Gong and Laney reaffirmed Seoul and Washington would maintain a "strong allied defence readiness against North Korea, " Yonhap said. A foreign ministry official said U.S. President Bill Clinton, scheduled to make a brief stopover in South Korea on April 16 on his way to Tokyo, was expected to reaffirm Washington's defence commitments. The U.S. maintains 37,000 troops in South Korea to back the country's 650,000-strong forces. North Korea has more than one million troops facing the South. A North Korean official at the United Nations office in New York told Japan's Kyodo news agency that Pyongyang's withdrawal from the armistice was aimed at replacing it with a peace treaty and was not a sign of war. Pyongyang has long demanded a bilateral peace accord with the United States, shutting out Seoul.

Reuters April 6, 1996 "U.S. takes low-key approach to Korea tensions." Despite two incursions by North Korean troops into the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea and a growing war of words between the two foes, U.S. officials Saturday were taking a low-key approach to the increasing tensions. The Clinton administration appeared to regard the developments as troubling but not cause for alarm. The second intrusion into the DMZ Saturday brought no new response from the United States. The Defense Department's position remained the same as when it announced stepped-up surveillance after the first incursion, a Pentagon spokesman said. "That still stands," he added. About 260 heavily armed North Korean soldiers entered the sensitive buffer zone- designed to discourage military confrontation- and remained there for several hours before withdrawing. On Friday 120 North Koreans marched into the DMZ to shatter a truce agreement in force since the 1950-53 Korean War and stayed two hours. The State Department allowed that the incursions were not unprecedented, but also noted they were a violation of the joint security area. The action reflected North Korea's efforts to distance itself from the Korean war armistice, a spokesman said. "It appears to us to be another step in the campaign of the North Koreans to dismantle the longstanding military armistice agreement," he added. In 1994 North Korea withdrew from the military armistice commission that oversees the truce and banned United Nations monitors from entering its territory at the border crossing on Panmunjom. Pyongyang has demanded a bilateral peace accord with the United States, shutting out Seoul. Washington has backed South Korea's stand that a peace treaty should chiefly be an inter-Korean affair, with only supporting roles for China and the United States, the two major outside forces that took part in the Korean War. The South Korean government has expressed outrage at the incursions from the North, calling the actions a deliberate provocation and putting its forces on the highest alert in 15 years. In turn a North Korean newspaper has accused the South of preparing for an invasion. The growing tension between the two Koreas comes less than two weeks before President Clinton is due to make a brief stop in South Korea for talks with President Kim Young-sam before continuing to Japan for a state visit. Heading his agenda for the April 16 meeting on the resort island of Cheju would be Pacific rim security and North Korea, officials said. The United States has a formidable military presence in the area, maintaining 37,000 troops in South Korea as a deterrent to aggression from the North.

Japan Economic Newswire April 5, 1996 "S. Korean military upgrades alert posture." South Korea has upgraded its intelligence alert status from the third to the second highest level on its four-scale system, the Defense Ministry said Friday. The upgrade followed North Korea's announcement Thursday that it will no longer observe its obligations under the 1953 Armistice Agreement to maintain and control the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. It is the first time in 15 years the alert status has been raised to the second highest alert level. The last time there was the second highest alert level was in February 1981 when North Korea moved its bombers close to the border and conducted a drill. The 4-kilometer demilitarized zone, a key element of the truce agreement, is a buffer designed to discourage military confrontation. The Defense Ministry said it would maintain the overall defense status at the current level and the raising of the intelligence alert status is designed to step up information-collection activities against the North Korean military. It described the latest North Korean announcement as aimed at abandoning the truce agreement and different from past ones aimed at invalidating it. The ministry said it expects the North to prepare an excuse to gradually expand military provocations given its claim that war with the south is inevitable. At Panmunjom, North Korean guards engaged in their duties Friday without wearing an armband as required under the truce pact, the ministry said.

Agence France Presse April 04, 1996 04:12 GMT "Text of North Korean statement on armistice and DMZ." Text of North Korea's statement on the Demilitarized Zone, given by an official spokesman and carried Thursday by its official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA): "The first vice minister of the People's Armed Forces, in his March 29 statement, made clear that the KPA would take legitimate self- defensive steps to cope with ill-boding military moves which had become frequent in areas south of the military demarcation line (MDL), reminding one of the situation on the brink of war. We put forward reasonable proposals long ago to turn the DMZ into a peace zone, a buffer zone and prevent a war in the Korean peninsula, and have exerted patient efforts to put them into effect. However, the South Korean authorities have persistently rejected our proposals and driven the situation to the brink of war under the protection of their master, the United States, so that we can no longer expect a negotiated solution. The armistice agreement stipulates that heavy and automatic weapons shall not be brought into the DMZ and in no case shall the total number of military personnel from each side who are permitted to enter the DMZ exceed 1,000. But the South Korean military authorities, ignoring the agreement, have brought many tanks, various kinds of artillery pieces and heavy weapons into the DMZ and deployed a large number of armed military personnel. They have even openly built large military facilities at the Oryonggye post in the DMZ only 100 metres from the MDL. Areas south of the MDL have been left without the real meaning of a buffer zone and the DMZ established under the armistice agreement has turned into an armed zone and a new attack position for the invasion of the north. This situation has made us no longer unilaterally observe articles of the armistice agreement concerning the DMZ. There is a limit to our restraint and patience. The Panmunjom mission of the KPA is authorized to announce that following immediate self-defensive measures will be taken now that the status of DMZ cannot be maintained any longer: Firstly, the KPA side shall give up its duty, under the armistice agreement, concerning the maintenance and control of the military demarcation line and DMZ. Secondly, the KPA side shall, as a follow-up step to the first measure, have its personnel and vehicles bear no distinctive insignia and marking when they enter the joint security area of Panmunjom and the DMZ. The responsibility for the measures we cannot but take lies with those who have flagrantly violated the armistice agreement and the order in the DMZ.

------------------------------------------------------------------ Recent quotes from U.S. officials in response to N. Korea pulling- out of the Korean War Armistice and carrying-out three subsequent DMZ border intrusions with hundreds of heavily armed troops: "We haven't seen anything that indicates an offensive buildup that implies hostilities." (Mike McCurry, White House Press Secretary) "There is not going to be a second Korean War because of this." (Jim Coles, Command Spokesman for U.S. Forces in S. Korea) ------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "Defense Official Says Soldiers from North Dug Trenches in DMZ." April 10th, 1996 North Korean troops built two covered communication trenches in the northern sector of the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom between Friday and Sunday, a Defense Ministry official said yesterday. One of the trenches, presumed to be 1 meter deep and 400 meters long, was built between the North Korean guard posts No.1 and No. 2 in the east of the North Korea-controlled section of the JSA, the official said. The other was built near North Korea's guard post No. 5 in the west of the JSA, said the official. The trenches are believed to have been built between Friday and Sunday when more than 200 armed North Korean soldiers with heavy weapons entered the JSA and stayed to prepare fighting positions, the ministry official said. The official also said that as many as 250 armed North Korean soldiers entered the JSA Friday, contrary to an initial estimate of 130. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "PYONYANG URGES YOUNG MEN TO ENLIST IN THE ARMY." Pyongyang Broadcasting reported in an emergency news broadcast at 11 p.m. on April 7 that the North Korean government held a rally urging young male students in Pyongyang to enlist in the army. This was the first time North Korea had broadcast an emergency news report after the 10 p.m. final evening news since reporting Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty(NPT) in March of 1993. According to South Korea's Naewoe News Agency, Pyongyang Broadcasting reported that an 'enlistment rally' was held on the same day on the grounds of the Victory Commemorative Tower with Kang Hyun-soo, the head of Labor Party in Pyongyang City, and war veterans in attendance. Pyongyang Broadcasting also reported that the rally participants were told that "an atmosphere for an immediate break-out of a new war reigns on the Korean peninsula' and urged the nation's male students and workers to enlist in the army. (Articles For Fair Use Only)

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